History of the Peloponnesian War - Thucydides (classic literature books .TXT) 📗

his Plataeans and Peripoli,

just where the trophy now stands; and he was no sooner within the

gates than the Plataeans engaged and defeated the nearest party of

Peloponnesians who had taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and

secured the gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry.

 

After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered went

against the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian garrison stood their

ground at first, and tried to repel the assault, and some of them were

killed; but the main body took fright and fled; the night attack and

the sight of the Megarian traitors in arms against them making them

think that all Megara had gone over to the enemy. It so happened

also that the Athenian herald of his own idea called out and invited

any of the Megarians that wished, to join the Athenian ranks; and this

was no sooner heard by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced

that they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge in

Nisaea. By daybreak, the walls being now taken and the Megarians in

the city in great agitation, the persons who had negotiated with the

Athenians, supported by the rest of the popular party which was

privy to the plot, said that they ought to open the gates and march

out to battle. It had been concerted between them that the Athenians

should rush in, the moment that the gates were opened, while the

conspirators were to be distinguished from the rest by being

anointed with oil, and so to avoid being hurt. They could open the

gates with more security, as four thousand Athenian heavy infantry

from Eleusis, and six hundred horse, had marched all night, according

to agreement, and were now close at hand. The conspirators were all

ready anointed and at their posts by the gates, when one of their

accomplices denounced the plot to the opposite party, who gathered

together and came in a body, and roundly said that they must not march

out—a thing they had never yet ventured on even when in greater force

than at present—or wantonly compromise the safety of the town, and

that if what they said was not attended to, the battle would have to

be fought in Megara. For the rest, they gave no signs of their

knowledge of the intrigue, but stoutly maintained that their advice

was the best, and meanwhile kept close by and watched the gates,

making it impossible for the conspirators to effect their purpose.

 

The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had arisen, and that

the capture of the town by force was no longer practicable, at once

proceeded to invest Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it

before relief arrived, the surrender of Megara would soon follow.

Iron, stone-masons, and everything else required quickly coming up

from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall which they

occupied, and from this point built a cross wall looking towards

Megara down to the sea on either side of Nisaea; the ditch and the

walls being divided among the army, stones and bricks taken from the

suburb, and the fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade

wherever this seemed necessary; the houses also in the suburb with the

addition of battlements sometimes entering into the fortification. The

whole of this day the work continued, and by the afternoon of the next

the wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea, alarmed

by the absolute want of provisions, which they used to take in for the

day from the upper town, not anticipating any speedy relief from the

Peloponnesians, and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the

Athenians on condition that they should give up their arms, and should

each be ransomed for a stipulated sum; their Lacedaemonian

commander, and any others of his countrymen in the place, being left

to the discretion of the Athenians. On these conditions they

surrendered and came out, and the Athenians broke down the long

walls at their point of junction with Megara, took possession of

Nisaea, and went on with their other preparations.

 

Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of Tellis,

happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth, getting

ready an army for Thrace. As soon as he heard of the capture of the

walls, fearing for the Peloponnesians in Nisaea and the safety of

Megara, he sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible at

Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under Mount Geraneia,

and went himself, with two thousand seven hundred Corinthian heavy

infantry, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such

troops of his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea

not yet taken. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out by night to

Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked men from the army,

without waiting till his coming should be known, and came up to Megara

unobserved by the Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and

really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get into

Megara and secure the town. He accordingly invited the townspeople

to admit his party, saying that he had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

 

However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he might expel

them and restore the exiles; the other that the commons,

apprehensive of this very danger, might set upon them, and the city be

thus destroyed by a battle within its gates under the eyes of the

ambushed Athenians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both

parties electing to remain quiet and await the event; each expecting a

battle between the Athenians and the relieving army, and thinking it

safer to see their friends victorious before declaring in their

favour.

 

Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the rest of the

army. At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. Having determined to

relieve Megara, whose danger they considered their own, even before

hearing from Brasidas, they were already in full force at Plataea,

when his messenger arrived to add spurs to their resolution; and

they at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy infantry,

and six hundred horse, returning home with the main body. The whole

army thus assembled numbered six thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian

heavy infantry were drawn up by Nisaea and the sea; but the light

troops being scattered over the plain were attacked by the Boeotian

horse and driven to the sea, being taken entirely by surprise, as on

previous occasions no relief had ever come to the Megarians from any

quarter. Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and engaged

by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action ensued which lasted a long

time, and in which both parties claimed the victory. The Athenians

killed and stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of

his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and remaining masters

of the bodies gave them back under truce, and set up a trophy; but

regarding the action as a whole the forces separated without either

side having gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to

their army and the Athenians to Nisaea.

 

After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the sea and to

Megara, and taking up a convenient position, remained quiet in order

of battle, expecting to be attacked by the Athenians and knowing

that the Megarians were waiting to see which would be the victor. This

attitude seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the

offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle, they

openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus without bearing the

burden of the day would fairly reap its honours; while at the same

time they effectually served their interests at Megara. For if they

had failed to show themselves they would not have had a chance, but

would have certainly been considered vanquished, and have lost the

town. As it was, the Athenians might possibly not be inclined to

accept their challenge, and their object would be attained without

fighting. And so it turned out. The Athenians formed outside the

long walls and, the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless;

their generals having decided that the risk was too unequal. In fact

most of their objects had been already attained; and they would have

to begin a battle against superior numbers, and if victorious could

only gain Megara, while a defeat would destroy the flower of their

heavy soldiery. For the enemy it was different; as even the states

actually represented in his army risked each only a part of its entire

force, he might well be more audacious. Accordingly, after waiting for

some time without either side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to

Nisaea, and the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which they

had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles now threw aside

their hesitation, and opened the gates to Brasidas and the

commanders from the different states—looking upon him as the victor

and upon the Athenians as having declined the battle—and receiving

them into the town proceeded to discuss matters with them; the party

in correspondence with the Athenians being paralysed by the turn

things had taken.

 

Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself went back to

Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to Thrace, his original

destination. The Athenians also returning home, the Megarians in the

city most implicated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they

had been detected, presently disappeared; while the rest conferred

 

binding them under solemn oaths to take no vengeance for the past, and

only to consult the real interests of the town. However, as soon as

they were in office, they held a review of the heavy infantry, and

separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred of their

enemies, and of those who were thought to be most involved in the

correspondence with the Athenians, brought them before the people, and

compelling the vote to be given openly, had them condemned and

executed, and established a close oligarchy in the town—a revolution

which lasted a very long while, although effected by a very few

partisans.