A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

A study of the extant commentaries on the Brahma-sûtras of Bâdarâya@na by the adherents of different schools of thought leaves us convinced that these sûtras were regarded by all as condensations of the teachings of the Upani@sads. The differences of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sûtras and the Upani@sad texts to which references were made by them in each particular case. The Brahma-sûtra is divided into four adhyâyas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters or pâdas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion (adhikara@na) which are composed of a number of sûtras, which raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour

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[Footnote 1: See note on p. 432.]

[Footnote 2: S'a@nkara's bhâ@sya on the Brahma-sûtras, I. iii. 19.]

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a particular conclusion. As explained by S'a@nkara, most of these sûtras except the first four and the first two chapters of the second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the Upani@sad passages. S'a@nkara's method of explaining the absolutist Vedânta creed does not consist in proving the Vedânta to be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but in so interpreting the Upani@sad texts as to show that they all agree in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the only truth. In Chapter I of Book II S'a@nkara tries to answer some of the objections that may be made from the Sâ@mkhya point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute the Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bhâgavata and S'aiva systems of thought. These two chapters and his commentaries on the first four sûtras contain the main points of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing that the conclusion of the sûtras was always in strict agreement with the Upani@sad doctrines. Reason with S'a@nkara never occupied the premier position; its value was considered only secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding of the revealed scriptures, the Upani@sads. The ultimate truth cannot be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater. So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found in the Upani@sads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport of the Upani@sads. From his own position S'a@nkara was not thus bound to vindicate the position of the Vedânta as a thoroughly rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on its rationality but on the authority of the Upani@sads. But what was true could not contradict experience. If therefore S'a@nkara's interpretation of the Upani@sads was true, then it would not contradict experience. S'a@nkara was therefore bound to show that his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience. If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation that was faithful to the Upani@sads, and that its apparent contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,

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he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upani@sads and not simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously appear to be quite reasonable, Ultimate validity does not belong to reason but to the scriptures.

He started with the premise that whatever may be the reason it is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which identifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the senses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification, for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal knower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would be no cognitive act. S'a@nkara does not try to prove philosophically the existence of the pure self as distinct from all other things, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upani@sads describe the pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate truth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be taken, for it is so revealed in the Upani@sads. This point being granted, the next point is that our experience is always based upon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and the imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc. upon the self; and this with S'a@nkara is a beginningless illusion. All this had been said by Gau@dapâda. S'a@nkara accepted Gau@dapâda's conclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive proof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the refutation of other systems of thought. This being done he thought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his idea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upani@sads. He showed that the Upani@sads held that the pure self as pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This being accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must be a mere magic show of illusion or mâyâ. S'a@nkara never tries to prove that the world is mâyâ, but accepts it as indisputable. For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion is that all else is mere illusion or mâyâ. He had thus to quarrel on one side with the Mîmâ@msâ realists and on the other with the Sâ@mkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validity of the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The Mîmâ@msists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,

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or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the Upani@sads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in the Upani@sads does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. S'a@nkara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was that the Upani@sads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required; but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmakâ@n@da (those dealing with the injunctions relating to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upani@sads, the jñânakâ@n@da (those which declare the nature of ultimate truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly joy. Throughout his commentary on the Bhagavadgîtâ S'a@nkara tried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions of the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices, etc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in that order they had no right to follow the higher teachings of the Upani@sads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural duties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of all desires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions, the field of karmamârga (the path of duties), and wanted to know the truth alone, they entered the jñânamârga (the way of wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vedânta was thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longer inclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete emancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intending to study the Vedânta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is eternal and what is transitory (nityânityavastuviveka), (2) disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of

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the after world (ihâmutraphalabhogavirâga), (3) attainment of peace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration and faith (s'amadamâdisâdhanasampat) and desire for salvation (mumuk@sutva). The person who had these qualifications should study the Upani@sads, and as soon as he became convinced of the truth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attained emancipation. When once a man realized that the self alone was the reality and all else was mâyâ, all injunctions ceased to have any force with him. Thus, the path of duties (karma) and the path of wisdom (jñâna) were intended for different classes of persons or adhikârins. There could be no joint performance of Vedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in the Upani@sads (jñâna-karma-samuccayâbhâva@h). As against the dualists he tried to show that the Upani@sads never favoured any kind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference between the Vedânta as expounded by Gau@dapâda and as explained by S'a@nkara consists in this, that S'a@nkara tried as best he could to dissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition of the former and to formulate the philosophy as a direct interpretation of the older Upani@sad texts. In this he achieved remarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as a hidden Buddhist (pracchanna Bauddha), but his influence on Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded in later times as being almost a divine person or an incarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples, and those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeeding generations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in a much stronger way than S'a@nkara did. Our treatment of S'a@nkara's philosophy has been based on the interpretations of Vedânta thought, as offered by these followers of S'a@nkara. These interpretations are nowhere in conflict with S'a@nkara's doctrines, but the questions and problems which S'a@nkara did not raise have been raised and discussed by his followers, and without these one could not treat Vedânta as a complete and coherent system of metaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections, we may close this with a short description of some of the main features of the Vedânta thought as explained by S'a@nkara.

Brahman according to S'a@nkara is "the cause from which (proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world which is extended in names and forms, which includes many

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agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially determined according to space, time, and cause, a world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination of the) mind [Footnote ref 1]." The reasons that S'a@nkara adduces for the existence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) The world must have been produced as the modification of something, but in the Upani@sads all other things have been spoken of as having been originated from something other than Brahman, so Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung into being, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated from something else, for then we should have a regressus ad infinitum (anavasthâ). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have come forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent source then from which this world has come into being is Brahman. (3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (sâk@si) which shines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognition which the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self, and hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it, for even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us all and is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions.

Brahman according to S'a@nkara is the identity of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self of us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are identifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that we call "I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely without any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of our true state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual self as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth is the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure blessedness,