History of the Peloponnesian War - Thucydides (classic literature books .TXT) 📗

would

not let the Athenians march out against them.

 

However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered

the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships

for Peloponnese, and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the

ships he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred

cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first time made out of

old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the

expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left

the Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at

Epidaurus in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the territory, and

even had hopes of taking the town by an assault: in this however

they were not successful. Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid

waste the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on

the coast of Peloponnese, and thence sailing to Prasiai, a maritime

town in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory, and took and sacked

the place itself; after which they returned home, but found the

Peloponnesians gone and no longer in Attica.

 

During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the

Athenians on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the

plague both in the armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually

asserted that the departure of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear

of the disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in the city,

and also could see the burials going on. Yet in this invasion they

remained longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country,

for they were about forty days in Attica.

 

The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of

Clinias, the colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had

lately made use, and went off upon an expedition against the

Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and Potidaea, which was still

under siege. As soon as they arrived, they brought up their engines

against Potidaea and tried every means of taking it, but did not

succeed either in capturing the city or in doing anything else

worthy of their preparations. For the plague attacked them here

also, and committed such havoc as to cripple them completely, even the

previously healthy soldiers of the former expedition catching the

infection from Hagnon’s troops; while Phormio and the sixteen

hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by being no longer in the

neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end of it was that Hagnon

returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand and

fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days;

though the soldiers stationed there before remained in the country and

carried on the siege of Potidaea.

 

After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over

the spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste;

and war and pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They began

to find fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of

all their misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with

Lacedaemon, and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however

succeed in their mission. Their despair was now complete and all

vented itself upon Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at the

present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he

called an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general,

with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them

from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of

mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke as follows:

 

“I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the

object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the

purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting

against your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your

sufferings. I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the

advantage of private citizens, than any individual well-being

coupled with public humiliation. A man may be personally ever so

well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with

it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of

salvation to unfortunate individuals. Since then a state can support

the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers,

it is surely the duty of every one to be forward in her defence, and

not like you to be so confounded with your domestic afflictions as

to give up all thoughts of the common safety, and to blame me for

having counselled war and yourselves for having voted it. And yet if

you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe, is second

to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the

ability to expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an

honest one. A man possessing that knowledge without that faculty of

exposition might as well have no idea at all on the matter: if he

had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he would be but a

cold advocate for her interests; while were his patriotism not proof

against bribery, everything would go for a price. So that if you

thought that I was even moderately distinguished for these qualities

when you took my advice and went to war, there is certainly no

reason now why I should be charged with having done wrong.

 

“For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and

whose fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But

if the only choice was between submission with loss of independence,

and danger with the hope of preserving that independence, in such a

case it is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he

who will. I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change,

since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for

misfortune to repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies

in the infirmity of your resolution, since the suffering that it

entails is being felt by every one among you, while its advantage is

still remote and obscure to all, and a great and sudden reverse having

befallen you, your mind is too much depressed to persevere in your

resolves. For before what is sudden, unexpected, and least within

calculation, the spirit quails; and putting all else aside, the plague

has certainly been an emergency of this kind. Born, however, as you

are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have been, with

habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the greatest

disasters and still to keep unimpaired the lustre of your name. For

the judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls

short of a recognized renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that

aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for your private

afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the

commonwealth.

 

“If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary,

and fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the

reasons by which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness

of your apprehensions. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an

advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think

has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in my

previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should

scarce adventure it now, were it not for the unnatural depression

which I see around me. You perhaps think that your empire extends only

over your allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible field

of action has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these

you are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at

present, but also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine,

your naval resources are such that your vessels may go where they

please, without the King or any other nation on earth being able to

stop them. So that although you may think it a great privation to lose

the use of your land and houses, still you must see that this power is

something widely different; and instead of fretting on their

account, you should really regard them in the light of the gardens and

other accessories that embellish a great fortune, and as, in

comparison, of little moment. You should know too that liberty

preserved by your efforts will easily recover for us what we have

lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what you have will pass from

you. Your fathers receiving these possessions not from others, but

from themselves, did not let slip what their labour had acquired,

but delivered them safe to you; and in this respect at least you

must prove yourselves their equals, remembering that to lose what

one has got is more disgraceful than to be balked in getting, and

you must confront your enemies not merely with spirit but with

disdain. Confidence indeed a blissful ignorance can impart, ay, even

to a coward’s breast, but disdain is the privilege of those who,

like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to their

adversary. And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies

courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its trust being

placed, not in hope, which is the prop of the desperate, but in a

judgment grounded upon existing resources, whose anticipations are

more to be depended upon.

 

“Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining

the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you

all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect

to share its honours. You should remember also that what you are

fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for

independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the

animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no

longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has

become enamoured of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For

what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it

perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these

retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state;

indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent

by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure

without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are

useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an

unmolested servitude.

 

“But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with

me—who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves—in spite

of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be

certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands;

and although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon

us—the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault.

It is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more

unpopular than I should otherwise have been—quite undeservedly,

unless you are also prepared to give me the credit of any success with

which chance may present you. Besides, the hand of heaven must be

borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the

old way at Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember,

too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it