The Writings of Thomas Jefferson - Thomas Jefferson (buy e reader .TXT) 📗

uniformly pursued; and that the general expressions of the Arret of September the 28th had within their contemplation the nations of Europe only. This presumption is further strengthened by having observed, that in the treaties of commerce, made since the epoch of our independence, the jura gentis amicissimæ conceded to other nations, are expressly restrained to those of the "most favored European nation;" his Majesty wisely foreseeing, that it would be expedient to regulate the commerce of a nation, which brings nothing but raw materials to employ the industry of his subjects, very differently from that of the European nations, who bring mostly what has already passed through all the stages of manufacture.

On these circumstances, I take the liberty of asking information from your Excellency, as to the extent of the late Arret; and if I have not been mistaken in supposing it did not mean to abridge that of December the 29th, I would solicit an explanatory Arret, to prevent the misconstructions of it, which will otherwise take place. It is much to be desired, too, that this explanation could be given as soon as possible, in order that it may be handed out with the Arret of September the 28th. Great alarm may otherwise spread among the merchants and adventurers in the fisheries, who, confiding in the stability of regulations, which his Majesty's wisdom had so long and well matured, have embarked their fortunes in speculations in this branch of business.

The importance of the subject to one of the principal members of our Union induces me to attend with great anxiety, the re-assurance from your Excellency, that no change has taken place in his Majesty's views on this subject; and that his dispositions to multiply, rather than diminish the combinations of interest between the two people, continue unaltered.

Commerce is slow in changing its channel. That between this country and the United States, is as yet but beginning; and this beginning has received some checks. The Arret in question would be a considerable one, without the explanation I have the honor to ask. I am persuaded, that a continuation of the dispositions which have been hitherto manifested towards us, will insure effects, political and commercial, of value to both nations.

I have had too many proofs of the friendly interest your Excellency is pleased to take, in whatever may strengthen the bands and connect the views of the two countries, to doubt your patronage of the present application; or to pretermit any occasion of repeating assurances of those sentiments of high respect and esteem with which I have the honor to be, your Excellency's most obedient, and most humble servant.

 

TO MONSIEUR L'ABBÉ DE MORELLET.

Paris, Oct. 24, 1787

Sir,—I wish it were in my power to announce to the Count de Cambrai that the Treasury Board of the United States had enabled their banker here to answer the demands of the foreign officers. But it is not. As soon as I knew that there was a deficiency of money to pay the interest of this demand I informed the Treasury Board of it. They answered me they would supply the necessary fund as soon as it should be in their power; and I am persuaded they have not failed in inclination to do it. Of this I had the honor to notify the Count de Cambrai the last year. It is not unknown to you that the pursuit of our new machine of government which works the worst, is that which respects the raising money; and it is that which has occasioned the late attempts to amend our confederation. Foreseeing that our Treasury Board might not be able to remit money from America, I suggested to Congress the expediency of borrowing money in Holland to pay off the foreign officers. And in the month of July last, being assured they could command the money in Holland, I pressed a more particular proposition to this purpose. As I do not foresee any possible objection to the proposition I made them, I think myself sure of their acceding to it, and that I may receive news of it in the month of December. I may be disappointed as to the time of receiving their answer, because the course of their business is slow; but I do not apprehend it will be much retarded, and still less that they will refuse it altogether. The moment I receive an answer, the Count de Cambrai may be assured it shall be communicated to him. In doing this I shall gratify not only my personal friendship for him, but also those sentiments of particular esteem and attachment with which I have the honor to be, dear Sir, your most obedient, and most humble servant.

 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN JAY.

Paris, Oct. 27, 1787.

Sir,—When I had the honor of addressing you on the 8th instant, the appearances of war were such, that no one would have been surprised to hear that hostilities were actually commenced at sea. The preparations were pushed with such vivacity on the part of England, that it was believed she had other objects in view than those she spoke out. However, having protected by her countenance the establishment of the Stadtholder by the Prussian troops, and completely detached the Court of Berlin from that of Versailles, she made a proposition to the latter to disarm, which was agreed to. Mutual declarations for this purpose were signed last night at Versailles, of which I have now the honor to enclose you copies.

Commissaries are to be appointed on each side to see that the disarming takes place. The Count de Moustier having been detained at Brest a fortnight by contrary wind, and this continuing obstinately in the same point, admits a possibility that this letter may yet reach Brest before his departure. It passes through the post office and will be opened and read of course. I shall have the honor of addressing you more fully a week hence by a private hand. I have now that of assuring you of the sincerity of that esteem and respect with which I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.

 

TO JOHN JAY.

Paris, November 3, 1787.

Sir,—My last letters to you were of the 8th and 27th of October. In the former, I mentioned to you the declaration of this country, that they would interpose with force, if the Prussian troops entered Holland; the entry of those troops into Holland; the declaration of England, that if France did oppose force, they would consider it as an act of war; the naval armaments on both sides; the nomination of the Bailli de Suffrein as Generalissimo on the ocean; and the cold reception of Mr. Granville here, with his conciliatory propositions, as so many symptoms which seemed to indicate a certain and immediate rupture. It was indeed universally and hourly expected. But the King of Prussia, a little before these last events, got wind of the alliance on the carpet between France and the two empires; he awaked to the situation in which that would place him; he made some applications to the court of St. Petersburg, to divert the Empress from the proposed alliance, and supplicated the court of London not to abandon him. That court had also received a hint of the same project; both seemed to suspect, for the first time, that it would be possible for France to abandon the Turks, and that they were likely to get more than they had played for at Constantinople, for they had meant nothing more there, than to divert the Empress and Emperor from the affairs of the west, by employing them in the east, and at the same time, to embroil them with France as the patroness of the Turks. The court of London engaged not to abandon Prussia: but both of them relaxed a little the tone of their proceedings. The King of Prussia sent a Mr. Alvensleben here expressly to explain and soothe: the King of England, notwithstanding the cold reception of his propositions by Granville, renewed conferences here through Eden and the Duke of Dorset. The Minister, in the affection of his heart for peace, readily joined in conference, and a declaration and counter-declaration were cooked up at Versailles, and sent to London for approbation. They were approved, arrived here at one o'clock the 27th, were signed that night at Versailles, and on the next day, I had the honor of enclosing them to you, under cover to the Count de Moustier, whom I supposed still at Brest, dating my letter as of the 27th, by mistake for the 28th. Lest, however, these papers should not have got to Brest before the departure of the Count de Moustier, I now enclose you other copies. The English declaration states a notification of this court, in September, by Barthelemy, their Minister at London, "that they would send succours into Holland," as the first cause of England's arming; desires an explanation of the intentions of this court, as to the affairs of Holland, and proposes to disarm; on condition, however, that the King of France shall not retain any hostile views in any quarter, for what has been done in Holland. This last phrase was to secure Prussia, according to promise. The King of France acknowledges the notification by his Minister at London, promises he will do nothing in consequence of it, declares he has no intention to intermeddle with force in the affairs of Holland, and that he will entertain hostile views in no quarter, for what has been done there. He disavows having ever had any intention to interpose with force in the affairs of that republic. This disavowal begins the sentence, which acknowledges he had notified the contrary to the court of London, and it includes no apology to soothe the feelings which may be excited in the breasts of the Patriots of Holland, at hearing the King declare he never did intend to aid them with force, when promises to do this were the basis of those very attempts to better their constitution, which have ended in its ruin, as well as their own.

I have analyzed these declarations, because, being somewhat wrapped up in their expressions, their full import might escape, on a transient reading; and it is necessary it should not escape. It conveys to us the important lesson, that no circumstances of morality, honor, interest, or engagement, are sufficient to authorize a secure reliance on any nation, at all times, and in all positions. A moment of difficulty, or a moment of error, may render forever useless the most friendly dispositions in the King, in the major part of his ministers, and the whole of his nation. The present pacification is considered by most as only a short truce. They calculate on the spirit of the nation, and not on the agued hand which guides its movements. It is certain, that from this moment the whole system of Europe changes. Instead of counting together England, Austria, and Russia, as heretofore, against France, Spain, Holland, Prussia, and Turkey, the division will probably be, England, Holland, and Prussia, against France, Austria, Russia, and perhaps Spain. This last power is not sure, because the dispositions of its heir apparent are not sure. But whether the present be truce or peace, it will allow time to mature the conditions of the alliance between France and the two empires, always supposed to be on the carpet. It is thought to be obstructed by the avidity of the Emperor, who would swallow a good part of Turkey, Silesia, Bavaria, and the rights of the Germanic body. To the two or three first articles, France might consent, receiving in gratification a well-rounded portion of the Austrian Netherlands, with the islands of Candia, Cyprus, Rhodes, and perhaps lower Egypt. But all this is in embryo, uncertainty known, and counterworked by the machinations of the