History of the Peloponnesian War - Thucydides (classic literature books .TXT) 📗

concluded in

their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the

night preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms

and, accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the

Thebans offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other,

during the negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the

Thebans, and decided that they could easily attack and overpower them;

the mass of the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At

all events they resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party

walls of the houses, they thus managed to join each other without

being seen going through the streets, in which they placed wagons

without the beasts in them, to serve as a barricade, and arranged

everything else as seemed convenient for the occasion. When everything

had been done that circumstances permitted, they watched their

opportunity and went out of their houses against the enemy. It was

still night, though daybreak was at hand: in daylight it was thought

that their attack would be met by men full of courage and on equal

terms with their assailants, while in darkness it would fall upon

panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a disadvantage from

their enemy’s knowledge of the locality. So they made their assault at

once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they could.

 

The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up

to repel all attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back

their assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women

and slaves screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with

stones and tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and

so at last their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through

the town. Most of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right

ways out, and this, with the mud, and the darkness caused by the

moon being in her last quarter, and the fact that their pursuers

knew their way about and could easily stop their escape, proved

fatal to many. The only gate open was the one by which they had

entered, and this was shut by one of the Plataeans driving the spike

of a javelin into the bar instead of the bolt; so that even here there

was no longer any means of exit. They were now chased all over the

town. Some got on the wall and threw themselves over, in most cases

with a fatal result. One party managed to find a deserted gate, and

obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through the bar; but as they were

soon observed only a few succeeded in getting out. Others were cut off

in detail in different parts of the city. The most numerous and

compact body rushed into a large building next to the city wall: the

doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and the Thebans

fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that there was a

passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing their

enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to the

building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was

anything else that they could do with them; until at length these

and the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town

agreed to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to

the Plataeans.

 

While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the

Thebans who were to have joined them with all their forces before

daybreak, in case of anything miscarrying with the body that had

entered, received the news of the affair on the road, and pressed

forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from

Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in the

night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and

so, having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the

river, they arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain

or captive. When they learned what had happened, they at once formed a

design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had

been made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were

of course men and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if

possible to have some prisoners to exchange against their countrymen

in the town, should any chance to have been taken alive. Such was

their plan. But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost

before it was formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens

outside the town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for

their unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time of peace, and

warning them against any outrage on those outside. Should the

warning be disregarded, they threatened to put to death the men they

had in their hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their

territory, they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This

is the Theban account of the matter, and they say that they had an

oath given them. The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any

promise of an immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon

subsequent negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this as it

may, upon the Thebans retiring from their territory without committing

any injury, the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the

country and immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a

hundred and eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the

traitors had negotiated, being one.

 

This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the

dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city

as seemed best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile,

having had word of the affair sent them immediately after its

occurrence, had instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent

a herald to the Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities

with their Theban prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news

of the men’s death had of course not arrived; the first messenger

having left Plataea just when the Thebans entered it, the second

just after their defeat and capture; so there was no later news.

Thus the Athenians sent orders in ignorance of the facts; and the

herald on his arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians

marched to Plataea and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in

the place, also taking away the women and children and such of the men

as were least efficient.

 

After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an

overt act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon

and her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to

such other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for

assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent states

at home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders

to the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build

vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city

being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of

money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to

admit single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part

reviewed her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places

more immediately round Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania,

and Zacynthus—perceiving that if these could be relied on she could

carry the war all round Peloponnese.

 

And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their

utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always

at its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this

particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men

whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest

of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its

leading cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and

oracles being chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not

only in the contending cities. Further, some while before this,

there was an earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory

of the Hellenes. This was said and thought to be ominous of the events

impending; indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to

pass without remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the

Lacedaemonians, especially as they proclaimed themselves the

liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help them

in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered

wherever he could not himself see to it. So general was the

indignation felt against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape

from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such

were the preparations and such the feelings with which the contest

opened.

 

The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were

the allies of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus

except the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the

only Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was

afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese the Megarians,

Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and

Anactorians. Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians,

Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians;

and cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states

sent infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of

Athens comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in

Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians,

and some tributary cities in the following countries, viz. , Caria upon

the sea with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the

Thracian towns, the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete

towards the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of

these, ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry

and money by the rest. Such were the allies of either party and

their resources for the war.

 

Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round

orders to the cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to

prepare troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in

order to invade Attica. The several states were ready at the time

appointed and assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent of each city

being two-thirds of its whole force. After the whole army had

mustered, the Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the

expedition, called together the generals of all the states and the

principal persons and officers, and exhorted them as follows:

 

“Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both

within and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are

not without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger

force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are

remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we

march. We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our

ancestors, or unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and

attention of all Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its

sympathy is with the enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as

the invading army may appear to be, and certain as some may think it

that our adversary will not meet us in the field, this is no sort of

justification for the least negligence upon the march; but the

officers and men of each particular city should always be prepared for

the advent of danger in their own quarters. The course of war cannot

be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by the impulse

of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised

preparation, a wise apprehension often been able to make head

against