Problems of Life and Mind. Second series - George Henry Lewes (thriller books to read txt) 📗
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62. This is the modification of the Law of Bell to which reference was made in § 26. It replaces the idea of two different kinds of nerve, sensory and motor, by that of two different anatomical connections. I need not reproduce here the argument with which I formerly criticised the supposed distinction between sensory and motor nerves; because the old idea is rapidly falling into discredit, and physiologists so eminent as Vulpian and Wundt have explicitly announced their adhesion to the principle of identity,—a principle which, as Vulpian truly remarks, dominates the whole physiology of the nervous system.106
THE HYPOTHESIS OF SPECIFIC ENERGIES.63. One development of the theory of Bell, respecting the different kinds of nerve, has been the still accredited hypothesis that each nerve has a “specific energy,” or quality, in virtue of which it acts and reacts only in one way. The optic nerve, no matter how stimulated, only responds by a sensation of color, the auditory nerve only by a sensation of sound; and so on. This hypothesis, which (as I learn from a correspondent)107 was originally propounded by Bell himself, was developed and made an European doctrine by Johannes Müller, first in his remarkable treatise, Über die phantastischen Gesichtserscheinungen (1826), and afterwards in his Physiology. Like all good hypotheses, it has been fruitful; and Helmholtz still holds it to be of extraordinary importance for the theory of perception. Although combated by a few physiologists, it has kept its place firm in the general acceptance; no doubt because it forms a ready explanation of the facts. But, as I often have to remark, explanation is not demonstration.108
64. The first criticism to be made on the hypothesis is that it commits the error of confounding function with property, assigning as a specific quality of the nerve the reaction of the organ innervated. Thus Müller speaks of the specific energy as “the essential condition of the nerves in virtue of which they see light and hear sound.” But the optic nerve no more sees, than the liver-nerve secretes bile. That the optic nerve is one element in the mechanism on which vision depends, is all that we can say, Müller declares that it is not sufficient to assume each nerve to be so constituted that it has a susceptibility to certain stimuli rather than to others; but that “with Aristotle we must ascribe to each a peculiar energy as its vital quality. Sensation,” he adds, “consists in the sensorium receiving through the medium of the nerves a knowledge of certain qualities,—a condition, not of the external bodies, but of the nerves themselves,”—and these qualities are different in different nerves. In other words, he assumes a special substance for each special energy. The sensation of color depends on the special Visual substance (Sehsinnsubstanz); the sensation of sound on the Auditory substance (Hörsinnsubstanz); and so on.
65. We have here an hypothesis analogous to that of Innate Ideas, or a priori Forms of Thought. It is, in fact, only a reproduction of that conception carried into the sphere of Sense. No one thinks of assigning specific energies to the several muscles, yet a movement of prehension is as different from a movement of extension, a peristaltic movement is as different from a movement of occlusion, as a sensation of sound is from a sensation of color. If movement is common to both of the one class, feeling is common to both of the other: the forms and mechanism are different and specific. Muscles have the common property of contracting under stimulation; whatever be the nature of the stimulus, each muscle has its own particular response, or mode of reaction: the flexor always bending, never extending the limb; the sphincter always closing, never opening the orifice. The movements of the heart are not the same as those of the eye; both are unlike the movements of the intestine. There are muscles which respond to some stimuli, and not to others. Those of the eye, or of the vocal chords, respond to impulses which would leave the masseter or biceps unstirred. According to Marey, the hyoglossus of a frog will become tetanic under a stimulus of only ten pulses in a second; whereas the gastrocnemius of that same frog resists a stimulus of less than twenty in a second. We find the retina responding to ethereal pulses which leave the auditorius unaffected; we find the muscles of a gnat’s wing so exquisitely susceptible that the wing beats eight thousand times in a second,—a delicacy in comparison with which even our muscles of the eye are coarse.
66. The facts which the hypothesis of specific energies is called on to explain are more consistently interpreted on the admission of a common property in nerve-tissue, manifesting different degrees of excitability, and entering into different mechanisms, so that the functional results differ. A nerve which may be stimulated from the skin will not respond at all, or not in the same way, if the stimulus be applied under the skin. Are we to suppose that the specific energy resides in one part of the nerve, and not in another?109 That the optic nerve responds to stimuli which will not sensibly excite a motor nerve, depends on the terminal structures through which the stimulation is excited; for the optic nerve itself, apart from the retinal expansion, is as insensible to light as the motor nerve is. And the specific sensation, or movement, which results from stimulation of a nerve depends not on the nerve, but on the mechanism of which the nerve is one element. Sensations of touch, temperature, and pain are assuredly specific; they are as unlike each other as a sensation of taste is unlike a sensation of smell. Yet the same nerves, variously stimulated, produce all three sensations.
67. We conclude, therefore, that the phrase “specific energy” is an elliptical expression for the particular office of a nerve. In this meaning there is no obscurity. The optic nerve is not a vasomotor nerve, the skin nerve is not a muscle nerve; the auditory nerve is a nerve of special sensation, the vagus is a nerve of systemic sensation; and so on. Neither movement nor sensation belongs to the nerves themselves.
SENSIBILITY.
68. The principles laid down in the preceding chapter are equally applicable to the central system. But here greater difficulties await us. We cannot expect traditional views to be easily displaced, when they have taken such hold on the mind, as is the case with regard to Sensibility. To admit that all nerves have a common property, and that their functional relations depend on the organs which they innervate, demands small relinquishment of cherished opinions. But to admit that all nerve-centres have a common property, and that their functional relations depend on their anatomical connections, is to sweep away at once a mass of theoretic interpretations which from long familiarity have acquired an almost axiomatic force. That the brain, and the brain only, is the source and seat of Sensibility is the postulate of modern Physiology.
69. The question is one of extreme complexity, but may be greatly simplified, if we can manage to reduce it to purely physiological terms, and consider the phenomena in their objective aspect. In dealing with nerves and their actions this was comparatively easy; we had for the most part only physiological processes to unravel. It is otherwise in dealing with nerve-centres—the subjective or psychological aspect of the phenomena inevitably thrusts itself on our attention; and all the mysteries of Feeling and Thought cloud our vision of the neural process. Do what we will, we cannot altogether divest Sensibility of its psychological connotations, cannot help interpreting it in terms of Consciousness; so that even when treating of sensitive phenomena observed in molluscs and insects, we always imagine these more or less suffused with Feeling, as this is known in our own conscious states.
70. Feeling is recognized as in some way or other bound up with neural processes; but Physiology proper has only to concern itself with the processes; and the question whether these can, and do, go on unaccompanied by Feeling, is, strictly speaking, one which belongs to Psychology. It demands as a preliminary that the term Feeling be defined; and the answer will depend upon that definition, namely, whether Feeling be interpreted as synonymous with Consciousness in the restricted sense, or synonymous with the more general term Sentience. If the former, then since there are unquestionably neural processes of which we are not conscious, we must specify the particular groups which subserve Feeling; as we specify the particular groups which subserve the sensations of Sight, Hearing, Taste, etc.; and localize the separate functions in separate organs. If the latter, then, since all neural processes have a common character, we have only to localize the particular variations of its manifestation, and distinguish sensitive phenomena as we distinguish motor phenomena.
71. It is absolutely certain that the Feeling we attribute to a mollusc is different from that which we attribute to a man; if only because the organisms of the two are so widely different, and have been under such different conditions of excitation. If every feeling is the functional result of special organic activities, varying with the co-operant elements, we can have no more warrant for assuming the existence of the same particular forms of Feeling in organisms that are unlike, than for assuming the 47th proposition of Euclid to be presented by any three straight lines. The lines are the necessary basis for the construction, but they are not the triangle, except when in a special configuration. This is not denying that animals feel (in the general sense of that term), it is only asserting that their feelings must be very unlike our own. Even in our own race we see marked differences—some modes of feeling being absolutely denied to individuals only slightly differing from their fellows. If, however, we admit that different animals must have different modes of Feeling, we must also admit that the neuro-muscular activities are generically alike in all, because of the fundamental similarity in the structures. Whether we shall assign Feeling to the mollusc or not will depend on the meaning of the term; but, at all events, we require some term general enough to include the phenomena manifested by the mollusc, and those manifested by all other animals. Sensibility is the least objectionable term. Unless we adopt some such general designation, physiological and psychological interpretations become contradictory and obscure. The current doctrine which assigns Sensibility to the brain, denying it to all other centres, is seriously defective, inasmuch as it implies that tissues similar in kind have utterly diverse properties; in other words, that the same nerve-tissue which manifests Sensibility in the brain has no such property in the spinal cord.
72. How is this tenable? No one acquainted at first hand with the facts denies that the objective phenomena exhibited by the brainless animal have the same general character as those of the animal possessing a brain: the actions of the two are identical in all cases which admit of comparison. That is to say, the objective appearances are the same; differing only in so far as the mechanisms are made different by the presence
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