The Analysis of Mind - Bertrand Russell (brene brown rising strong .TXT) 📗
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until that result is caused, unless they are interrupted by
death, accident, or some new behaviour-cycle. (Here “accident”
may be defined as the intervention of purely physical laws
causing mechanical movements.)
The “purpose” of a behaviour-cycle is the result which brings it
to an end, normally by a condition of temporary
quiescence-provided there is no interruption.
An animal is said to “desire” the purpose of a behaviour cycle
while the behaviour-cycle is in progress.
I believe these definitions to be adequate also to human purposes
and desires, but for the present I am only occupied with animals
and with what can be learnt by external observation. I am very
anxious that no ideas should be attached to the words “purpose”
and “desire” beyond those involved in the above definitions.
We have not so far considered what is the nature of the initial
stimulus to a behaviour-cycle. Yet it is here that the usual view
of desire seems on the strongest ground. The hungry animal goes
on making movements until it gets food; it seems natural,
therefore, to suppose that the idea of food is present throughout
the process, and that the thought of the end to be achieved sets
the whole process in motion. Such a view, however, is obviously
untenable in many cases, especially where instinct is concerned.
Take, for example, reproduction and the rearing of the young.
Birds mate, build a nest, lay eggs in it, sit on the eggs, feed
the young birds, and care for them until they are fully grown. It
is totally impossible to suppose that this series of actions,
which constitutes one behaviour-cycle, is inspired by any
prevision of the end, at any rate the first time it is
performed.* We must suppose that the stimulus to the performance
of each act is an impulsion from behind, not an attraction from
the future. The bird does what it does, at each stage, because it
has an impulse to that particular action, not because it
perceives that the whole cycle of actions will contribute to the
preservation of the species. The same considerations apply to
other instincts. A hungry animal feels restless, and is led by
instinctive impulses to perform the movements which give it
nourishment; but the act of seeking food is not sufficient
evidence from which to conclude that the animal has the thought
of food in its “mind.”
* For evidence as to birds’ nests, cf. Semon, “Die Mneme,” pp.
209, 210.
Coming now to human beings, and to what we know about our own
actions, it seems clear that what, with us, sets a
behaviour-cycle in motion is some sensation of the sort which we
call disagreeable. Take the case of hunger: we have first an
uncomfortable feeling inside, producing a disinclination to sit
still, a sensitiveness to savoury smells, and an attraction
towards any food that there may be in our neighbourhood. At any
moment during this process we may become aware that we are
hungry, in the sense of saying to ourselves, “I am hungry”; but
we may have been acting with reference to food for some time
before this moment. While we are talking or reading, we may eat
in complete unconsciousness; but we perform the actions of eating
just as we should if we were conscious, and they cease when our
hunger is appeased. What we call “consciousness” seems to be a
mere spectator of the process; even when it issues orders, they
are usually, like those of a wise parent, just such as would have
been obeyed even if they had not been given. This view may seem
at first exaggerated, but the more our so-called volitions and
their causes are examined, the more it is forced upon us. The
part played by words in all this is complicated, and a potent
source of confusions; I shall return to it later. For the
present, I am still concerned with primitive desire, as it exists
in man, but in the form in which man shows his affinity to his
animal ancestors.
Conscious desire is made up partly of what is essential to
desire, partly of beliefs as to what we want. It is important to
be clear as to the part which does not consist of beliefs.
The primitive non-cognitive element in desire seems to be a push,
not a pull, an impulsion away from the actual, rather than an
attraction towards the ideal. Certain sensations and other mental
occurrences have a property which we call discomfort; these cause
such bodily movements as are likely to lead to their cessation.
When the discomfort ceases, or even when it appreciably
diminishes, we have sensations possessing a property which we
call PLEASURE. Pleasurable sensations either stimulate no action
at all, or at most stimulate such action as is likely to prolong
them. I shall return shortly to the consideration of what
discomfort and pleasure are in themselves; for the present, it is
their connection with action and desire that concerns us.
Abandoning momentarily the standpoint of behaviourism, we may
presume that hungry animals experience sensations involving
discomfort, and stimulating such movements as seem likely to
bring them to the food which is outside the cages. When they have
reached the food and eaten it, their discomfort ceases and their
sensations become pleasurable. It SEEMS, mistakenly, as if the
animals had had this situation in mind throughout, when in fact
they have been continually pushed by discomfort. And when an
animal is reflective, like some men, it comes to think that it
had the final situation in mind throughout; sometimes it comes to
know what situation will bring satisfaction, so that in fact the
discomfort does bring the thought of what will allay it.
Nevertheless the sensation involving discomfort remains the prime
mover.
This brings us to the question of the nature of discomfort and
pleasure. Since Kant it has been customary to recognize three
great divisions of mental phenomena, which are typified by
knowledge, desire and feeling, where “feeling” is used to mean
pleasure and discomfort. Of course, “knowledge” is too definite a
word: the states of mind concerned are grouped together as
“cognitive,” and are to embrace not only beliefs, but
perceptions, doubts, and the understanding of concepts. “Desire,”
also, is narrower than what is intended: for example, WILL is to
be included in this category, and in fact every thing that
involves any kind of striving, or “conation” as it is technically
called. I do not myself believe that there is any value in this
threefold division of the contents of mind. I believe that
sensations (including images) supply all the “stuff” of the mind,
and that everything else can be analysed into groups of
sensations related in various ways, or characteristics of
sensations or of groups of sensations. As regards belief, I shall
give grounds for this view in later lectures. As regards desires,
I have given some grounds in this lecture. For the present, it is
pleasure and discomfort that concern us. There are broadly three
theories that might be held in regard to them. We may regard them
as separate existing items in those who experience them, or we
may regard them as intrinsic qualities of sensations and other
mental occurrences, or we may regard them as mere names for the
causal characteristics of the occurrences which are uncomfortable
or pleasant. The first of these theories, namely, that which
regards discomfort and pleasure as actual contents in those who
experience them, has, I think, nothing conclusive to be said in
its favour.* It is suggested chiefly by an ambiguity in the word
“pain,” which has misled many people, including Berkeley, whom it
supplied with one of his arguments for subjective idealism. We
may use “pain” as the opposite of “pleasure,” and “painful” as
the opposite of “pleasant,” or we may use “pain” to mean a
certain sort of sensation, on a level with the sensations of heat
and cold and touch. The latter use of the word has prevailed in
psychological literature, and it is now no longer used as the
opposite of “pleasure.” Dr. H. Head, in a recent publication, has
stated this distinction as follows:**
* Various arguments in its favour are advanced by A. Wohlgemuth,
“On the feelings and their neural correlate, with an examination
of the nature of pain,” “British Journal of Psychology,” viii, 4.
(1917). But as these arguments are largely a reductio ad absurdum
of other theories, among which that which I am advocating is not
included, I cannot regard them as establishing their contention.
** “Sensation and the Cerebral Cortex,” “Brain,” vol. xli, part
ii (September, 1918), p. 90. Cf. also Wohlgemuth, loc. cit. pp.
437, 450.
“It is necessary at the outset to distinguish clearly between
‘discomfort’ and ‘pain.’ Pain is a distinct sensory quality
equivalent to heat and cold, and its intensity can be roughly
graded according to the force expended in stimulation.
Discomfort, on the other hand, is that feeling-tone which is
directly opposed to pleasure. It may accompany sensations not in
themselves essentially painful; as for instance that produced by
tickling the sole of the foot. The reaction produced by repeated
pricking contains both these elements; for it evokes that sensory
quality known as pain, accompanied by a disagreeable
feeling-tone, which we have called discomfort. On the other hand,
excessive pressure, except when applied directly over some
nerve-trunk, tends to excite more discomfort than pain.”
The confusion between discomfort and pain has made people regard
discomfort as a more substantial thing than it is, and this in
turn has reacted upon the view taken of pleasure, since
discomfort and pleasure are evidently on a level in this respect.
As soon as discomfort is clearly distinguished from the sensation
of pain, it becomes more natural to regard discomfort and
pleasure as properties of mental occurrences than to regard them
as separate mental occurrences on their own account. I shall
therefore dismiss the view that they are separate mental
occurrences, and regard them as properties of such experiences as
would be called respectively uncomfortable and pleasant.
It remains to be examined whether they are actual qualities of
such occurrences, or are merely differences as to causal
properties. I do not myself see any way of deciding this
question; either view seems equally capable of accounting for the
facts. If this is true, it is safer to avoid the assumption that
there are such intrinsic qualities of mental occurrences as are
in question, and to assume only the causal differences which are
undeniable. Without condemning the intrinsic theory, we can
define discomfort and pleasure as consisting in causal
properties, and say only what will hold on either of the two
theories. Following this course, we shall say:
“Discomfort” is a property of a sensation or other mental
occurrence, consisting in the fact that the occurrence in
question stimulates voluntary or reflex movements tending to
produce some more or less definite change involving the cessation
of the occurrence.
“Pleasure” is a property of a sensation or other mental
occurrence, consisting in the fact that the occurrence in
question either does not stimulate any voluntary or reflex
movement, or, if it does, stimulates only such as tend to prolong
the occurrence in question.*
* Cf. Thorndike, op. cit., p. 243.
“Conscious” desire, which we have now to consider, consists of
desire in the sense hitherto discussed, together with a true
belief as to its “purpose,” i.e. as to the state of affairs that
will bring quiescence with cessation of the discomfort. If our
theory of desire is correct, a belief as to its purpose may very
well be erroneous, since only experience can show what causes a
discomfort to cease. When the experience needed is common and
simple, as in the case of hunger, a mistake is not very probable.
But
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