Approaching Zero - Paul Mungo (books to read to increase intelligence .txt) 📗
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according to this code, may break into computers or computer networks with
impunity, but should not tamper with files or programs.
In the real world it rarely works like that. Though hackers see themselves as a
useful part of the system, discovering design flaws and security deficiencies,
the urge to demonstrate that a particular computer has been cracked tempts
hackers to leave evidence, which involves tampering with the computer. The
ethical code is easy to overlook, and sometimes tampering can become malicious
and damaging.
For the authorities, the whole thing is a giant can of worms. Patrolling the
access points and communications webs that make up Worldnet is an impossible
task; in the end, policing in the information age is necessarily reactive.
Adding to the problems of the authorities is the increasing
internationalization of the computer underground. Laws are formed to cover
local conditions, in which the crime, the victim, and the perpetrator share a
common territory. International crime, in which the victim is in America, say,
and the perpetrator in Europe, while the scene of the crime—the computer that
was violated—may be located in a third country, makes enforcement all the more
difficult. Police agencies only rarely cooperate internationally, language
differences create artificial barriers, and the laws and legal systems are
never the same.
Still, the authorities are bound to try. The argument that began as the
information age dawned, encapsulated in Stephen Levy’s uncompromising view that
access to data should be “unlimited and total,” has never ended. The
government, corporations, and state agencies will never aliow unlimited access
for very obvious reasons: state security, the privacy of individuals, the
intellectual property conventions … the list goes on and on. In all western
countries, hacking is now illegal; the theft of information from computers, and
in some cases even unauthorized access, is punishable by fines and jail
sentences. The position is rigid and clear: the computer underground is a
renegade movement, in conflict with the authority of the state.
But there are still good hackers and bad hackers. And it is even true that
sometimes hackers can be helpful to the authorities—or at least, it’s happened
once. A hacker named Michael Synergy (he has legally changed his name to his
handle) once broke into the computer system at a giant credit agency that holds
financial information on 80 million Americans, to have a look at then president
Ronald Reagan’s files. He located the files easily and discovered sixty-three
other requests for the president’s credit records, all logged that day from
enquirers with unlikely names. Synergy also found something even odder—a group
of about seven hundred people who all appeared to hold one specific credit
card. Their credit histories were bizarre, and to Synergy they all seemed to
have appeared out of nowhere, as if “they had no previous experience.” It then
occurred to him that he was almost certainly looking at the credit history—and
names and addresses—of people who were in the U.S. government’s Witness Protection
Program.
Synergy, a good citizen, notified the FBI about the potential breach of the
Witness Program’s security. That was hacker ethics. But not every hacker is as
good a citizen.
Pat Riddle has never claimed to be a good citizen. He is proud of being the
first hacker in America to be prosecuted. Even now, as a thirty-four-yearold
computer security consultant, he is fond of describing cases he has worked on
in which the law, if not actually broken, is overlooked. “I’ve never been
entirely straight,” he says.
As a child growing up in a suburb of Philadelphia, he, like most hackers, was
fascinated by technology. He built model rockets, played with electronics, and
he liked to watch space launches. When he became a little older, his interests
turned to telecommunications and computers.
Pat and his friends used to rummage through the garbage left outside the back
doors of phone company offices for discarded manuals or internal memos that
would tell them more about the telephone system—a practice known as dumpster
diving. He learned how to make a “butt set,” a portable phone carried by phone
repairmen to check the lines, and first started “line tapping”—literally,
listening in on telephone calls—in the early 1970s, when he was fourteen or
fifteen.
The butt set he had built was a simple hand-held instrument with a dial on the
back and two alligator clips dangling from one end. All the materials he used
were purchased from hardware and electronics stores. To line-tap, he would
search out a neighborhood telephone box where the lines for all the local phones come together.
Every three-block area, roughly, has one, either attached to a telephone pole
or freestanding. Opening the box with a special wrench—also available from
most good hardware stores—he would attach the clips to two terminals and
listen in on conversations.
Sometimes, if the telephone box was in a public area, he would run two long
wires from the clips so that he could sit behind the bushes and listen in on
conversations without getting caught. To find out whose phone he was listening
to, he would simply use his butt set to call the operator and pretend to be a
lineman. He would give the correct code, which he had learned from his hours of
dumpster diving, and then ask, “What’s this number?” Despite being fourteen, he
was never refused. “So long as you know the lingo, you can get people to do
anything,” Pat says.
The area where he grew up was a dull place, however, and he never heard
anything more interesting than a girl talking to her date. “It was basically
boring and mundane,” he says, “but at that age any tittle-tattle seemed
exciting.”
Pat learned about hacking from a guy he met while shoplifting electronic parts
at Radio Shack. Doctor Diode, as his new friend was called, didn’t really know
much more about hacking than Pat, but the two of them discovered the procedures
together. They began playing with the school’s computer, and then found that
with a modem they could actually call into a maintenance port—a dial-up—at
the phone company’s switching office. The phone company was the preferred
target for phreakers-turned-hackers: it was huge, it was secretive, and it was
a lot of fun to play on.
Breaking into a switch through a maintenance port shouldn’t have been easy, but
in those days security was light. “For years and years the phone company never
had any problems because they were so secret,” Pat says. “They never expected
anyone to try to break into their systems.” The switch used an operating system
called UNIX, designed by the phone company, that was relatively simple to use.
“It had lots of menus,” recalls Pat with satisfaction. Menus are the lists of
functions and services available to the computer user, or in this case, the
computer hacker. Used skillfully, menus are like a map of the computer.
As Pat learned his way around the switch, he began to play little jokes, such
as resetting the time. This, he says, was absurdly simple: the command for the
clock was Time. Pat would reset the clock from a peak time—when telephone
charges were highest—to an off-peak time. The clock controlled the telephone
company’s charges, so until the billing department noticed it was out of
kilter, local telephone users enjoyed a period of relatively inexpensive
calls. He also learned how to disconnect subscriber’s phones and to manipulate
the accounts files. The latter facility enabled him to “pay” bills, at first at
the phone company and later, he claims, at the electric company and at credit
card offices. He would perform this service for a fee of 10 percent of the
bill, which became a useful source of extra income.
He also started to play on the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) computer network. ARPANET was the oldest and the largest of the
many computer nets—webs of interconnected mainframes and workstations—that
facilitated the Defense Department’s transfer of data. ARPANET was conceived in
the 1950s—largely to protect the ability of the U.S. military to communicate
after a nuclear strike—and finally established in the late 1960s. It
eventually linked about sixty thousand computers, or nodes, and interacted with
other networks, both in the United States and elsewhere in the world, making it
an integral part of Worldnet. Most universities, research centers, defense
contractors, military installations, and government departments were connected
through ARPANET . Because there was no “center” to the system, it functioned
like a highway network, connecting each node to every other; accessing it at
one point meant accessing the whole system.
Pat used to commune regularly with other hackers on pirate bulletin boards,
where he exchanged information on hacking sites, known computer dial-ups, and
sometimes even stolen IDs
and passwords. From one of these pirate boards he obtained the dial-up numbers
for several ARPANET nodes.
He began his hack of ARPANET by first breaking into Sprint, the long-distance
phone carrier. He was looking for long-distance access codes, the five-digit
numbers that would get him onto the long-distance lines for free. In the old
days he could have used a blue box, but since then the phone system had become
more sophisticated. Blue boxes were said to have been killed off once and for
all in 1983 when Bell completed the upgrading of its system to what is called
Common Channel Interoffice Signaling (CCIS). Very simply, CCIS separates the
signaling—the transmission of the multifrequency tones—from the voice lines.’
To get the codes he wanted, Pat employed a technique known as war-dialing, in
which a program instructs the computer to systematically call various
combinations of digits until it finds a “good” one, a valid access code. The
system is crude but effective; a few hours spent war-dialing can usually garner
a few good codes.
These long-distance codes are necessary because of the timeconsuming nature of
hacking. It takes patience and persistence to break into a target computer, but
once inside, there is a myriad of menus and routes to explore, to say nothing
of other linked computers to jump to. Hackers can be on the phone for hours,
and whenever possible, they make certain their calls are free.
Pat’s target was an ARPANET-linked computer at MIT, a favorite for hackers
because at that time security was light. In common with many other
universities, MIT practiced a sort of open access, believing that its computers
were there to be used. The difficulty for MIT, and other computer operators, is
that if security is light, the computers are abused, but if security is tight,
they become more difficult for even authorized users to access.
Authorized users are given a personal ID and a password, which hackers spend a
considerable amount of time collecting through pirate bulletin boards, peering
over someone’s shoulder in an office, or “dumpster diving.” But exploiting a
computer’s default log-ins and passwords can often be even simpler—as Nick
Whiteley discovered when he hacked in to the QMC computer for the first time. A
common default is “sysmaint,” for systems maintenance, used as both the log-in
and the password. Accessing a machine with this default would require no more
than typing “sysmaint” at the log-in prompt and then again at the password
prompt. Experienced hackers also know that common commands such as “test” or
“help” are also often used as IDs and passwords.
Pat first accessed ARPANET by using a default code. “Back then there was no
real need for security,” he says. “It was all incredibly simple. Computers were
developed for human beings to use. They have to be simple to access because
humans are idiots.”
ARPANET became a game for him—he saw it as “a new frontier to play in.” He
jumped from computer to computer within the system,
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