Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

he knew it, and ordered the preparations required to receive the battalion. This meeting took place between 2100 and 2130 hours.

Sundlo did not ask the commander of Co 2, Captain Langlo, to attend the meeting since that company was placed on full alert around 2000 hours and he felt that under these circumstances the commander’s place was with his unit. The company executive officer, Captain Dalsve, attended the meeting and he was expected to brief Langlo. Some of Langlo’s later statements to his subordinates indicate that he did not understand the situation.17 The commanders of the engineer company, the railcar-mounted 75mm gun detachment, and the supply organization were not present at the meeting and Colonel Sundlo neglected to inform them about the events that were taking place. In addition, the chief of police and other civilian authorities were not notified.

Sundlo briefed Lieutenant Munthe-Kaas, the acting commander of the antiaircraft battery, about 2150 hours. He ordered Munthe-Kaas to insure that the guns were manned. The lieutenant pointed out that the battery did not have searchlights and it was impossible to pick out targets in the dark without them. Munthe-Kaas recommended that the personnel under his command be allowed to rest until morning and occupy the gun positions at first light. Sundlo agreed, provided that a skeleton crew was maintained at the battery during the night.18 This detail was given to a sergeant and ten men.

The battery’s primary mission was to engage enemy aircraft and the guns were therefore located on the high ground at Framnes. From that location, they could fire on targets in the fjord but not on targets in the harbor.

It took some time to move the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen to Narvik at night in a snowstorm. The ferry moved from Vassvik to Øyjord where it was ready to start loading at midnight. The distance from Elvegårdsmoen to Øyjord is 13 kilometers and the distance across the fjord is less than 5 kilometers. The ferry had to make several trips to bring the battalion to Vassvik and the turnaround time was about one hour. The battalion started its move from Elvegårdsmoen around midnight. It brought along the battle and kitchen trains. The pack train and trucks were left behind. Company 4 with two platoons (one platoon was already in Narvik) and the battalion commander with a small staff traveled to Øyjord by motor vehicles and made the first trip across the fjord. These troops arrived in Narvik between 0130 and 0200 hours. The second ferry carried Co 3 and part of the trains. The ferry captain refused to load the horses because of heavy seas in the fjord. Consequently, the sleds for the trains were loaded manually and unloaded in Vassvik in the same manner. Company 3 arrived in Narvik about 0300 hours. The ferry brought Co 1 to Vassvik on its third trip. The company had to wait in Øyjord for over one hour and arrived in Vassvik about 0445 hours.

In Sundlo’s staff meeting at 2100 hours it was decided not to move the arriving units into defense positions immediately. Sundlo directed that the troops take up quarters in various locations in town to rest up and dry out from their rigorous travels. The troops were told to remain in battle gear and be prepared to move out on short notice. Officers were directed to remain with their units.

In view of what was known at the time, this was a logical decision. First, the only threat warning against Narvik came from the British and the Norwegian military authorities in Oslo passed it to General Fleischer and Captain Askim with the observation that it was not believable. Even Fleischer and his chief of staff concluded that the British report must have been false, since the authorities in Oslo did not order mobilization. They both expected a quiet night when they went to sleep. Second, Sundlo, the District Command and the 3rd Naval District believed that the two coastal defense ships had left the harbor to take up their planned positions at the Ofotfjord entrance. The distance from the early-warning patrol line at the Ofotfjord entrance to Narvik was approximately 60 kilometers (37 miles) and enemy warships, even if they traveled at maximum speed, would need more than one hour to reach the town. Even if he had known that the coastal defense ships had not taken up positions at the Ofotfjord entrance, it was reasonable for Sundlo to assume that the early-warning patrol vessels, with radios, would provide sufficient warning of an enemy approach to allow the troops in the city to take up defensive positions.

The decision not to deploy the forces immediately was sensible for yet another reason, although there is no evidence that it was an important factor in Sundlo’s mind. The Norwegian forces were inadequate to defend a relatively long stretch of shoreline. It would be wise to keep relatively large reserves until the enemy’s landing site was identified. If Sundlo deployed the forces as they arrived, he ran the risk of having only a small portion of his force covering the actual landing site and few, if any, reserves at his disposal. By retaining a sizable reserve and quickly moving it to the threatened location, it was possible for the Norwegians to muster sufficient combat power to frustrate an attacker.

Colonel Sundlo briefed Major Spjeldnæs when he arrived in Narvik. Apparently, both Major Spjeldnæs and Major Omdal, who was also present at the briefing, considered the decisions taken by Colonel Sundlo reasonable. At least they did not register any objections.19

Sundlo expected a mobilization order and he remained near a telephone in his headquarters all night. District Command had not informed him about the message it received from the General Staff at 2125 hours stating that a decision on mobilization would not be taken until the following morning. Sundlo was beginning to suspect that the warships approaching Bergen and Trondheim were the same ships that the report received at 2000 hours claimed were on their way to