Meditations - Marcus Aurelius (top 10 inspirational books .TXT) 📗

like other people for

illegal acts, it would have had no meaning, for that could have been done

without asking the emperor’s advice. The real purpose of the rescript is

that Christians must be punished if they persisted in their belief, and

would not prove their renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen

religion.

 

In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new

belief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion

urged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions of

the Christian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. Antoninus represents the

Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial orders. Shameless

informers, he says, men who were greedy after the property of others,

used these orders as a means of robbing those who were doing no harm. He

doubts if a just emperor could have ordered anything so unjust; and if

the last order was really not from the emperor, the Christians entreat

him not to give them up to their enemies. We conclude from this that

there were at least imperial rescripts or constitutions of M. Antoninus

which were made the foundation of these persecutions. The fact of being a

Christian was now a crime and punished, unless the accused denied their

religion. Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modern critics

place in A.D. 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. The

governors of the provinces under M. Antoninus might have found enough

even in Trajan’s rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and

the fanaticism of the people would drive them to persecution, even if

they were unwilling. But besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all

the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that they plainly maintained

that all the heathen religions were false. The Christians thus declared

war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly necessary to observe that

this was a declaration of hostility against the Roman government, which

tolerated all the various forms of superstition that existed in the

empire, and could not consistently tolerate another religion, which

declared that all the rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies of

the empire only a worship of devils.

 

If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman

emperors attempted to check the new religion; how they enforced their

principle of finally punishing Christians, simply as Christians, which

Justin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that he

tells the truth; how far popular clamor and riots went in this matter,

and how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians—for there were many

such—contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to

imbitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new religion.

Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified, and what

truth they contain is grossly exaggerated; but the fact is certain that

in the time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were in open

hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus’ rule men were put

to death because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the preface to his

fifth book, remarks that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus’ reign, in

some parts of the world, the persecution of the Christians became more

violent, and that it proceeded from the populace in the cities; and he

adds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that we may infer from what

took place in a single nation that myriads of martyrs were made in the

habitable earth. The nation which he alludes to is Gallia; and he then

proceeds to give the letter of the churches of Vienna and Lugdunum. It is

probable that he has assigned the true cause of the persecutions, the

fanaticism of the populace, and that both governors and emperor had a

great deal of trouble with these disturbances. How far Marcus was

cognizant of these cruel proceedings we do not know, for the historical

records of his reign are very defective. He did not make the rule against

the Christians, for Trajan did that; and if we admit that he would have

been willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm that it was in

his power, for it would be a great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had

the unlimited authority which some modern sovereigns have had. His power

was limited by certain constitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the

precedents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man was an

active persecutor, for there is no evidence that he was, though it is

certain that he had no good opinion of the Christians, as appears from

his own words. But he knew nothing of them except their hostility to the

Roman religion, and he probably thought that they were dangerous to the

state, notwithstanding the professions false or true of some of the

Apologists. So much I have said, because it would be unfair not to state

all that can be urged against a man whom his contemporaries and

subsequent ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I

admitted the genuineness of some documents, he would be altogether clear

from the charge of even allowing any persecutions; but as I seek the

truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him to bear whatever blame

is his due. I add that it is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive

any of his ethical principles from a religion of which he knew nothing.

 

There is no doubt that the Emperor’s Reflections—or his Meditations, as

they are generally named—is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks

of himself, his family, and his teachers; and in other books he mentions

himself.

 

It is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as

the occasions arose; and since they were intended for his own use, it is

no improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him written

with his own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent a man would use

the labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his most secret

thoughts to any other eye. He may have also intended the book for his son

Commodus, who however had no taste for his father’s philosophy.

 

The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in

Simplicius’ Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was

not a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a time

when Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really religious

man, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the Deity which no

Christian could improve. From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of

about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy formed the characters of

some of the best and greatest men. A man’s greatness lies not in wealth

and station, as the vulgar believe, nor yet in his intellectual capacity,

which is often associated with the meanest moral character, the most

abject servility to those in high places, and arrogance to the poor and

lowly; but a man’s true greatness lies in the consciousness of an honest

purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of himself and everything

else, on frequent self-examination, and a steady obedience to the rule

which he knows to be right, without troubling himself, as the emperor

says he should not, about what others may think or say, or whether they

do or do not do that which he thinks and says and does.

 

THE THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.

 

BOOK 1.

 

1. From my grandfather Verus [I learned] good morals and the government

of my temper.

 

2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a manly

character.

 

3. From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from

evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my

way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.

 

4. From my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools, and

to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things a man

should spend liberally.

 

5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party at

the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the

Scutarius at the gladiators’ fights; from him too I learned endurance of

labor, and to want little, and to work with my own hands, and not to

meddle with other people’s affairs, and not to be ready to listen to

slander.

 

6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to

give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about

incantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and not to

breed quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to such

things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become intimate with

philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of

Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my youth; and to

have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs

to the Grecian discipline.

 

7. From Rusticus I received the impression that my character required

improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray

to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to

delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man

who practices much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to make a

display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing; and

not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other

things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity, like the

letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect

to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily

disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they have shown a

readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not to be

satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily to give

my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him for being

acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated to me

out of his own collection.

 

8. From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness

of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to

reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the

loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see clearly in a living

example that the same man can be both most resolute and yielding, and not

peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had before my eyes a man

who clearly considered his experience and his skill in expounding

philosophical principles as the smallest of his merits; and from him I

learned how to receive from friends what are esteemed favors, without

being either humbled by them or letting them pass unnoticed.

 

9. From Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family

governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to

nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after the

interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those who

form opinions without consideration: he had the power of readily

accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more

agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly

venerated by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty both

of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the

principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other

passion, but was entirely