Lord Elgin - Sir John George Bourinot (distant reading .txt) 📗

the concession of constitutional government has a tendency to draw the colonists" towards England and not towards republicanism; "firstly, because it slakes that thirst for self-government which seizes on all British communities when they approach maturity; and secondly because it habituates the colonists to the working of a political mechanism which is both intrinsically superior to that of the Americans, and more unlike it than our old colonial system." In short, he felt very strongly that "when a people have been once thoroughly accustomed to the working of such a parliamentary system as ours they never will consent to resort to this irresponsible mechanism."

Since these significant words were written half a century ago, Canadians have been steadily working out the principles of parliamentary government as understood and explained by Lord Elgin, and have had abundant opportunities of contrasting their experiences with those of their neighbours under a system in many respects the very reverse of that which has enabled Canada to attain so large a measure of political freedom and build up such prosperous communities to the north of the republic, while still remaining in the closest possible touch with the imperial state. I propose now to close this book with some comparisons between the respective systems of the two countries, and to show that in this respect as in others Lord Elgin proved how deep was his insight into the working of political institutions, and how thoroughly he had mastered the problem of the best methods of administering the government of a great colonial dependency, not solely with a regard to its own domestic interests but with a view of maintaining the connection with the British Crown, of which he was so discreet and able a servant.

It is especially important to Canadians to study the development of the institutions of the United States, with the view of deriving benefit from their useful experiences, and avoiding the defects that have grown up under their system. All institutions are more or less on trial in a country like Canada, which is working out great problems of political science under decided advantages, since the ground is relatively new, and the people have before them all the experiences of the world, especially of England and the United States, in whose systems Canadians have naturally the deepest interest. The history of responsible government affords another illustration of a truth which stands out clear in the history of nations, that those constitutions which are of a flexible character, the natural growth of the experiences of centuries, and which have been created by the necessities and conditions of the times, possess the elements of real stability, and best ensure the prosperity of a people. The great source of the strength of the institutions of the United States lies in the fact that they have worked out their government in accordance with certain principles, which are essentially English in their origin, and have been naturally developed since their foundation as colonial settlements, and whatever weaknesses their system shows have chiefly arisen from new methods, and from the rigidity of their constitutional rules of law, which separate too sharply the executive and the legislative branches of government. Like their neighbours the Canadian people have based their system on English principles, but they have at the same time been able to keep pace with the progress of the unwritten constitution of England, to adapt it to their own political conditions, and to bring the executive and legislative authorities to assist and harmonize with one another.

Each country has its "cabinet council," but the one is essentially different from the other in its character and functions. This term, the historical student will remember, was first used in the days of the Stuarts as one of derision and obloquy. It was frequently called "junto" or "cabal," and during the days of conflict between the commons and the king it was regarded with great disfavour by the parliament of England. Its unpopularity arose from the fact that it did not consist of men in whom parliament had confidence, and its proceedings were conducted with so much secrecy that it was impossible to decide upon whom to fix responsibility for any obnoxious measure. When the constitution of England was brought back to its original principles, and harmony was restored between the Crown and the parliament, the cabinet became no longer a term of reproach, but a position therein was regarded as the highest honour in the country, and was associated with the efficient administration of public affairs, since it meant a body of men responsible to parliament for every act of government.[29] The old executive councils of Canada were obnoxious to the people for the same reason that the councils of the Stuarts, and even of George III, with the exception of the régime of the two Pitts, became unpopular. Not only do we in Canada, in accordance with our desire to perpetuate the names of English institutions use the name "cabinet" which was applied to an institution that gradually grew out of the old privy council of England, but we have even incorporated in our fundamental law the older name of "privy council," which itself sprang from the original "permanent" or "continual" council of the Norman kings. Following English precedent, the Canadian cabinet or ministry is formed out of the privy councillors, chosen under the law by the governor-general, and when they retire from office they still retain the purely honorary distinction. In the United States the use of the term "cabinet" has none of the significance it has with us, and if it can be compared at all to any English institutions it might be to the old cabinets who acknowledged responsibility to the king, and were only so many heads of departments in the king's government. As a matter of fact the comparison would be closer if we said that the administration resembles the cabinets of the old French kings, or to quote Professor Bryce, "the group of ministers who surround the Czar or the Sultan, or who executed the bidding of a Roman emperor like Constantine or Justinian." Such ministers like the old executive councils of Canada, "are severally responsible to their master, and are severally called in to counsel him, but they have not necessarily any relations with one another, nor any duty or collective action." Not only is the administration conducted on the principle of responsibility to the president alone, in this respect the English king in old irresponsible days, but the legislative department is itself constructed after the English model as it existed a century ago, and a general system of government is established, lacking in that unity and elasticity which are essential to its effective working. On the other hand the Canadian cabinet is the cabinet of the English system of modern times and is formed so as to work in harmony with the legislative department, which is a copy, so far as possible, of the English legislature.

The special advantages of the Canadian or English system of parliamentary government, compared with congressional government, may be briefly summed up as follows:--

(1) The governor-general, his cabinet, and the popular branch of the legislature are governed in Canada, as in England, by a system of rules, conventions and understandings which enable them to work in harmony with one another. The Crown, the cabinet, the legislature, and the people, have respectively certain rights and powers which, when properly and constitutionally brought into operation, give strength and elasticity to our system of government. Dismissal of a ministry by the Crown under conditions of gravity, or resignation of a ministry defeated in the popular House, bring into play the prerogatives of the Crown. In all cases there must be a ministry to advise the Crown, assume responsibility for its acts, and obtain the support of the people and their representatives in parliament. As a last resort to bring into harmony the people, the legislature, and the Crown, there is the exercise of the supreme prerogative of dissolution. A governor, acting always under the advice of responsible ministers, may, at any time, generally speaking, grant an appeal to the people to test their opinion on vital public questions and bring the legislature into accord with the public mind. In short, the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty lies at the very basis of the Canadian system.

On the other hand, in the United States, the president and his cabinet may be in constant conflict with the two Houses of Congress during the four years of his term of office. His cabinet has no direct influence with the legislative bodies, inasmuch as they have no seats therein. The political complexion of Congress does not affect their tenure of office, since they depend only on the favour and approval of the executive; dissolution, which is the safety valve of the English or Canadian system--"in its essence an appeal from the legal to the political sovereign"--is not practicable under the United States constitution. In a political crisis the constitution provides no adequate solution of the difficulty during the presidential term. In this respect the people of the United States are not sovereign as they are in Canada under the conditions just briefly stated.

(2) The governor-general is not personally brought into collision with the legislature by the direct exercise of a veto of its legislative acts, since the ministry is responsible for all legislation and must stand or fall by its important measures. The passage of a measure of which it disapproved as a ministry would mean in the majority of cases a resignation, and it is not possible to suppose that the governor would be asked to exercise a prerogative of the Crown which has been in disuse since the establishment of responsible government and would now be a revolutionary measure even in Canada.

In the United States there is danger of frequent collision between the president and the two legislative branches, should a very critical exercise of the veto, as in President Johnson's time, occur at a time when the public mind was deeply agitated. The chief magistrate loses in dignity and influence whenever the legislature overrides the veto, and congress becomes a despotic master for the time being.

(3) The Canadian minister, having control of the finances and taxes and of all matters of administration, is directly responsible to parliament and sooner or later to the people for the manner in which public functions have been discharged. All important measures are initiated by the cabinet, and on every question of public interest the ministers are bound to have a definite policy if they wish to retain the confidence of the legislature. Even in the case of private legislation they are also the guardians of the public interests and are responsible to the parliament and the people for any neglect in particular.

On the other hand in the United States the financial and general legislation of congress is left to the control of committees, over which the president and his cabinet have no direct influence, and the chairman of which may have ambitious objects in direct antagonism to the men in office.

(4) In the Canadian system the speaker is a functionary who certainly has his party proclivities, but it is felt that as long as he occupies the chair all political parties can depend on his justice and impartiality. Responsible government makes the premier and his ministers responsible for the constitution of the committees and for the opinions and decisions that may emanate from them. A government that would constantly endeavour to shift its responsibilities on committees, even of its own selection, would soon disappear from the treasury benches. Responsibility in legislation is accordingly ensured, financial measures prevented from being made the footballs of ambitious and irresponsible politicians, and the impartiality and dignity of the speakership guaranteed by the presence in parliament of a cabinet having the direction