Launch on Need by Daniel Guiteras (small books to read txt) 📗

During NASA’s late-afternoon press conference yesterday, engineers outlined their ambitious plan to send Orbiter Atlantis up to rendezvous with Columbia to rescue the marooned crew. Many questions were raised by reporters as to other options for Columbia that could possibly extend the time available for rescue.

But Columbia’s Flight Director Allan Warner made it clear that rescue is NASA’s only option. “We can’t use the International Space Station as a safe haven,” Warner said. “Columbia would need about three times the fuel they have now to reach the Space Station, which is orbiting roughly 60 miles above them—they simply can’t get there.” Warner also said that although the European Space Agency’s Ariane rocket could reach Columbia from its French Guiana launch site, it wouldn’t be possible to build the necessary hardware and supply module, and write the necessary software, to successfully rendezvous with Columbia, all within the roughly 25-day time frame.

NASA officials were quick to point out that a rescue mission like this has never been attempted, and that the ground crews processing Atlantis will be following a very rushed processing schedule.

“Every last detail will have to be right the first time,” Warner commented. “There won’t be time for do-overs. If we can’t get Atlantis launched during one of the three windows, the crew of Columbia will perish in space; it’s that serious.”

The first launch window for Atlantis opens Feb. 9 at 11:09 P.M., which will be Columbia’s twenty-fifth day in space.

Chapter 26

NASA Headquarters

300 E Street S.W.

Washington, D.C.

NASA ADMINISTRATOR WILLIAM ATHERTON stood quietly at the windows of the executive boardroom. His arms were crossed behind his back, but he was not at ease. He waited for the various administrative heads of the Strategic Communications offices to take their places at the table, and listened for the sound of the boardroom door closing.

“I’m sure I don’t have to spend any time this morning explaining the scale of the mess we’re in,” Atherton began in a solemn tone, his back still to the group. “I know the news is fresh, but I trust by now you’ve all seen the EVA video of the wing damage, listened to the president’s speech, and had time to think over the wide-sweeping ramifications of this disaster.”

Atherton turned away from the window and walked to his chair at the far end of the conference table. He sat back slowly into the high-back chair and uttered a troubled, audible sigh. Then he leaned forward, perching his elbows on the table’s edge. He lowered his face into his hands, paused to savor a deep breath and continued his monologue.

“I’m going to refer to it as a disaster, this mess with Columbia, because even though the Tiger Team has done an incredible job devising a rescue plan, I’m troubled by the countless number of dominoes that will have to be lined up just right for this thing to go, for the team’s plan to succeed. You’ve all been in this business long enough to know the plan’s a real long shot. Successfully rescuing the crew of Columbia with Atlantis is a real long shot.

“Until the centers have had time to review the rescue timeline, until we have clearer definitions of what will be cut from Atlantis’s processing schedule, I want you all thinking along the lines of a disaster and damage control.

“Before I get input from the various offices here today, I’d like to set the stage for what we’re up against. First, the liberal media is already falling all over itself. Stories are already hinting at how maybe this agency may have covered up the potential for this very thing to happen—for a foam debris strike to cripple an orbiter and place the crew’s lives in jeopardy.”

Atherton stood up from his chair and began to circle the seven seated at the conference table. Another huge sigh. “You know, if you put yourself on the outside for just a minute, it’s not hard to see why the public might wonder about the foam strike history—after all, it was just three months ago, on STS-112, when we experienced our sixth incident of foam loss from the bi-pod area. Trust me when I say that as an agency, we’re going to look long and hard at why the shuttle fleet wasn’t grounded right then and there, why sufficient policing of our own agency didn’t occur, why it was that we didn’t stand on the brake pedal with both feet, and how we could’ve let even one more shuttle and crew go into space.

“Secondly, there are those who think the space program is a huge waste of money—you’ve met them, you’ve taken questions from them, you know who I’m talking about. They’ve argued that it’s nice the shuttle can launch like a rocket and land like an airplane. ‘But what is it going to do?’ they ask. ‘It costs so much,’ they complain. So we came up with the idea of building the International Space Station, you know, to give the shuttle a purpose—but of course they have complaints about that, too. It seems the critics of the space program see only the downside; they see the costs, but never the benefits.

“Thirdly, next year is a reelection year. I’ve already received calls from various White House staff reminding me of the need to proceed with caution, to handle the rescue attempt carefully. Their words were presented to me, well, let’s say they weren’t in the form of a directive—let’s just call it a suggestion. They wanted me to understand how the success or failure of the rescue mission could impact the president’s chances for reelection.”

Atherton fell back into his seat, defeated. “I could go on all day about the various angles of attack we’re facing, but I want to hear from the various departments. I want to know your thoughts about our situation. We’ll start with public affairs, then