A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

in Nyâya pratijñâ, hetu d@r@s@tânta, upanaya, and nigamana are called in Vais'e@sika pratijñâ, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhâna, and pratyâmnâya. Ka@nâda however does not mention the name of any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a." Pratijñâ is of course the same as we have in Nyâya, and the term nidars'ana is very similar to Nyâya d@r@s@tânta, but the last two are entirely different. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

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{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyâbhû@sa@na says that "An example before the time of Dignâga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignâga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (Indian Logic, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vâtsyâyana had an imperfect example as "like a kitchen" (s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvâdanuya@h sthâlyâdivat, I.i. 36), but Pras'astapâda has it in the proper form. Whether Pras'astapâda borrowed it from Dig@nnâga or Dig@nnâga from Pras'astapâda cannot be easily settled.]

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(nidars'anâbhâsa). Pras'astapâda's contribution thus seems to consist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of the nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional Vais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being pursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Nyâya. There is no reason however to suppose that Pras'astapâda borrowed anything from Di@nnâga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapâda's apparent innovations are all definitely alluded to by Ka@nâda himself, and Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the question of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved that Di@nnâga preceded Pras'astapâda, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most important part of inference. Vâtsyâyana says that an inference can be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through the memory of the connection between the middle and the major previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is li@ngaparâmars'a, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection, but the present perception of the middle associated with the memory of the connection (sm@rtyanug@rhîto li@ngaparâmars'o). But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. Udyotakara's criticisms of Di@nnâga as shown by Vâcaspati have no reference to this point The doctrine of tâdâtmya and tadutpatti was therefore in all probability a new contribution to Buddhist logic by Dharmakîrtti. Dharmakîrtti's contention was that the root principle of the connection between the middle and the major was that the former was either identical in essence with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

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[Footnote 1: Pras'astapâda's bhâ@sya with Nyâyakandalî, pp. 200-255.]

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the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vâcaspati in his refutation of this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence such that there being fire there is smoke and there being no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of identity of essence (tâdâtmya as in the case of the pine and the tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when such is the case, though we may not know any further about the nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate the validity of inference. To this Vâcaspati's answer is that if even after observing a large number of cases and careful search such conditions (upâdhi) cannot be discovered, we have to take it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural connection between the middle and the major. The later Buddhists introduced the method of Pañcakâra@nî in order to determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions determining the causal relation are (1) neither the cause nor the effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in

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[Footnote 1: Kâryyakâra@nubhâvâdvâ svabhâvâdva niyâmakât avinâbhâvaniyamo' dars'anânna na dars'anât. Tâtparya@tîkâ, p. 105.]

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immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause and effect relation; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect relation [Footnote ref 1].

In early Nyâya books three kinds of inference are described, namely pûrvavat, s'e@savat, and sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta. Pûrvavat is the inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from heavy dark clouds; s'e@savat is the inference of causes from effects, e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta refers to the inference in all cases other than those of cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the tamarind from its form and colour. Nyâyamañjarî mentions another form of anumâna, namely paris'e@samâna (reductio ad absurdum), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness) of any other thing (e.g. âtman), because it was already definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely that of the inference of the probandum (sâdhya) by virtue of the unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called the vyâpti-niyama. In the new school of Nyâya (Navya-Nyâya) a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalânvayi, and kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the vyâpti has been observed by a combination of a large number of instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever there is smoke there is fire (anvaya), and where there is no fire, there is no smoke (vyatireka)). An inference could be for one's own self (svârthânumâna) or for the sake of convincing others (parârthânumâna). In the latter case, when it was necessary that an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner, live propositions (avayavas) were regarded as necessary, namely pratijña (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), udâhara@na (where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen), upanaya (this hill has smoke), niga@mana (therefore it has got

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[Footnote 1: Vâtsyâya@na's bhâsya, Udyotakara's Vârttika and Tâtparyya@tîkâ, I.i. 5.]

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fire). Kevalânvayi is that type of inference, the vyâpti of which could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case "this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge (ida@m, vâcyam prameyatvât)." Now no such case is known which is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any case where there was no object of knowledge (prameyatva) and no name (vâcyatva); the vyâpti here has therefore to be based necessarily on cases of agreement—wherever there is prameyatva or an object of knowledge, there is vâcyatva or name. The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our inference—earth differs from other elements, since it has the special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.

Upamâna and S'abda.

The third pramâ@na, which is admitted by Nyâya and not by Vais'e@sika, is upamâna, and consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never seen a wild ox (gavaya) goes to the forest, asks a forester—"what is gavaya?" and the forester replies—"oh, you do not know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its similarity to a known thing is called upamâna. If some forester had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would have been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge is said to be generated by the upamâna process when the association of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer

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on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown animal to a known one. The naiyâyikas are thorough realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind. Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception of similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is called upamâna [Footnote ref 1].

S'abda-pramâ@na or testimony is the right knowledge which we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the Vedas were uttered by Îs'vara himself. The Vedas give us right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the utterances of the infallible Îs'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admit s'abda as a separate pramâ@na, but they sought to establish the validity of testimony (s'abda) on the strength of inference (anumiti) on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly corroborated by the Vais'e@sika sûtras, which tacitly admit the validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this was how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times.

Negation in Nyâya-Vais'e@sika.

The problem of negation or non-existence (abhâva) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumârila [Footnote ref 2]

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[Footnote 1: See