Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

an attack on Narvik and the Admiralty had strongly alluded to this possibility. The approach to Narvik from the south was through Vestfjord, which is why the mines were laid there. The defenders also point out that the admiral was bombarded by a mass of irrelevant incoming messages as he headed north, that the required intense and critical evaluation of the situation was inhibited by increasingly rough weather, and finally that he was placed in a position where he was forced to second-guess the desires of his superiors.

These explanations are less than convincing, except that Whitworth may have given his superiors’ well-known fears of a German breakout into the Atlantic more consideration than it warranted. The earlier aerial reconnaissance reports about German ships on a west-northwest course off Trondheim may have caused him to think, as it did Admiral Forbes, that the German intention was to break into the Atlantic. However, by comparing the reconnaissance report from 1400 hours with the report of the bombers from 1330 hours on the previous day, it should have been apparent that something was wrong. The report from 1400 hours reported five ships while the report from the previous day had reported thirteen ships. In any case, Whitworth ordered his ships to look for the British west of the Lofoten Islands.

Admiral Whitworth listed the possible enemy courses of action after the encounter with Glowworm as follows: 1) return to Germany, 2) head for Iceland, 3) make for Murmansk, or 4) attack Narvik. It is difficult to understand why he placed the possibility that the Germans were heading for Iceland ahead of an attack on Narvik. The likelihood that the Germans were heading for Murmansk also did not make sense. Why would the Germans risk their ships in a dash for Murmansk, and for what purpose? The British should also have realized that, without refueling, both these destinations were beyond the range of the destroyers in the German force. Whitworth placed the possibility of an attack on Narvik last, notwithstanding intelligence to the contrary and despite the obvious fact that this was the enemy course of action most damaging to British interests. At the entrance to Vestfjord, Whitworth’s battle cruiser and nine destroyers would have been in an ideal position to bring on a major naval engagement and probably thwart the German attack on Narvik. In retrospect, positioning himself near the British minefield would have led to a German disaster since the battleships had separated from TF 1 and headed into the open sea. Instead, Whitworth apparently planned to be in a position to meet the Germans if they should attempt to pass northward, outside the Lofoten Islands. This fateful decision opened the gate to Narvik just as Admiral Forbes’ decision to alter course to the north and then north-northwest opened the gate to Trondheim.

At 1752 hours, shortly after Admiral Whitworth began to head away from the Norwegian coast and into the Norwegian Sea, he received a cautionary message from the Admiralty. It stated that since the aircraft that had sighted the Germans ships west of Trondheim had only spotted part of the enemy force, it was possible that the rest were still headed towards Narvik. Other than noting that the missing ships were two cruisers and 12 destroyers, Whitworth took no action.

The officials in London now had a clearer appreciation of German intentions than did Admiral Whitworth. At this time, the German destroyers were still about three hours from the entrance to Vestfjord, and so about two hours from separating from the battleships. Every minute counted. This was the proper time for the Admiralty to intercede and at 1850 hours a message was sent to Whitworth that should have left no doubt in his mind as to the appropriate action to take: “To Vice-Admiral Commanding Battlecruisers, repeat to Commander-in-Chief. Most immediate. The force under your orders is to concentrate on preventing any German force proceeding to Narvik. May enter territorial waters as necessary.”17 Admiral Whitworth received the message by 1915 hours. There was no doubt that the message was an order. The words “is to concentrate” should have left no doubt.

Admiral Whitworth did not immediately take the action necessary to carry out the Admiralty order but continued on his westward course. At 2014 hours, he signaled his force: “Our object is to prevent German forces reaching Narvik. My present intention is to alter course at 2100 to 280 degrees (to north-northwest), and to turn 180 degrees to starboard (east-southeast) in succession at midnight.” These course changes left the British fleet steering away from the Norwegian coast for almost five hours after receipt of the Admiralty order.

The weather was now dictating Admiral Whitworth’s course of action. The conditions had deteriorated to a point never experienced by some of the seasoned sailors aboard the British ships. During the night the wind reached Force 11 on the Beaufort scale, a speed of 64 to 72 miles per hour, with towering 50-foot waves. The destroyers became almost unmanageable in the heavy seas and Whitworth felt it necessary to keep his fleet together and steer a course that would avoid sea damage to his ships. His explanation is as follows:18

On receipt of this signal (Admiralty 1850 hours message) I calculated that the enemy had had ample time to reach my vicinity if they were proceeding direct to Narvik. Assuming that they had not yet passed me I decided to proceed up Vestfjord with the object of placing myself between the enemy and his objective. There were two objections to this course of action. One was the possibility of being brought to action by a superior force (four of my destroyers had no torpedoes and only two guns).19 The other was the navigational danger of approaching a dangerous coast in low visibility without having been able to fix the ship’s position for three days.

The weather at this time showed signs of improving and I decided to disregard both these objections. But the improvement proved to be only a lull and