Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

1900 hours, 12 nautical miles north of Skagen Lightship (the northern point of the Jutland Peninsula) on a westerly course at high speed. They stated that these were the same three ships reported on earlier in the day. The westerly course of the German ships appeared to confirm the view held by Admiral Diesen and his chief of staff that the destination was not Norway and they appear to have persisted in their view despite the warning from the British five hours earlier. There were many who viewed the British warning as an attempt to distract the Norwegians from dealing with the British minefields.

Admiral Diesen refused to believe the statements by the German survivors from Rio de Janeiro that they were headed for Bergen. He believed their statements camouflaged a German operation against a more westerly target, possibly the Shetland Islands or the Faeroes. It is difficult to see how he arrived at this conclusion since he also believed that a German attack against Norway was improbable due to British naval superiority. If he ruled out German operations against Norway because of British naval strength, it seems surprising that he then ruled in operations by the Germans in Britain’s backyard. Furthermore, the naval staff apparently did not find it strange that the reports included a large number of smaller ships (small minesweepers, trawlers, and torpedo boats) unsuitable for distant operations. If these were destined for the Netherlands, they would surely have used the Kiel Canal rather than the long, circuitous, and exposed route around the Jutland Peninsula.

However, most government officials and members of the Norwegian parliament shared Diesen’s view that the German naval activity did not have Norway as a target and that the Germans would wait to see what the Norwegians did about the British mining before taking any actions. This was a big mistake on the part of the Norwegian military leaders. They failed to appreciate that air power had significantly changed the old concept of naval superiority. Furthermore, they violated an important principle by basing their plans and actions on what they perceived the German intentions to be. It would have been more prudent to base their plans and preparations on German capabilities and the German course of action most dangerous to Norwegian interests. Finally, British actions over the last 24 hours had already given the Norwegians ample reasons to make plans and preparations necessary to defend the country.

Instead, only minor precautionary measures were taken. At 1820 hours, Admiral Diesen ordered the 1st Naval District to call up additional personnel for the forts. A request for two infantry companies to protect the Bergen and Trondheim forts was passed to the army at 2215 hours but it could not be acted on in time. On recommendations from the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Naval Districts, Diesen ordered the lighthouses from the Swedish border to the entrance of Bergen extinguished. A statement over the national broadcasting system announced this action at 2218 hours. The lighthouses in the 3rd Naval District (and the rest of the 2nd Naval District) were not included in this order, even though the British had reported that German naval forces could be expected in Narvik before midnight.

The acting commander of the 3rd Naval District pointed out to Admiral Diesen at 2345 hours that there were 14 German merchant ships in Narvik harbor and asked for instructions in case of a British attack on these ships. Admiral Diesen answered 10 minutes later that a British attack on German shipping in Narvik was to be met with force. Similar messages were not sent to the 1st and 2nd Naval Districts but the fact that such messages were even considered necessary tells much about the irresolute nature of the Norwegian Government and its military officials.

Diesen did not order his forces to the highest state of alert. The 1st Naval District gave a second-stage alert warning to its forces after it was told by Diesen not to activate the highest state of alert “because it would just scare people.” Some lower echelons misinterpreted the 1st Naval District order and proceeded to the highest state of alert. The 2nd Naval District had already ordered its ships to their assigned war stations after the British mining.9

Crisis Provoked by the British Mining of Norwegian Waters

Some of the lethargy of the Norwegian authorities can be explained by the fact that they were already trying to manage another crisis, Allied mining of Norwegian waters. The rapidly unfolding events of April 8 were propelling the country precipitously into a war it wanted to avoid at all costs. These events were so confusing that even those who had concluded that the country would find itself at war within a very short time did not know before midnight on April 8 whether they would be fighting the British or the Germans.

Information about British mining operations in Norwegian territorial waters reached Norwegian authorities at 0420 hours on April 8. Norwegian naval vessels intercepted the British destroyers in territorial waters off the coast near Molde. No armed clashes took place, despite the Norwegian Foreign Minister’s earlier warning to the British that future violations would be met with force. The British action was different from earlier violations of the country’s neutrality: it was an act of war. Norwegian officers protested the mining and the British destroyers left Norwegian waters before noon after Norwegian assurances that they would assume responsibility for warning merchant traffic. The Norwegians received sketches of the simulated minefield.

At 0600 hours, the British and French Naval Attachés delivered notes to the duty officer at the Norwegian Naval Staff that Norwegian territorial waters had been mined in three places. Only one minefield was actually laid but the Norwegians did not know this until later.

The British and French diplomatic representatives in Oslo also delivered simultaneous notes to the Norwegian Foreign Office about the mining operations. Koht called the Prime Minister at 0630 hours and requested an emergency meeting of the cabinet. Prime Minister Nygaardsvold decided to consider the