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as in Ideation, and may expect to find it in unconscious as in conscious processes—in a word, in all sensorial processes whatever. Place a bit of marble on your tongue, and it will be touched, but not tasted: the sensations of contact and temperature will excite reflexes, but little or no reflexes from parotid and salivary glands. A difference in sensation has a corresponding difference in reflex action; which may be made evident by removing the tasteless marble, and replacing it by a pinch of carbonate of lime, i. e. the marble in another state reduced to a powder: this will excite a sensation of taste, and a secretion from the glands. In both cases your sentient organism was affected, but it reacted differently because the difference of the stimulation was discriminated: consciously or unconsciously, you felt differently. Again: touch the back of your mouth with your finger, or a feather, and a convulsive contraction of the gullet responds, followed by vomiting, if the excitation be renewed. Yet these same nerves and muscles respond by the totally opposite action of swallowing, if instead of the stimulation coming from your finger, it come from the pressure of food or drink.

Analogous experiments on animals without their brains yield similar results.265 The salivary secretion and the ordinary reactions of Taste are provoked by sapid substances. Still more conclusive are the observations made on a dog whose spinal cord has been divided, and who therefore according to the reigning ideas is incapable of feeling any impression made on parts below the section. A pencil inserted in the rectum causes a reaction of the muscles energetically resisting the entrance of this foreign body; yet this rectum so sensitive in its reaction on the stimulus of the pencil, responds by the totally different reaction—the relaxation of the muscles—on the stimulus of fæcal matters.

52. “This is all mechanical,” you say? Mechanical, no doubt, as all actions are; but the question here is whether among the conditions of the mechanical action Sensibility has a place? The answer can only be grounded on induction. The actions of the dog are analogous to the actions which you know were sentient in yourself. There was in both a discrimination, in both a corresponding reaction. I admit that what is here called “discrimination” is the application of a logical term to a mechanical process; I admit that if the spinal mechanism is insentient, the fact of discrimination may still be manifested; but I conceive that the many and coercive grounds for admitting that the mechanism is sentient gain further support in the evidence of discrimination. Every particular sensation has its corresponding reaction; and although this has been acquired during ancestral or individual experiences, so that in the majority of cases there is no consciousness accompanying the operation, this, as we have seen, is not a valid argument against the existence of a sensorial process. We have only to lower the Sensibility of the cord by anæsthetics, or to preoccupy its energies by some other excitation, and the reaction fails.

MEMORY.

53. “But discrimination, if not a purely physical process, implies Memory?” No doubt. And what is Memory—on its physiological side—but an organized tendency to react on lines previously traversed? As Griesinger truly says: “There is Memory in all the functions of the central organs, including the spinal cord. There is one for reflex actions, no less than for sense-images, words, and ideas.” Gratiolet makes a similar assertion.266 Indeed if, as we have seen, reflex actions are partly connate, and partly acquired, it is obvious that the second class must involve that very reproduction of experiences, which in the sphere of Intellect is called Memory.

There is assuredly something paradoxical at first in this application of the terms of the Logic of Signs, yet the psychologist will find it of great service. But if the terms discrimination and memory be objected to, they may be replaced by some such phrase as the “adaptation of the mechanism to varying impulses.” On its objective side, Discrimination is Neural Grouping; on its subjective side, it is Association of experiences.

INSTINCT.

54. If we can detect evidences of Volition and Instinct in the absence of the brain, our thesis may be considered less questionable. And such evidence there is. Goltz decapitated a male frog (in the pairing season), and observed that it not only sought, grasped, and energetically embraced a female, but could always discriminate a female from a male. Thus when a male frog closely resembling a female in size and shape was presented to this decapitated animal, he clasped it, but rapidly let it go again, whereas even the dead body of a female was held as in a vice. Goltz tried to delude this brainless animal in various ways, always in vain. Only a female would be held in his embrace. Goltz then presented a female in a reversed position, so that the head was grasped by the male. Now here, had there been simply a reflex machine, incapable of sentient discrimination, the clutched female would have been held in this position, just like any other object which excited the reflex; there would have been no “sense of incongruity,” such as Goltz noticed in his frog, who at once began a series of movements by which he was enabled, without letting the female escape, to bring her into the proper position. To render this observation still more significant, I may add that Goltz did not find all male frogs act thus—many relinquished the female thus improperly presented to them. Such phenomena observed in frogs possessing brains, would be accepted as evidence of sexual instinct and volition.

Further: Goltz removed the brain from a frog, which he then held under water, gently pressing the body so as to drive the air out of its lungs; the body being then heavier than the water sank to the bottom, where it remained motionless. He repeated this procedure with another frog, not brainless but blinded. This one sank also, but in a few minutes rose to the surface to breathe. This difference naturally suggests that the brainless frog was insensible of the condition which in the other caused a movement of relief. The one felt impending suffocation, the other felt nothing. Such was the interpretation of a German friend in whose presence I repeated the experiment. But I had been instructed by Goltz, and bade my friend wait awhile. He did so, and saw the brainless frog slowly rise to the surface and breathe there like his blinded companion. So that the only difference observable was in the lessened sensibility of the brainless frog.

55. But Goltz records a still more conclusive case. In a large vessel of water he inverted a glass jar also containing water, which could then only be retained in the jar by atmospheric pressure. Through the neck of this inverted jar he thrust a blinded frog, not having pressed the air out of its lungs. It rose at once in the jar, touching the inverted bottom with its nose, and when the necessity of fresh air was felt, the frog began restlessly feeling about the surface of its prison till an issue was found in the neck of the jar, through which it dashed into the vessel, and at once rose to the surface of the water to breathe. In this observation are plainly manifested the stimulation of uneasy sensation, the volition of seeking relief, and the discrimination of it when found. If this frog was a sentient mechanism, what shall we say to the fact that a brainless frog was observed to go through precisely the same series of actions? Goltz pertinently remarks: “So long as physiologists satisfied themselves that the brain was the sole organ of sensation, it was easy to declare all the actions of the brainless animal to be merely reflex. But now we must ask whether the greater part of these actions are not due to the power of adaptation in the central organs, and are therefore to be struck out of the class of simple reflexes? If I bind one leg of a brainless frog and observe that he not only sees an obstacle, but crawls aside from it, I must regard these movements as regulated by his central power of adaptation; but now suppose I unbind the leg and remove the obstacle, then if I prick the frog he hops forward. Must I now declare this hop to have been a simple reflex? Not at all. In both cases the physiological processes have been similar.”

* * * * *

56. There are no doubt readers who will dismiss all evidence drawn from experiments on frogs, as irrelevant to mammals and man. Let us therefore see how the evidence stands with respect to animals higher in the scale, endowed with less questionable mental faculties. In a former chapter (Problem II. § 29) we recorded the marked results of removing the cerebral hemispheres; and at the same time suggested that these by no means justified the conclusion usually drawn respecting the hemispheres as the exclusive seat of sensation. And this on two grounds: First, because the absence of some sensitive phenomena does not prevent the presence of others: the mutilated organism is still capable of manifesting Sensibility in those organs which remain intact. Secondly, because were the mutilation followed by total destruction of Sensibility, this would not prove Sensibility in the normal organism to have its seat in the part injured. If the removal of a pin will destroy the chronometric action of a watch, we do not thence infer that the chronometric action was the function of this pin. And this objection has the greater force when we remember that one hemisphere may be removed without the consequent loss of a single function, and both may be removed without the loss of several functions usually ascribed to cerebral influence.267

57. Consider the analogous effects of injuries to or removal of the Cerebellum, in causing disturbance of locomotion, whence the conclusion has been drawn that the Cerebellum is the exclusive organ of muscular co-ordination, in spite of the unquestionable evidence that very many muscular co-ordinations still persist after this organ is removed. What is the part played by the Cerebellum I do not pause here to examine.268 I only say that the movements of swimming, sucking, swallowing, breathing, crying, micturition, defecation, etc., are co-ordinated as well after removal of the Cerebellum as they were before, and that consequently their co-ordination has not its seat in the Cerebellum. The parallelism is obvious. Removal of the Cerebrum causes a disturbance in the combination of sensations, and the execution of certain sense-guided actions, but causes little appreciable disturbance in others. Removal of the Cerebellum causes a disturbance in the combination of certain muscular sensations, and the execution of certain co-ordinated actions, with little appreciable disturbance in others.

58. So little have the facts been surveyed and estimated in their entirety that there is perhaps no subject on which physiologists are more agreed than on the function of the Cerebellum being that of co-ordination. Yet consider this decisive experiment. I etherized three healthy frogs, from one I removed the entire cranial centres; from another I removed only the cerebellum; and, leaving the third in possession of an intact encephalon, I made two sections of the posterior columns of the spinal cord. The two first hopped, swam, used their legs in defence, and exhibited a variety of muscular co-ordinations, although in both the supposed organ of co-ordination was absent. Whereas the third, which had this organ intact, and was capable of moving each limb separately, and each pair of limbs separately, was utterly incapable of moving all four simultaneously. Why was this? Obviously because in

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