Autobiography - John Stuart Mill (motivational books for men txt) 📗

period follows

of criticism and negation, in which mankind lose their old convictions

without acquiring any new ones, of a general or authoritative character,

except the conviction that the old are false. The period of Greek and

Roman polytheism, so long as really believed in by instructed Greeks and

Romans, was an organic period, succeeded by the critical or sceptical

period of the Greek philosophers. Another organic period came in with

Christianity. The corresponding critical period began with the

Reformation, has lasted ever since, still lasts, and cannot altogether

cease until a new organic period has been inaugurated by the triumph of

a yet more advanced creed. These ideas, I knew, were not peculiar to the

St. Simonians; on the contrary, they were the general property of

Europe, or at least of Germany and France, but they had never, to my

knowledge, been so completely systematized as by these writers, nor the

distinguishing characteristics of a critical period so powerfully set

forth; for I was not then acquainted with Fichte's _Lectures on the

Characteristics of the Present Age_. In Carlyle, indeed, I found bitter

denunciations of an "age of unbelief," and of the present age as such,

which I, like most people at that time, supposed to be passionate

protests in favour of the old modes of belief. But all that was true in

these denunciations, I thought that I found more calmly and

philosophically stated by the St. Simonians. Among their publications,

too, there was one which seemed to me far superior to the rest; in which

the general idea was matured into something much more definite and

instructive. This was an early work of Auguste Comte, who then called

himself, and even announced himself in the title-page as, a pupil of

Saint Simon. In this tract M. Comte first put forth the doctrine, which

he afterwards so copiously illustrated, of the natural succession of

three stages in every department of human knowledge: first, the

theological, next the metaphysical, and lastly, the positive stage; and

contended, that social science must be subject to the same law; that the

feudal and Catholic system was the concluding phasis of the theological

state of the social science, Protestantism the commencement, and the

doctrines of the French Revolution the consummation, of the

metaphysical; and that its positive state was yet to come. This doctrine

harmonized well with my existing notions, to which it seemed to give a

scientific shape. I already regarded the methods of physical science as

the proper models for political. But the chief benefit which I derived

at this time from the trains of thought suggested by the St. Simonians

and by Comte, was, that I obtained a clearer conception than ever before

of the peculiarities of an era of transition in opinion, and ceased to

mistake the moral and intellectual characteristics of such an era, for

the normal attributes of humanity. I looked forward, through the present

age of loud disputes but generally weak convictions, to a future which

shall unite the best qualities of the critical with the best qualities

of the organic periods; unchecked liberty of thought, unbounded freedom

of individual action in all modes not hurtful to others; but also,

convictions as to what is right and wrong, useful and pernicious, deeply

engraven on the feelings by early education and general unanimity of

sentiment, and so firmly grounded in reason and in the true exigencies

of life, that they shall not, like all former and present creeds,

religious, ethical, and political, require to be periodically thrown off

and replaced by others.

 

Comte soon left the St. Simonians, and I lost sight of him and his

writings for a number of years. But the St. Simonians I continued to

cultivate. I was kept _au courant_ of their progress by one of their

most enthusiastic disciples, M. Gustave d'Eichthal, who about that time

passed a considerable interval in England. I was introduced to their

chiefs, Bazard and Enfantin, in 1830; and as long as their public

teachings and proselytism continued, I read nearly everything they

wrote. Their criticisms on the common doctrines of Liberalism seemed to

me full of important truth; and it was partly by their writings that my

eyes were opened to the very limited and temporary value of the old

political economy, which assumes private property and inheritance as

indefeasible facts, and freedom of production and exchange as the

_dernier mot_ of social improvement. The scheme gradually unfolded by

the St. Simonians, under which the labour and capital of society would

be managed for the general account of the community, every individual

being required to take a share of labour, either as thinker, teacher,

artist, or producer, all being classed according to their capacity, and

remunerated according to their work, appeared to me a far superior

description of Socialism to Owen's. Their aim seemed to me desirable and

rational, however their means might be inefficacious; and though I

neither believed in the practicability, nor in the beneficial operation

of their social machinery, I felt that the proclamation of such an ideal

of human society could not but tend to give a beneficial direction to

the efforts of others to bring society, as at present constituted,

nearer to some ideal standard. I honoured them most of all for what they

have been most cried down for--the boldness and freedom from prejudice

with which they treated the subject of the family, the most important of

any, and needing more fundamental alterations than remain to be made in

any other great social institution, but on which scarcely any reformer

has the courage to touch. In proclaiming the perfect equality of men and

women, and an entirely new order of things in regard to their relations

with one another, the St. Simonians, in common with Owen and Fourier,

have entitled themselves to the grateful remembrance of future

generations.

 

In giving an account of this period of my life, I have only specified

such of my new impressions as appeared to me, both at the time and

since, to be a kind of turning points, marking a definite progress in my

mode of thought. But these few selected points give a very insufficient

idea of the quantity of thinking which I carried on respecting a host of

subjects during these years of transition. Much of this, it is true,

consisted in rediscovering things known to all the world, which I had

previously disbelieved or disregarded. But the rediscovery was to me a

discovery, giving me plenary possession of the truths, not as

traditional platitudes, but fresh from their source; and it seldom

failed to place them in some new light, by which they were reconciled

with, and seemed to confirm while they modified, the truths less

generally known which lay in my early opinions, and in no essential part

of which I at any time wavered. All my new thinking only laid the

foundation of these more deeply and strongly, while it often removed

misapprehension and confusion of ideas which had perverted their effect.

For example, during the later returns of my dejection, the doctrine of

what is called Philosophical Necessity weighed on my existence like an

incubus. I felt as if I was scientifically proved to be the helpless

slave of antecedent circumstances; as if my character and that of all

others had been formed for us by agencies beyond our control, and was

wholly out of our own power. I often said to myself, what a relief it

would be if I could disbelieve the doctrine of the formation of

character by circumstances; and remembering the wish of Fox respecting

the doctrine of resistance to governments, that it might never be

forgotten by kings, nor remembered by subjects, I said that it would be

a blessing if the doctrine of necessity could be believed by all _quoad_

the characters of others, and disbelieved in regard to their own. I

pondered painfully on the subject till gradually I saw light through it.

I perceived, that the word Necessity, as a name for the doctrine of

Cause and Effect applied to human action, carried with it a misleading

association; and that this association was the operative force in the

depressing and paralysing influence which I had experienced: I saw that

though our character is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do

much to shape those circumstances; and that what is really inspiriting

and ennobling in the doctrine of freewill is the conviction that we have

real power over the formation of our own character; that our will, by

influencing some of our circumstances, can modify our future habits or

capabilities of willing. All this was entirely consistent with the

doctrine of circumstances, or rather, was that doctrine itself, properly

understood. From that time I drew, in my own mind, a clear distinction

between the doctrine of circumstances and Fatalism; discarding

altogether the misleading word Necessity. The theory, which I now for

the first time rightly apprehended, ceased altogether to be

discouraging; and, besides the relief to my spirits, I no longer

suffered under the burden--so heavy to one who aims at being a reformer

in opinions--of thinking one doctrine true and the contrary doctrine

morally beneficial. The train of thought which had extricated me from

this dilemma seemed to me, in after years, fitted to render a similar

service to others; and it now forms the chapter on Liberty and Necessity

in the concluding Book of my _System of Logic_.

 

Again, in politics, though I no longer accepted the doctrine of the

_Essay on Government_ as a scientific theory; though I ceased to

consider representative democracy as an absolute principle, and regarded

it as a question of time, place, and circumstance; though I now looked

upon the choice of political institutions as a moral and educational

question more than one of material interests, thinking that it ought to

be decided mainly by the consideration, what great improvement in life

and culture stands next in order for the people concerned, as the

condition of their further progress, and what institutions are most

likely to promote that; nevertheless, this change in the premises of my

political philosophy did not alter my practical political creed as to

the requirements of my own time and country. I was as much as ever a

Radical and Democrat for Europe, and especially for England. I thought

the predominance of the aristocratic classes, the noble and the rich, in

the English constitution, an evil worth any struggle to get rid of; not

on account of taxes, or any such comparatively small inconvenience, but

as the great demoralizing agency in the country. Demoralizing, first,

because it made the conduct of the Government an example of gross public

immorality, through the predominance of private over public interests in

the State, and the abuse of the powers of legislation for the advantage

of classes. Secondly, and in a still greater degree, because the respect

of the multitude always attaching itself principally to that which, in

the existing state of society, is the chief passport to power; and under

English institutions, riches, hereditary or acquired, being the almost

exclusive source of political importance; riches, and the signs of

riches, were almost the only things really respected, and the life of

the people was mainly devoted to the pursuit of them. I thought, that

while the higher and richer classes held the power of government, the

instruction and improvement of the mass of the people were contrary to

the self-interest of those classes, because tending to render the people

more powerful for throwing off the yoke: but if the democracy obtained a

large, and perhaps the principal share, in the governing power, it would

become the interest of the opulent classes to promote their education,

in order to ward off really mischievous errors, and especially those

which would lead to unjust violations of property. On these grounds I

was not only as ardent as ever for democratic institutions, but

earnestly hoped that Owenite, St. Simonian, and all other anti-property

doctrines might spread widely among the poorer classes; not that I

thought those doctrines true, or desired that they should be acted on,

but in order that the higher classes might be made to see that they had

more to fear from the poor when uneducated than when educated.

 

In this frame of mind the French Revolution of July found me: It roused

my utmost enthusiasm, and gave me, as it were, a new existence. I went

at once to Paris, was introduced to Lafayette, and laid the groundwork

of the intercourse I afterwards kept up with several of the active

chiefs of the extreme popular party. After my return I entered warmly,

as a writer, into the political discussions of the time; which soon

became still more exciting, by the coming in of Lord Grey's Ministry,

and the proposing of the Reform Bill. For the next few years I wrote

copiously in newspapers. It was about this time that Fonblanque, who had

for some time written the political articles in the _Examiner_, became

the proprietor and editor of the paper.