The Categories - Aristotle (reading eggs books .TXT) 📗
- Author: Aristotle
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it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or
incapacity. Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue
of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or
incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any
kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in
virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn
capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called
healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to
those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy,
in virtue of the lack of this capacity. Similarly with regard to
softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated of a thing because
it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand
disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by
reason of the lack of that capacity.
A third class within this category is that of affective qualities
and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of
this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these;
heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective
qualities. It is evident that these are qualities, for those
things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such
by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it
contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains
whiteness; and so in all other cases.
The term ‘affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those
things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey
is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor
is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and
cold are called affective qualities, not because those things
which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said
qualities are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of
perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of
taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these
qualities.
Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not
said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they
themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many
changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is
ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so
on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such
affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his
constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the
corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of
bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily
present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a
man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding
colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions,
therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and
lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor
and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we
are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they
originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about
through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or
indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to
be such and such because of these.
Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may
easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called,
not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such
virtue of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to
be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale
through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather
to have been affected.
Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.
In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of
the soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its
origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I
mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for
people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these.
Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but
arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are
difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called
qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and
such.
Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered
ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a
man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken of as a
bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper
somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions are
therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.
The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs
to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any
other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as
being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a
thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it
is straight or curved; in fact a thing’s shape in every case
gives rise to a qualification of it.
Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms
indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to
a class different from that of quality. For it is rather a
certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus
qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms.
A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely
combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices
between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak,
evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.
There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most
properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.
These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name
from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on
them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. In most,
indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified
is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms ‘whiteness’,
‘grammar’, ‘justice’, give us the adjectives ‘white’,
‘grammatical’, ‘just’, and so on.
There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under
consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed
of it should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the
name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of
an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality; for
lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the
inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to
which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is
classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ‘boxing’
or ‘wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those
disposed in this way is derived from that of the science.
Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which
takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a
derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his character
from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name
given him is not derived from the word ‘integrity’. Yet this does
not occur often.
We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed
of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of
the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent
on it.
One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the
contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The
things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of
these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that
which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is
white to that which is black. This, however, is not always the
case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no
contraries.
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a
quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we
apply the names used to denote the other categories; for
instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and
justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality: neither
quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category
but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice. So
it is with all other contraries falling under the category of
quality.
Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated
of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is
also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the
same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did
before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.
Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if
we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree,
difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all
those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed,
who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that
justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree
themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they
possess these qualities, and that this is the case with
grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as
dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact
that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be
what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for
one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy
or just, than another, and so on.
The qualities expressed by the terms ‘triangular’ and
‘quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor
indeed do any that have to do with figure. For those things to
which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are
all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to
which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to
differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle
than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the
circle appropriate. In short, if the definition of the term
proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be
compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation
of degree.
Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar
to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be
predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category
its distinctive feature. One thing is like another only with
reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus
this forms the peculiar mark of quality.
We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though
proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in
it many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions
were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is
relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is
explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge
of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus
explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything
external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative
at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar
is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of
something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the
music of
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