Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗
- Author: Henrik Lunde
Book online «Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗». Author Henrik Lunde
After three years (1926-1929) with the Royal Guards, Fleischer returned to the General Staff and continued there until 1934. He was also an instructor in tactics at the Military Academy at the same time as Otto Ruge, the future Commander-in-Chief. The lack of an amicable relationship between these two officers assumed some importance during the Narvik Campaign. Their careers crossed at various times in the years leading up to World War 2 and it appears that they grew to dislike each other. Most writers attribute this bad chemistry to the fact that they were on opposite sides in the bitter dispute over the 1933 army reorganization. Hovland believes that the problems were deeper. Ruge was a pragmatist by nature. Fleischer, on the other hand, was an idealist who abhorred compromise when it came to national defense. He had little understanding for or patience with the give and take that characterize the budgetary process and allocation of resources in a democracy. Ruge’s view that military budget requests should be politically realistic and that the military should put the limited resources made available to the best use became the basis for the reorganization of 1933. Ruge made a distinction between what he called “peace defense,” such as a military neutrality watch, and the sort of situation that would arise if the country became involved in a European war because of its strategic position. To accomplish this dual mission, Ruge argued that the military should give up its wishes for a large establishment, which would only exist on paper because of limited resources. He wanted a small, modern, and well-trained army. Fleischer and many fellow officers opposed the reorganization that Ruge pushed through in 1933. They considered it unsuitable for the defense problems confronting Norway and a sell-out of national security. General Roscher-Nielsen described Fleischer as Ruge’s most incensed opponent.
Fleischer was promoted from major to colonel in 1934—skipping one rank—and assumed command of the 14th Inf Regt in Mosjøen. As commander of the 14th Inf, he was responsible for the defense of the area from Narvik to the Nord-Trøndelag provincial boundary. Fleischer was promoted to major general in January 1939, and given command of the 6th Division.
When the time came for the appointment of a new Minister of Defense in early 1940, Fleischer was one of three candidates under consideration. The other two were Colonels Ruge and Birger Ljungberg, the youngest of the three. Fleischer was not selected because it was judged unwise to make a command change in North Norway with hostilities just across the border in Finland. Ljungberg was eventually chosen because he was viewed as non-controversial and a person who could work well in a political setting.
The Town of Narvik
Narvik is located near the center of the area Fleischer and Hagerup were required to defend. At 68º 26’ 8’’ N, it is 220 kilometers north of the Arctic Circle, near the same latitude as Barrow, Alaska (71º 18’ 1” N). The distance from Narvik to Oslo is approximately 1,450 kilometers. Until 1902 Narvik was known as Victoriahavn. As late as 1883, it was an isolated community of a few farms, largely dependent on the Lofoten fisheries.
Narvik has an excellent ice–free harbor and this fact led to its selection as the western terminal of the Ofot Railway. Sweden and Norway had entered into a union in 1814 and the governments of the two countries decided, in the 1880s, to build a railroad to cross the 170km between the iron ore districts in Kiruna, Sweden and Narvik. The railroad would allow iron ore to be shipped during the winter months when the Gulf of Bothnia and parts of the Baltic froze. This immense, complicated construction project in a wild and inhospitable region took many years to complete, despite the involvement of thousands of laborers. The project included building harbor facilities to handle the iron ore and this caused a sharp increase in Narvik’s permanent population from 300 in 1898 to 4,500 in 1903, the year after the railroad was completed.
By 1940, Narvik’s population had grown to approximately 10,000 people, but the town remained very isolated. There were no road or railroad links to the southern areas of the country. A road or railroad through the mountainous wilderness between Narvik and Bodø was only in the planning stages. To reach Oslo or southern Norway from Narvik, a person had to take a coastal steamer to Trondheim or Bergen, and then catch a train for the remainder of the journey. An alternate route was by train from Narvik to Luleå, and on to Oslo via Stockholm. There was a road leading north from Øyjord, across the Ofotfjord from Narvik; however, it was difficult to keep this road open for traffic during the winter and it could become impassable during the spring thaw.
Prior to the construction of the Ofot Railway, North Norway was more or less a military no-man’s land. The railroad changed that and was the most important factor that caused the political and military leadership to plan a defense of the region. Russia was viewed as the main threat because of its well-known desire for ice-free harbors. A naval attack was viewed as the most likely form of Russian aggression and the plans to deal with this threat concentrated on naval and coastal artillery forces. Not much was accomplished, however, since in the period leading to the breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905, the southern and eastern parts of the country were viewed as the priority from a military perspective.
After 1905, Russia was still viewed as the main threat, but the possibility of a Swedish attack to secure the railroad and the harbor at Narvik
Comments (0)