Hegel's Philosophy of Mind - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (different ereaders .txt) 📗

tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">32. One might almost fancy Herbart was translating into a general philosophic thesis the words in which Goethe has described how he overcame a real trouble by transmuting it into an ideal shape, e.g. Wahrheit und Dichtung, cap. xii. 33. Herbart's language is almost identical with Hegel's: Encycl. § 389 (p. 12). Cf. Spencer, Psychology, i. 192. “Feelings are in all cases the materials out of which the superior tracts of consciousness and intellect are evolved.” 34. Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel, ch. xvii. 35. Psychologia Empirica, § 29. 36. As is also the case with Herbart's metaphysical reality of the Soul. 37. Human Nature, vii. 2. “Pleasure, Love, and appetite, which is also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing....” Deliberation is (ch. xii. 1) the “alternate succession of appetite and fears.” 38. Eth. ii. 48 Schol. 39. Eth. ii. 43 Schol.: cf. 49 Schol. 40. This wide scope of thinking (cogitatio, penser) is at least as old as the Cartesian school: and should be kept in view, as against a tendency to narrow its range to the mere intellect. 41. e.g. Analysis of the Human Mind, ch. xxiv. “Attention is but another name for the interesting character of the idea;” ch. xix. “Desire and the idea of a pleasurable sensation are convertible terms.” 42. As Mr. Spencer says (Psychology, i. 141), “Objective psychology can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from subjective psychology.” 43. The same failure to note that experiment is valuable only where general points of view are defined, is a common fault in biology. 44. Münsterberg, Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie, p. 144. 45. Lehrbuch der Psychologie, § 54 (2nd ed.), or § 11 (1st ed.). 46. See p. 11 (§ 387). 47. Cf. Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, i. 43. “There is more reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom.” 48. This language is very characteristic of the physicists who dabble in psychology and imagine they are treading in the steps of Kant, if not even verifying what they call his guesswork: cf. Ziehen, Physiol. Psychologie, 2nd ed. p. 212. “In every case there is given us only the psychical series of sensations and their memory-images, and it is only a universal hypothesis if we assume beside this psychical series a material series standing in causal relation to it.... The material series is not given equally originally with the psychical.” 49. It is the same radical feature of consciousness which is thus noted by Mr. Spencer, Psychology, i. 475. “Perception and sensation are ever tending to exclude each other but never succeed.” “Cognition and feeling are antithetical and inseparable.” “Consciousness continues only in virtue of this conflict.” Cf. Plato's resolution in the Philebus of the contest between intelligence and feeling (pleasure). 50. It is the quasi-Aristotelian ἀπαγωγή, defined as the step from one proposition to another, the knowledge of which will set the first proposition in a full light. 51. Grundlage des Naturrechts, § 5. 52. System der Sittenlehre, § 8, iv. 53. Even though religion (according to Kant) conceive them as divine commands. 54. Cf. Hegel's Werke, vii. 2, p. 236 (Lecture-note on § 410). “We must treat as utterly empty the fancy of those who suppose that properly man should have no organic body,” &c.; and see p. 159 of the present work. 55. Criticism of Pure Reason, Architectonic. 56. Spencer, Psychology, i. 291: “Mind can be understood only by observing how mind is evolved.” 57. Cf. Spencer, Principles of Ethics, i. 339: “The ethical sentiment proper is, in the great mass of cases, scarcely discernible.” 58. Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel, p. 143. 59. Windelband (W.), Präludien (1884), p. 288. 60. Cf. Plato, Republic, p. 486. 61. Human Nature: Morals, Part III. 62. Emotion and Will, ch. xv. § 23. 63. It is characteristic of the Kantian doctrine to absolutise the conception of Duty and make it express the essence of the whole ethical idea. 64. Which are still, as the Socialist Fourier says, states of social incoherence, specially favourable to falsehood. 65. Rechtsphilosophie, § 4. 66. Cf. Schelling, ii. 12: “There are no born sons of freedom.” 67. Simmel (G.), Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, i. 184. 68. Jenseits von Gut und Böse, p. 225. 69. Aristot. Polit. i. 6. 70. Plato, Phaedo. 71. Carus, Psyche, p. 1. 72. See Arist., Anal. Post. ii. 19 (ed. Berl. 100, a. 10). 73. Cf. The Logic of Hegel, notes &c., p. 421. 74. “Omnia individua corpora quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt.” Eth. ii. 13. schol. 75. Nanna (1848): Zendavesta (1851): Ueber die Seelenfrage (1861). 76. Described by S. as the rise from mere physical cause to physiological stimulus (Reiz), to psychical motive. 77. Infra, p. 12. 78. Aristot., De Anima, i. c. 4, 5. 79. Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre, i. 10. 80. Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre, iv. 18. 81. Works like Preyer's Seele des Kindes illustrate this aspect of mental evolution; its acquirement of definite and correlated functions. 82. Cf. the end of Caleb Balderstone (in The Bride of Lammermoor): “With a fidelity sometimes displayed by the canine race, but seldom by human beings, he pined and died.” 83. See Windischmann's letters in Briefe von und an Hegel. 84. Cf. Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel, chaps. xii-xiv. 85. Kieser's Tellurismus is, according to Schopenhauer, “the fullest and most thorough text-book of Animal Magnetism.” 86. Cf. Fichte, Nachgelassene Werke, iii. 295 (Tagebuch über den animalischen Magnetismus, 1813), and Schopenhauer, Der Wille in der Natur. 87. Bernheim: La suggestion domine toute l'histoire de l'humanité. 88. An instance from an unexpected quarter, in Eckermann's conversations with Goethe: “In my young days I have experienced cases enough, where on lonely walks there came over me a powerful yearning for a beloved girl, and I thought of her so long till she actually came to meet me.” (Conversation of Oct. 7, 1827.) 89. Gleichsam in einer Vorwelt, einer diese Welt schaffenden Welt (Nachgelassene Werke, iii. 321). 90. Selbst-bewusstsein is not self-consciousness, in the vulgar sense of brooding over feelings and self: but consciousness which is active and outgoing, rather than receptive and passive. It is practical, as opposed to theoretical. 91. The more detailed exposition of this Phenomenology of Mind is given in the book with that title: Hegel's Werke, ii. pp. 71-316. 92. System der Sittlichkeit, p. 15 (see Essay V). 93. Hegel's Werke, viii. 313, and cf. the passage quoted in my Logic of Hegel, notes, pp. 384, 385. 94. Hegel's Briefe, i. 15. 95. Kritik der Verfassung Deutschlands, edited by G. Mollat (1893). Parts of this were already given by Haym and Rosenkranz. The same editor has also in this year published, though not quite in full, Hegel's System der Sittlichkeit, to which reference is made in what follows. 96. In which some may find a prophecy of the effects of “blood and iron” in 1866. 97. Die Absolute Regierung: in the System der Sittlichkeit, p. 32: cf. p. 55. Hegel himself compares it to Fichte's Ephorate. 98. Die Absolute Regierung, l.c. pp. 37, 38. 99. Some idea of his meaning may perhaps be gathered by comparison with passages in Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre, ii. 1, 2. 100. Kritik der Verfassung, p. 20. 101. In some respects Bacon's attitude in the struggle between royalty and parliament may be compared. 102. Just as Schopenhauer, on the contrary, always says moralisch—never sittlich. 103. Grey (G.), Journals of two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West and Western Australia, ii. 220. 104. With some variation of ownership, perhaps, according to the prevalence of so-called matriarchal or patriarchal households. 105. Cf. the custom in certain