The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane - Earl of Dundonald Thomas Barnes Cochrane (guided reading books TXT) 📗

an error of Mavrocordatos to have made this man an open enemy to himself and to organization. Had he been allowed to have profited by order, he would have espoused it. At present he may be considered irreconcilably opposed to order and the Hydriot party.

NIKETAS.—There are two of this name; but the only one that merits notice is the Moreot captain, a relation of Kolokrotones. He is as ignorant and dirty as the rest of his brethren, but bears the reputation of being disinterested and courageous. He is always poor. All the chieftains are good bottle-men; but this one excels them so much that 'tis confidently asserted he drinks three bottles of rum per day.

STAIKOS.—A Moreot captain who took part early with the Hydriot party from jealousy of Kolokotrones. When that party gained the ascendency, not finding himself sufficiently rewarded, he joined the captains.

MOMGINOS.—A Mainot chieftain, a rival of Petro-Bey; is undistinguished, except by his colossal stature and ferocious countenance.

GOURA.—A Romeliot captain; was a soldier of Odysseus, and employed by him in various assassinations, and thus he rose to preferment and supplanted his protector, and at length assassinated him. This man possesses courage and extreme ferocity, but is remarkably ignorant. In the hands of a similar master, he would have been a perfect Tristan l'Hermite. To supplant Odysseus, he was obliged to range himself with the Hydriot party.

CONSTANTINE BOTZARES.—A Suliot captain; nephew to the celebrated
Makrys, who, from all accounts, was a phenomenon among the captains.
This man bears a good character.

KARAÏSKAKES, RANGO, KALTZAS, ZAVELLA, &c. &c.—Romeliot captains; all more or less opposed to order, according as they see it suits their immediate interest.

That estimate of the Greek heroes—in the main wonderfully accurate—was certainly not encouraging to Lord Cochrane. He determined, however, to go on with the work he had entered upon, and in doing his duty to the Greeks, to try to bring into healthy play the real patriotism that was being perverted by such unworthy leaders.

Great benefit was conferred upon the Greeks by his entering into their service from its very beginning, in spite of the obstacles which were thrown in his way at starting, and which materially damaged all his subsequent work on their behalf. No sooner was it known that he was coming to aid them with his unsurpassed bravery and his unrivalled genius than they took heart and held out against the Turkish and Egyptian foes to whom they had just before been inclined to yield. And his enlistment in their cause had another effect, of which they themselves were ignorant. The mere announcement that he intended to fight and win for them, as he had fought and won for Chili, for Peru, and for Brazil, while it caused both England and France to do their utmost in hindering him from achieving an end which was more thorough than they desired, forced both England and France to shake off the listlessness with which they had regarded the contest during nearly five years, and initiate the temporizing action by which Greece was prevented from becoming as great and independent a state as it might have been, yet by which a smaller independence was secured for it. Hardly had Lord Cochrane consented to serve as admiral of the Greeks than the Duke of Wellington was despatched, in the beginning of 1826, on a mission to Russia, which issued in the protocol of April, 1826, and the treaty of July, 1827—both having for their avowed object the pacification of Greece—and in the battle of Navarino, by which that pacification was secured.

The Duke of Wellington passed through Brussels, on his way to St. Petersburg, in March, 1826. Halting there, he informed the hotel-keeper that he could see no one except Lord Cochrane, which was as distinct an intimation that he desired an interview as, in accordance with the rules of etiquette, he could make. The hotel-keeper, however, was too dull to take the hint. He did not acquaint Lord Cochrane of the indirect message intended for him until the Duke of Wellington had proceeded on his journey. Thus was prevented a meeting between one of England's greatest soldiers and one of her greatest sailors, which could not but have been very memorable in itself, and which might have been far more memorable in its political consequences.

The meeting was hindered, and, without listening either to the personal courtesies or to the diplomatic arguments of the Duke of Wellington, Lord Cochrane continued his preparations for active service in Greek waters. The details of these preparations and their practical execution, as has been shown, he was forced to leave in other and less competent hands, and their actual supervision was still impossible to him. Gradually the irritating and wasteful obstacles for which Mr. Galloway was chiefly responsible induced him to resolve upon following the advice tendered in December by Mr. Hobhouse and Captain Hastings—that is, to go to Greece with a small portion only of the naval armament for which he had stipulated, and which his most cautious friends deemed necessary to his enterprise. To this he was driven, not only by a desire to do something worthy of his great name, and something really helpful to the cause which he had espoused, but also by the knowledge that the tedious delays that arose were squandering all the money with which he had counted upon rendering his work efficient when he could get to Greece.

Of this he received frequent and clear intimation from all his friends in London, though from none so emphatically as from the Greek deputies, Orlando and Luriottis, who, being themselves grievously to blame for their peculations and their bad management, threw all the blame upon Mr. Galloway and the other defaulters. Finding that the proceeds of the second Greek loan were being rapidly exhausted by their own and others' wrong-doing, they were even audacious enough to propose to Lord Cochrane that, not abandoning his Greek engagement, but rather continuing it under conditions involving much greater risk and anxiety than had been anticipated, he should return the 37,000_l._ which had been handed over to Sir Francis Burdett on his account, and take as sole security for his ultimate recompense the two frigates half built in America, acknowledged to be of so little value that no purchaser could be found for them. "Our only desire." they said, "is to rescue the millions of souls that are praying with a thousand supplications that they may not fall victims to the despair which is only averted by the hope of your lordship's arrival."

To that preposterous request Lord Cochrane made a very temperate answer. "I have perused your letter of the 18th," he wrote on the 28th of February, "with the utmost attention, and have since considered its contents with the most anxious desire to promote the objects you have in view in all ways in my power. But I have not been able to convince myself that, under existing circumstances, there is any means by which Greece can be so readily saved as by steady perseverance in equipping the steam-vessels, which are so admirably calculated to cut off the enemies' communication with Alexandria and Constantinople, and for towing fire-vessels and explosion-vessels by night into ports and places where the hostile squadrons anchor on the shores of Greece. With steam-vessels constructed for such purposes, and a few gunboats carrying heavy cannon, I have no doubt but that the Morea might in a few weeks be cleared of the enemy's naval force. I wish I could give you, without writing a volume, a clear view of the numerous reasons, derived from thirty-five years' experience, which induce me to prefer a force that can move in all directions in the obscurity of night through narrow channels, in shoal water, and with silence and celerity, over a naval armament of the usual kind, though of far superior force. You would then perceive with what efficacy the counsel of Demosthenes to your countrymen might be carried into effect by desultory attacks on the enemy; and, in fact, you would perceive that steam-vessels, whenever they shall be brought into war for hostile purposes, will prove the most formidable means that ever has been employed in naval warfare. Indeed, it is my opinion that twenty-four vessels moved by steam (such as the largest constructed for your service) could commence at St. Petersburg, and finish at Constantinople, the destruction of every ship of war in the European ports. I therefore hold that you ought to strain every nerve to get the steam-vessels equipped. For on these, next to the valour of the Greeks themselves, depends the fate of Greece, and not on large unwieldy ships, immovable in calms, and ill-calculated for nocturnal operations on the shores of the Morea and adjacent islands. Having thus repeated to you my opinions, I have only to add that, if you judge you can follow a better course, I release you from the engagement you entered into with me, and I am ready to return you the 37,000_l._ on your receiving as part thereof 72,500 Greek scrip, at the price I gave for it on the day following my engagement (under the faith of the stipulations then entered into), as a further stimulus to my exertion, by casting my property, as well as my life, into the scale with Greece. This release I am ready to make at once; but I cannot consent to accept as security, for the fruits of seven years' toil, vessels manned by Americans, whose pay and provisions I see no adequate or regular means of providing. But should the 150,000_l._ placed at the disposal of the Committee not prove sufficient for the objects I have required, I will advance the 37,000_l._ for the pay and provisions necessary for the steamboats on the security of the boats themselves. Thus you have the option of releasing me from the service, or of continuing my engagement, although I shall lose severely by my temporary acceptance of your offer."

In that letter Lord Cochrane conceded more than ought to have been expected of him. In a supplementary letter written on the same day he added: "I again assure you that I am ready to do whatever is reasonable for the interest of Greece; but it cannot be expected that for such interest I ought to sacrifice totally those of my family and myself, as would be the case were I to give up both the means I possess to obtain justice in South America and my indemnification, on so slender a security as that offered to me. Believe me, I should have tendered the 37,000_l._, without reference to the Greek scrip I had purchased, had it not been evident to me that, under such circumstances, the security of your public funds would be dependent on chances which I cannot foresee, and over which I should have no control."

Thus temperately rebuked, the Greek deputies did not urge their proposal any further. They only wrote to promise all possible expedition in completing the steam-vessels. Lord Cochrane, however, voluntarily acceded to one of their wishes. Hearing that the largest of the steamers, the Perseverance, was nearly ready for sea, and that Mr. Galloway had again solemnly pledged himself to complete the others in a short time, he determined not to wait for the whole force, but to start at once for the Mediterranean. It had been all along decided that the Perseverance should be placed under Captain Hastings's command; and it was now arranged that he should take her to Greece as soon as she was ready, and that Lord Cochrane should follow in a schooner, the Unicorn, of 158 tons. It was not intended, of course, that with that boat alone he should go all the way to Greece; but it was considered—perhaps not very wisely—that if he were actually on his way to Greece, the completion of the other five steamships would be proceeded with more rapidly; and he agreed that, as soon as he was joined in the Mediterranean by the first two of these, the Enterprise and the Irresistible, he would hasten on to the Archipelago, and there make the best of the small force at his disposal. Not only was it supposed that Mr. Galloway and the other agents would thus be induced to more vigorous action: it was also deemed that the effect of this step upon the Hellenic nation would be very beneficial. "As soon as the Greek Government know that your lordship is on your way to Greece," wrote the London deputies on the 13th of April, "their courage will be animated, and their confidence renewed. We may with truth assert that your lordship is regarded by all classes of our countrymen as a Messiah, who is to come to their deliverance; and, from the enthusiasm which will prevail amongst the people, we may venture to predict that your lordship's valour and success at sea will give energy and victory to their arms on land."

With the