Handbook of Ethical Theory - George Stuart Fullerton (chrome ebook reader txt) 📗

idea of an interested pursuit; since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object.”

Here we find our attention called to a very important truth, the significance of which there is danger of our overlooking. Pleasure or happiness is not something that can be parcelled up and handed about independently of the nature of the recipient. It is not everyone who can desire everything and feel pleasure in its attainment. That the objects of desire and will are many, and that the strivings of conscious creatures have in view many ends, and vary according to the impulsive and instinctive endowments of the creatures in question, has been well brought out in the admirable studies of instinct which we now have at our disposal. The most ardent devotee of pleasure must recognize, that only certain pleasures are open to him; that, such as they are, they are a revelation of his nature and capacities; that pleasures, if sought at all, cannot be secured directly, but only as the result of a successful striving for objects not pleasures, which bring pleasure as their accompaniment. He who would have the pleasure of eating must desire food; and neither food, nor the eating of food, can be regarded as, per se, pleasure. The pleasure of the brooding hen is beyond the reach of man, who, however pleasure-loving, cannot desire to sit upon eggs, and so must forego the pleasure which, in the case of the bird, crowns that exercise.

Such considerations as the above have led some moralists to define, as the end of desire, not pleasure, but self-satisfaction. Every desire, it is pointed out, strives to satisfy itself in the attainment of its appropriate object. With the attainment of the object, the desire has produced its proper fruit and ceases to be. It is admitted that the satisfaction of desire is accompanied by pleasure, but it is denied that the pleasure may be properly called the object of the desire, or regarded as calling it into being: “The appetite of hunger must precede and condition the pleasure which consists in its satisfaction. It cannot therefore have that pleasure for its exciting object.” [Footnote: GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, chapter i, Sec 161. See also Book II, chapter ii, Sec 131; Book III, chapter i, Sec Sec 154-160.]

At the same time it is conceded that the idea of a pleasure to be attained may “reinforce” the desire for an object, may “intensify the putting forth of energy,” and may tend “to sustain and prolong any mode of action.” [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec 161; DEWEY, Ethics, chapter xiv, Sec 1, p. 271; MCDOUGALL, Social Psychology, London, 1916, p. 43.] It is further conceded that pleasures may be consciously aimed at, but it is urged that this does not result in true self-satisfaction, and is evidence of the existence of unhealthy desires. [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec 158; DEWEY, Ethics p. 270.]

The utilitarian is not wholly helpless in the face of such objections. He may argue that, if it is difficult to see how a pleasure which is the result of a desire may cause the desire, it is equally difficult to see how it may prolong, reinforce or intensify it. And he may maintain that, although the pursuit of pleasure, in certain forms, is calculated to defeat its own aim and is undoubtedly unhealthy, this need not be the case if one’s aim be the true utilitarian one—the happiness of all. The direct attack upon his Greatest Happiness Principle which consists in the objection that, if pleasure is the only object of desire, a sum of pleasures, as not being a pleasure, cannot be desired, [Footnote: Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec 221.] he can put aside with the remark that no far-reaching and comprehensive aim can be realized at one stroke. I can desire a long and useful life; this cannot be had all at once. I can desire a long life full of pleasures; this cannot be enjoyed all at once either. But each can certainly be the object of desire.

But, when all is said, it remains true that the contention of those, who distinguish sharply between the satisfaction of desire and the attainment of pleasure, is of no little importance. It calls our attention to the following truths:

(a) We have definite instincts and impulses which tend to satisfy themselves with their appropriate objects.

(b) At their first exercise, our aim could not have been the pleasure resulting from their satisfaction, for that could not have been foreseen.

(c) Although, after experience, the attainment of pleasure may come to be our aim in the exercise of many activities, and may often, as far as we can see, be a natural and not unwholesome aim; it is by no means evident that, even when we are experienced and reflective, the exercise of our faculties comes to be regarded only as a means to the attainment of pleasure.

(d) The hedonist, in maintaining that pleasure is the only ultimate object of desire, appears, thus, to be committed to the doctrine that the satisfaction of all other desires is subordinated to the satisfaction of the desire for pleasure. For this position he can furnish no adequate proof. Self-evident the doctrine is not.

(e) It is incumbent upon him, as a moralist, to prove, not merely that all other satisfactions are, but also that they ought to be subordinated to the satisfaction of the desire for pleasure. This he appears to assume without proof.

(2) We have seen above [Footnote: See Sec 108.] that the fundamental principle of utilitarian hedonism, as against egoistic, namely, the making the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number the object of the endeavors of each individual, has not been satisfactorily established by leading utilitarians. Bentham assumes the principle; Mill advances a doubtful argument; Sidgwick falls back upon intuitions which all will not admit to be indubitable. To his assertion: “Reason shows me that if my happiness is desirable and a good, the equal happiness of any other person must be equally desirable,” [Footnote: The Methods of Ethics, Book III, chapter xiv, Sec 5.] the doubter may reply: Desirable to whom? to him or to me?

(3) Finally, it may be objected that the consistent utilitarian, in making pleasure, abstractly taken, the only ultimate good, and in regarding as the sole criterion of right actions their tendency to produce pleasure, really tears pleasure out of its moral setting altogether.

Thus Bentham’s contention [Footnote: Sec 106, above.] that the pleasure a man may derive from the exercise of malice or cruelty is, “taken by itself,” good—while it lasts, and before any bad consequences have set in, as good as any other that is not more intense—derives what plausibility it has, from an ambiguity in the word “good.” Pleasure, taken by itself, is undoubtedly pleasure, whatever be its source. To affirm this is mere tautology. And, if we chose to make “good” but a synonym for pleasure, we remain in the same tautology when we affirm that every pleasure is a good. But Bentham assumed that good in this sense and moral good are the same thing.

His assumption is not borne out by the moral judgments of mankind. Even a cursory view of those moral judgments as revealed in customs, laws and public opinion makes it evident that, under certain circumstances, pleasure is regarded as, from a moral standpoint, a good, and, under other circumstances, an evil. Torn out of its setting, it is simply pleasure, a psychological phenomenon like any other, with no ethical significance.

Take the case of the pleasure enjoyed by the malignant man. It may be intense, if he be peculiarly susceptible to such pleasure. The pain suffered by his victim may conceivably be less intense. Both may die before the “bad consequences,” that is to say, other pains, arrive. There may be no spectators. Is, in such a case, the pleasure one to be called a “good”? Can it be approved? No reflective moralist would maintain that it can. Which means that the moralists, in all ages, have meant by “good” something more than pleasure, taken abstractly, and that Bentham’s assumption may be regarded as an aberration.

114. TRANSFIGURED UTILITARIANISM.—It is possible to hold to a utilitarianism more circumspect and less startling than Bentham’s. It is possible, while maintaining that pleasure is the only thing that an experienced and reasonable being can regard as ultimately desirable, to maintain at the same time that it is rash for any man to attempt to seek his own happiness, or to strive to promote the general happiness, without taking into very careful consideration the instincts and impulses of man and the nature of the social organization which has resulted from man’s being what he is. One may argue that the experience of the race is, as a rule, a safer guide than the independent judgment of the individual; and that, in the secular endeavor to compass the general happiness, it has discovered the paths to that goal which may most successfully be followed. Thus, one may distrust Utopian schemes, recognizing the significance of custom, law, traditional moral maxims, and public opinion, and yet remain a utilitarian.

But he who does this must still answer the preceding objections. He must prove: (1) That pleasure is the only thing ultimately desirable; (2) that each is under obligation to promote the pleasure of all; (3) that its mere conduciveness to the production of a preponderance of pleasure makes an action right, even though the pleasure be a malicious one, as in the illustration above given.

Still, his doctrine has become less startling, and he has moved in the direction of a greater harmony with the moral judgments of men generally. The conduct he recommends need not, as a rule, differ greatly from that recognized as right by moralists of quite different schools.

Such a utilitarian may easily pass over to a form of doctrine which is not utilitarian at all. Thus, Sidgwick asks whether there is a measurable quality of feeling expressed by the word “pleasure,” which is independent of its relation to volition, and strictly undefinable from its simplicity—“like the quality of feeling expressed by ‘sweet,’ of which also we are conscious in varying degrees of intensity;” and he answers: “For my own part, when the term (pleasure) is used in the more extended sense which I have adopted, to include the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratifications, no less than the coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments, I can find no common quality in the feelings so designated except some relation to desire or volition.” [Footnote: The Methods of Ethics, Book II, chapter ii, Sec 2, 4th Edition. SIDGWICK never appreciably modified this opinion, which is most clearly expressed in the Edition quoted.]

When we seek, then, to “give pleasure,” are we doing nothing else than giving recognition to the desire and will of our neighbor? What has become of the Greatest Happiness Principle? Has it not dissolved into the doctrine of the Real Social Will?