Forty-Six Years in the Army - John McAllister Schofield (reading the story of the .TXT) 📗

id="id01176">Grant's first assent to Sherman's plan was made, October 11, on the condition of "holding the line of the Tennessee firmly." On October 22 Sherman telegraphed: "I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee."

Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that Hood ought to be his "objective," now that he "has gone so far north." At an earlier hour the same day, in the despatch above quoted, Sherman telegraphed, "trusting that General Thomas . . . will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive." To this Grant replied November 2: "With the force, however, you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him." In that despatch of November 1 Sherman had made a statement of the troops Thomas would have, including A. J. Smith's from Missouri, adding, "but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten days." Now Smith's troops did not reach Tennessee in less than thirty days instead of ten days, and after the crisis of the campaign was passed; and the effective force in Tennessee before Smith's arrival was 13,000 men less than Sherman had stated it. So that the whole brunt of the fight with Hood fell upon the two corps which Sherman had sent back, without any help from the reinforcements upon which Sherman counted so largely. It was, in fact, six weeks instead of a "very few days" before Thomas was able "to assume the offensive." It was not attempted to "hold the line of the Tennessee" either "firmly" or at all.

Having been absent from the army in the field during Hood's raid in Sherman's rear, I knew little personally about those estimates of the strength of the opposing forces. For the same reason, I knew nothing of Sherman's plans or correspondence with Grant which were considered or took place after the fall of Atlanta, though I had been perfectly familiar with the plans discussed previous to that time having in view a change of base to some point on the Atlantic or on the gulf, with a view to further operations in Georgia or the Gulf States, wherever there might be a hostile army to operate against. Yet when I met Sherman at Gaylesburg I was surprised to learn that he was going off to the sea with five sixths of his army, leaving Thomas, with only one of his six corps, and no other veteran troops then ready for field service, to take care of Hood until he could get A. J. Smith from Missouri, incorporate new regiments into the army and make them fit to meet the veteran enemy, remount his cavalry, and concentrate his garrisons and railroad guards in Tennessee! Of course I knew far less than Sherman did about all that, for I had no responsibility and little knowledge about Thomas's department. But I knew enough to feel astonished when Sherman told me what he proposed to do. I plainly told Sherman so, and urged him to send me back with my corps to join Stanley and help Thomas.(12)

Here arise several interesting questions which would be worthy of consideration, although a satisfactory solution of them might not be possible. Under Sherman's assurance as to what he had done for Thomas in Tennessee, Grant appears to have been fully satisfied that Thomas would be able to take care of Hood and destroy him, thus eliminating that Confederate army from the future problem in the Atlantic States. But could Sherman, with his more exact knowledge of what he actually had done, have felt the same confidence? In view of that knowledge and of the results of his own previous operations against Hood, could he have expected any such result? Is it not more probable that Sherman simply expected to take advantage of Hood's temporary absence from Georgia to make his own change of base to Savannah? Did Sherman not, in fact, really expect Hood to follow him, even though at so great a distance, and be prepared to resist his future operations from Savannah? Sherman repeatedly said, in his despatches before he started, that he believed Hood would follow him, being compelled to do so by public clamor. What was Sherman's plan when he started for Savannah? Was it simply to effect a change of base, or was it for well-defined ulterior purposes? When did Sherman mature his plan to march to Virginia, and when did that plan first dawn upon Sherman's mind? In this connection, what significance is to be attached to the dates of events in Tennessee, especially the battles of Franklin and Nashville?

GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT OF IT

By the first mails which reached Sherman after he arrived on the coast, December 14 and 15, containing letters from Grant dated December 3 and 6, full information was received of the battle of Franklin, which had occurred November 30. Thomas's official report of the battle of Nashville was received by Sherman on December 24, but rumors of that victory had reached him earlier. Sherman's first letter to Grant, relative to future operations, written in reply to those from Grant of December 3 and 6, was dated December 16. In that letter was mentioned Sherman's plan in the following words: "Indeed, with my present command I had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you." Sherman's second letter to Grant, on the same subject, written in reply to Grant's letter of the 18th, was dated December 24, the day on which he received Thomas's report of the battle of Nashville. In this letter Sherman said: "I am also gratified that you have modified your former orders. . . . I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight."

When Sherman first mentioned his future plan he knew that the success of his past plan in Tennessee had been assured. Thomas had succeeded in concentrating his forces at Nashville, and Hood had suffered a severe defeat in attempting to prevent it. At the time of Sherman's second letter, mentioning his very mature consideration of his future plans and perfect confidence in respect to them, he knew that Hood's army had been broken up, and had become a small factor in the future problem. How long, and to what extent, had Sherman anticipated these results in Tennessee, and matured the plans of future operations, which were dependent upon those results? I shall consider these several questions, which involve so intimately the character of my old commander.

[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.]

[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part ii, pp. 364, 411.]

[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 594.]

[( 4) ibid., p. 576.]

[( 5) Ibid., p. 594.]

[( 6) Vol. II, p. 154.]

[( 7) Mr. Jefferson Davis's speech. See General Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 141.]

[( 8) See the Century War Book, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. IV, p. 257.]

[( 9) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.]

[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.]

[(11) Vol. II, pp. 374-6.]

[(12) See my letter to General Sherman, December 28, 1864, p. 254.]

CHAPTER XVII Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea—His Expectations that the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If Not "War"—The Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to Sherman—The Credit Given by Grant to Sherman—"Master of the Situation"—The Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches—His Great Ability as a Strategist.

The actual result in Tennessee was more decisive than Sherman had any good reason to expect. But he had good reason to expect, and evidently did, that Thomas would be able, after he had concentrated his troops, and after Hood had done considerable damage, to drive the latter out of Tennessee and pursue him with such force and energy as fully to occupy his attention and prevent him from interfering in any manner with Sherman's own operations. Hence Sherman as well as Grant had reason to assume that Hood's army would be eliminated from the military problem in the Atlantic States. Again, the general military situation as known to General Sherman, or probably to anybody else, in October and November, 1864, did not indicate that Grant, with the force he then had in Virginia, would be able to capture or destroy Lee's army. He might undoubtedly capture Petersburg and Richmond, but Lee would probably be able to withdraw his army toward the south, nearer to his sources of supply, and by skilful manoeuvers prolong the contest until the National Government might abandon it. Grant's letters at that time confirm this view of the military situation.

Some writers have attempted to explain and justify Sherman's action in taking with him so large an army, while leaving Thomas one so much smaller, on the ground that he might meet in his march to the sea such opposition as possibly to require so large a force to overcome it. But to any one familiar with the facts, and to no one more than to Sherman, his army of 60,000 men was evidently all out of proportion to any possible resistance it could meet in Georgia. But when he should start northward from Savannah the case would become vastly different. At any point in the Carolinas he might possibly meet the whole of Lee's army. That is to say, Sherman's ulterior plan could not be prudently undertaken at all without an army as large as that with which he actually marched to the sea, namely, 60,000 men. Indeed, as the records show, Sherman considered a long time before he decided that he could spare the Twenty-third Corps to go back and help Thomas. If any question can possibly exist as to what was the essential part of Sherman's plan in marching to Savannah, what other possible military reason can be given for that march except to make the subsequent march to Virginia with so large an army? Why change his base to Savannah? What was he to operate against after he got there?

Nothing could have been clearer to any military mind in the fall of 1864, than that if either Lee's or Hood's army could be captured or destroyed, the surrender of the other must necessarily follow very quickly, and the rebellion be ended. No man could have been more earnest than Sherman in his laudable desire to make the capture of his own adversary the beginning of the end. Sherman's well- known character leaves this beyond question. It is not possible that he could have preferred a manifestation of the power of the nation by destroying Southern property rather than by destroying a Southern army.

SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA

But there was one objection—absolutely overruling, apparently, in Sherman's mind—to any further attempt by Sherman himself, with the main body of his army then in Georgia, to prosecute the primary military object of his campaign—the destruction or capture of Hood's army. To have done so would have conceded a temporary triumph to the chief of the Confederate armies, who had loudly proclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect that State from any further invasion. Such a concession, however temporary, was manifestly intolerable to Sherman's mind.( 1) Besides, Sherman had formed and announced, with Grant's cordial concurrence, a well-matured plan of future operations. As "master of the situation," he could afford to go on and substantially execute that plan, or at least the primary part of it,—the change of base,—treating almost with contempt the enemy's bold design to thwart him. Although this must, at least for the time being, compel him personally to forego and leave to a subordinate the primary operations of a military campaign,—those directly against the opposing army,—the joint action of Sherman and Grant, each with a powerful army, directly against Lee's army in Virginia, was the surest and probably the shortest possible way to end