Criminal Psychology - Hans Gross (list of e readers .TXT) 📗

one or the other of these persons was condemned guiltlessly, or that such “side issues” have no value and ought not to be proved. I merely point out that caution is necessary in two directions. First of all, these side issues must not be identified with the central issue. Their demonstration is only preparatory work, the value of which must be established cautiously and without prejudice. It may be said that the feeling of satisfaction with what has been done causes jurists frequently to forget what must yet be done, or to undervalue it. Further, a psychological examination must seek out the motives which led or might have led the accused to deny some point not particularly dangerous to him. In most cases an intelligible ground for such action can be discovered, and if the psychologically prior conditions are conceived with sufficient narrowness to keep us from assuming unconditional guilt, we are at least called upon to be careful.

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This curious danger of identification of different issues as the aim of presentation of evidence, occurs much more frequently and with comparatively greater degree in the cases of individual witnesses who are convinced of the principal issue when a side issue is proved. Suppose a witness is called on to identify a man as somebody who had stabbed him in a serious assault, and that he has also to explain whether the quarrel he had had with this man a short time ago was of importance. If the suspect is desirous of having the quarrel appear as harmless, and the wounded person asserts that the quarrel was serious, the latter will be convinced, the moment his contention may be viewed as true, that his opponent was really the person who had stabbed him. There is, of course, a certain logical justification for this supposition, but the psychological difficulty with it is the fact that this case, like many others, involves the identification of what is inferred with what is perceived. It is for this reason that the mere fact of arrest is to most people a conviction of guilt. The witness who had first identified A as only the probable criminal becomes absolutely convinced of it when A is presented to him in stripes, even though he knows that A has been arrested on his own testimony alone. The appearance and the surroundings of the prisoner influence many, and not merely uneducated people, against the prisoner, and they think, involuntarily, “If he were not the one, they would not have him here.”

 

Section 24. (b) Causation.[1]

 

If we understand by the term cause the axiom that every change has an occasion, hence that every event is bound up with a number of conditions which when lacking in whole or in part would prevent the appearance of the event, while their presence would compel its appearance, then the whole business of the criminalist is the study of causes. He must indeed study not only whether and how crime and criminal are causally related, but also how their individual elements are bound to each other and to the criminal; and finally, what causation in the criminal, considered with regard to his individual characteristics, inevitably led to the commission of the crime. The fact that we deal with the problem of cause brings us close to other sciences which have the same task in their own re-

 

[1] Max Mayer: Der Kausalzusammenhang zwischen Handlung und Erfolg in Strafrecht. 1899.

von Rohland. Die Kausallehre im Strafreeht. Leipzig 1903

H. Gross’s Archiv, XV, 191.

 

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searches; and this is one of the reasons for the criminalist’s necessary concern with other disciplines. Of course no earnest criminalist can pursue other studies for their own sane, he has no time; but he must look about him and study the methods used in other sciences.

In the other sciences we learn method, but not as method, and that is all that we need. And we observe that the whole problem of method is grounded on causation. Whether empirically or aprioristically does not matter. We are concerned solely with causation.

 

In certain directions our task is next to the historians’ who aim to bring men and events into definite causal sequence. The causal law is indubitably the ideal and only instructive instrument in the task of writing convincing history, and it is likewise without question that the same method is specifically required in the presentation of evidence. Thus: “This is the causal chain of which the last link is the crime committed by A. Now I present the fact of the crime and include only those events which may be exclusively bound up with A’s criminality—and the crime appears as committed. Now again, I present the fact of the crime and exclude all those events which can without exception be included only if A is not a criminal—

and there is no crime.”[1]

 

Evidently the finding of causes involves, according to the complexities of the case, a varying number of subordinate tasks which have to be accomplished for each particular incident, inasmuch as each suspicion, each statement pro or con has to be tested. The job is a big one but it is the only way to absolute and certain success, provided there is no mistake in the work of correlating events. As Schell says: “Of all the observed identities of effect in natural phenomena only one has the complete strength of mathematical law—the general law of causation. The fact that everything that has a beginning has a cause is as old as human experience.”

The application of this proposition to our own problem shows that we are not to turn the issue in any unnecessary direction, once we are convinced that every phenomenon has its occasion. We are, on the contrary, to demonstrate this occasion and to bring it into connection with every problem set by the testimony at any moment.

In most cases the task, though not rigidly divided, is double and its quality depends upon the question whether the criminal was known from the beginning or not. The duality is foremost, and lasts [1] Cf. S. Strieker: Studien <u:>ber die Assoziation der Vorstellungen. Vienna 1883.

 

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longest if only the deed itself is known, and if the judge must limit himself entirely to its sole study in order to derive from it its objective situation.

 

The greatest mistakes in a trial occur when this derivation of the objective situation of the crime is made unintelligently, hastily or carelessly, and conversely the greatest successes are due to its correct rendering. But such a correct rendering is no more than the thoroughgoing use of the principle of causality. Suppose a great crime has been committed and the personality of the criminal is not revealed by the character of the crime. The mistake regularly made in such a case is the immediate and superficial search for the personality of the criminal instead of what should properly proceed—the study of the causal conditions of the crime. For the causal law does not say that everything which occurs, taken as a whole and in its elements, has one ground—that would be simply categorical emptiness.

What is really required is an efficient and satisfying cause. And this is required not merely for the deed as a whole but for every single detail. When causes are found for all of these they must be brought together and correlated with the crime as described, and then integrated with the whole series of events.

 

The second part of the work turns upon the suspicion of a definite person when his own activity is interpolated as a cause of the crime.

Under some conditions again, the effect of the crime on the criminal has to be examined, i. e., enrichment, deformation, emotional state, etc. But the evidence of guilt is established only when the crime is accurately and explicitly described as the inevitable result of the activity of the criminal and his activity only. This systematic work of observing and correlating every instant of the supposed activities of the accused (once the situation of the crime is defined as certainly as possible), is as instructive as it is promising of success.

It is the one activity which brings us into touch with bare perception and its reproduction. “All inference with regard to facts appears to depend upon the relation of cause to effect; by virtue of this relation alone may we rely upon the evidence of our memories and our senses.”[1] Hume illustrates this remark with the following example: If a clock or some other machine is found on a desert island, the conclusion is drawn that men are or were on the island. The application is easy enough. The presence of a clock, the presence of a three-cornered wound is perceived by the senses—that men were there, that the wound was made with a specific kind of in-

 

[1] Meinong: Humestudien. Vienna 1882.

 

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strument, is a causal inference. Simple as this proposition of Hume’s is, it is of utmost importance in the law because of the permanent and continually renewed problems: What is the effect in *this case?

What is the cause? Do they belong together? Remembering that these questions make our greatest tasks and putting them, even beyond the limit of disgust, will save us from grave errors.

 

There is another important condition to which Hume calls attention and which is interpreted by his clever disciple Meinong. It is a fact that without the help of previous experience no causal nexus can be referred to an observation, nor can the presence of such be discovered in individual instances. It may be postulated only. A cause is essentially a complex in which every element is of identical value. And this circumstance is more complicated than it appears to be, inasmuch as it requires reflection to distinguish whether only one or more observations have been made. Strict self-control alone and accurate enumeration and supervision will lead to a correct decision as to whether one or ten observations have been made, or whether the notion of additional observations is not altogether illusory.

 

This task involves a number of important circumstances. First of all must be considered the manner in which the man on the street conceives the causal relation between different objects. The notion of causality, as Schwarz[1] shows, is essentially foreign to the man on the street. He is led mainly by the analogy of natural causality with that of human activity and passivity, e. g., the fire is active with regard to water, which simply must sizzle passively. This observation is indubitably correct and significant, but I think Schwarz wrong to have limited his description to ordinary people; it is true also of very complex natures. It is conceivable that external phenomena shall be judged in analogy with the self, and inasmuch as the latter often appears to be purely active, it is also supposed that those natural phenomena which appear to be especially active are really so.

 

In addition, many objects in the external world with which we have a good deal to do, and are hence important, do as a matter of fact really appear to be active—the sun, light, warmth, cold, the weather, etc., so that we assign activity and passivity only according to the values the objects have for us. The ensuing mistake is the fact that we overlook the alternations between activity and pas-

 

[1] Das Wahrnehmungsproblem von Standpunkte des Physikers, Physiologen und Philosophen. Leipzig 1892.

 

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sivity, or simply do not make the study such alternations require; yet the correct apportionment of action and reaction is, for us, of greatest importance. In this regard, moreover, there is always the empty problem as to whether two things may stand in causal relation,—

empty, because the answer is always yes. The scientific and practical