An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - David Hume (free ereaders .txt) 📗

principle no

advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt,

116;

his appeal to the veracity of God is useless, 120 (v. Scepticism,

116-132).

 

Design

argument from, 105 f. (v. Providence).

 

Divisibility

of mathematical and physical points, 124.

 

Doubt

Cartesian, 116, 120 (v. Scepticism A).

 

Epictetus

34.

Epicurean

philosophy, defence of, 102-15;

denial of providence and future state is harmless, 104 (v.

Providence).

 

Euclid

truths in, do not depend on existence of circles or triangles, 20.

 

Evidence

moral and natural, 70;

value of human, 82-9 (v. Miracles).

 

Evil

doctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies

existence of evil as regards the whole, 78-81.

 

Existence

external and perception, 118-9 (v. Scepticism, B, 116-32).

 

Ex nihilo nihil

132 n.

 

Experience

(v. Cause A, 23-33);

opposition of reason and experience usual, but really erroneous and

superficial, 36 n.

 

Infallible, may be regarded as proof, 87 (v. Miracles);

all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond

the usual course of experience, 113.

 

Extension

50;

a supposed primary quality, 122.

 

Faith

101, 132.

 

Fiction

and fact (v. Cause C), 39 f.

 

Future

inference to, from past, 29 (v. Cause A).

 

General

ideas, do not really exist, but only particular ideas attached to a

general term, 125 n.

 

Geography

mental, 8.

 

Geometry

propositions of certain, as depending only on relations of ideas not

on existence of objects, 20;

gives no knowledge of ultimate causes: only applies laws discovered

by experience, 27.

 

God

idea of, 14;

no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own

faculties, 57;

theory that God is cause of all motion and thought, causes being

only occasions of his volition, 54-57;

by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or God is

the cause of evil, 78-81.

 

Veracity of, appealed to, 120.

 

And creation of matter, 132 n.

 

v. Providence, 102-115; Scepticism, 116-132.

 

Golden

age, 107.

 

Gravity

26.

Habit

(v. Custom, Cause B).

 

History

use of, 65.

 

Human

nature, inconstancy a constant character of, 68.

 

Ideas

A. Origin of, 11-17.

 

Perceptions divided into impressions and ideas, 11-12;

the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or

inward sentiment, 13 (cf. 53);

all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent

feelings, 14;

deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in

corresponding idea, 15-16;

suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from

which it is derived, 17 (cf. 49);

idea of reflection, 51;

general ideas, 135 n;

innate ideas, 19 n;

power of will over ideas, 53.

 

B. Association of, 18-19.

 

Ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and

regularity, 18;

only three principles of association, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity,

and Cause or Effect, 19;

contrariety, 19 n;

production of belief by these principles, 41-43.

 

C. Correspondence of ideas and course of nature, 44;

relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry, 20;

such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 20,

131;

no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or

number, 131.

 

Imagination

11, 39;

and belief, 40.

 

Impressions

all our more lively perceptions, 12;

the test of ideas, 17, 49.

 

Incest

peculiar turpitude of explained, 12.

 

Inconceivability

of the negative, 132 (cf. 20).

 

Inertia

57 n.

 

Inference

and similarity, 30, 115 (v. Cause).

 

Infinite

divisibility, 124 f.

 

Instances

multiplication of not required by reason, 31.

 

Instinct

more trustworthy than reasoning, 45;

the basis of all experimental reasoning, 85;

the basis of realism, 118, 121.

 

Intuitive

opp. mediate reasoning, 2.

 

La Bruyere

4.

Liberty

(v. Necessity, 62-97).

Definition of hypothetical liberty, 73.

Necessary to morality, 77.

 

Locke

4, 40 n, 50 n, 57 n.

His loose use of ‘ideas,’ 19 n;

betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the

Schoolmen, 19 n;

distinction of primary and secondary qualities, 122.

 

Malebranche

4, 57 n..

 

Man

a reasonable and active being, 4.

 

Marriage

rules of, based on and vary with utility, 118.

 

Mathematics

ideas of, clear and determinate, hence their superiority to moral

and metaphysical sciences, 48;

their difficulty, 48.

 

Mathematical and physical points, 124 n.

 

Matter

necessity of, 64;

creation of, 132 n (v. Scepticism A).

 

Matter-of-fact

contrary of, always possible, 21;

arguments to new, based only on cause and effect, 22.

 

Metaphysics

not a science, 5-6;

how inferior and superior to mathematics, 48.

 

Mind

mental geography, 8;

secret springs and principles of, 9;

can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward

sentiment, 13;

power of will over, 53.

 

Miracles.

86-101.

 

Belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed

is unusual or extraordinary, 89;

difference between extraordinary and miraculous, 89 n;

if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one

proof opposed by another proof, for the proof against a

miracle is as complete as possible;

an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience,

that is a proof, against it, 90;

definition of miracle, 90 n;

hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its

falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it

establishes, 91;

as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof, 92;

the passion for the wonderful in human nature, 93;

prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their

diminution with civilization, 94;

the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the

almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions, 95;

value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a

prophet or apostle, 97;

no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much

less to a proof, and if it did amount to a proof it would be

opposed by another perfect proof, 98;

so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a

system of religion, 99;

a conclusion which confounds those who base the Christian religion

on reason, not on faith, 100;

the Christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which

will subvert the principle of a man’s understanding and give

him a determination to believe what is most contrary to

custom and experience, 101.

 

Moral

evil (q.v.) 80.

 

Moral science

30;

inferior to mathematics, 48;

sceptical objections to, 126-7.

 

Moral evidence easily combined with natural, 70.

 

Motion

50.

Nature

design in, 105 f. (v. Providence),

and the course of our ideas, 44.

 

State of, a philosophical fiction, 151, 151 n.

 

Necessary

connexion (v. Cause).

 

Necessity

two definitions of, 75.

 

A. and Liberty, 62-81;

the controversy is based on ambiguity, and all mankind have always

been of the same opinion on this subject, 63;

our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed

uniformity and consequent inference, circumstances which are

allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action, 64;

history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity, 65,

which does not exclude variety due to education and progress, 66;

irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary

causes, 67;

the inconstancy of human action, its constant character, as of winds

and weather, 68;

we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction

of motives and actions, 69;

history, politics, and morals show this, and the possibility of

combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a

common origin, 70;

the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a

lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere

conjunction, 71;

we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of

brute matter, 72;

the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of

liberty and a false experiment, 72 n;

though this question is the most contentious of all, mankind has

always agreed in the doctrine of liberty, if we mean by it

that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of

acting or not acting according to the determinations of our

will, and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a

prisoner, 73;

liberty when opposed to necessity, and not merely to constraint, is

the same as chance, 74.

 

B. Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality, this

doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so

is at least innocent, 75;

rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives, and

connexion of character and action: if necessity be denied,

a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it, 76;

liberty also essential to morality, 77.

 

Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of

causes either makes God the cause of evil, or abolishes evil

in actions, 78;

Stoic answer, that the whole system is good, is specious but

ineffectual in practice, 79;

no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural

sentiments to blame certain actions, 80;

how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of

moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal,

81.

Negative

inconceivability of, 132.

 

Newton

57 n.

 

Nisus

52 n, 60 n.

 

Number

the object of demonstration, 131.

 

Occasional causes

theory of, 55.

 

Parallelism

between thought and course of nature, 44-5.

 

Perception

and external objects, 119 f. (v. Scepticism, Impression,

Idea).

 

Philosophy

moral, two branches of, abstruse and practical, 1-5;

gratifies innocent curiosity, 6;

metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human

understanding, 6.

 

True, must lay down limits of understanding, 7 (cf. 113);

a large part of, consists in mental geography, 8;

may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general

principles, 9.

 

Natural, only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as moral or

metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger

portions of it, 26;

academical, or sceptical, flatters no bias or passion except love of

truth, and so has few partisans, 34;

though it destroy speculation, cannot destroy action, for nature

steps in and asserts her rights, 34;

moral, inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas, superior in

shortness of arguments, 48.

 

Controversies in, due to ambiguity of terms, 62.

 

Disputes in, not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a

doctrine, 75.

 

Speculative, entirely indifferent to the peace of society and

security of government, 104 (cf. 114).

 

All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion in the world,

which is nothing but a species of philosophy, can never

carry us beyond the usual course of experience, 113.

 

Happiness of, to have originated in an age and country of freedom

and toleration, 102.

 

Points

physical, indivisible, 124 n.

 

Power

50 f, 60 n. (v. Cause D).

 

Probability

46 f. (v. Cause, B).

 

Probable

arguments, 38, 46 n.

 

Production

50 n.

 

Promises

not the foundation of justice, 257.

 

Proof

46 n, 86-101 (v. Miracles, Demonstrative).

 

Providence

102-115 (v. God).

 

The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design

in nature; must not infer greater power in the cause than is

necessary to produce the observed effects, nor argue from

such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not

been observed, 105;

so must not infer in God more power, wisdom, and benevolence than

appears in nature, 106;

so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by

assuming the intractability of matter or the observance