Criminal Psychology - Hans Gross (list of e readers .TXT) 📗

the merely accurate description of a wound may bring about the same effect in nervous persons as the sight of that wound. If, however, the wound is not described and even its place not mentioned, and only the general harm is spoken of, then if the accused reaches for that part of his body in which the wound of his victim is located, you have a clew, and your attention should be directed upon it. Such an index is worth no more, but even as a clew it has some value.

 

All in all, we may say that the legally significant direction of association falls in the same class with “getting an idea.” We need association for the purpose of constructing an image and an explanation of the event in question; something must “occur to us.”

We must “get an idea,” if we are to know how something happened.

We need association, moreover, in order to discover that something has occurred to the witness.

 

“Getting an idea” or “occurrence” is essentially one and the same in all its forms. We have only to study its several manifestations: 1. “Constructive occurrence,” by means of which the correct thing may possibly be discovered in the way of combining, inferring, <p 257>

comparing and testing. Here the association must be intentional and such ideas must be brought to a fixed image, which may be in such wise associated with them as to make a result possible. Suppose, e. g., that the case is one of arson, and the criminal is unknown.

Then we will require the plaintiff to make local, temporal, identifying, and contrasting associations with the idea of all and each of his enemies, or of discharged servants, beggars, etc. In this wise we can attain to other ideas, which may help us to approach some definite theory.

 

2. “Spontaneous occurrence” in which a thought appears with apparent suddenness for no particular reason. As a matter of fact, such suddenness is always caused by some conscious, and in most cases, some unconscious association, the thread of which can not be later sought out and exhibited because of its being subconscious, or of its being overleaped so quickly and readily that it can not be traced. Very often some particular sense-perception exercises an influence which unites simultaneous ideas, now here again united.

Suppose once during some extraordinary sound, e. g., the ringing of a bell, which I do not often hear, I had seen somebody. Now when I hear that bell ringing I will think of the person without perhaps knowing the definite association—i. e., the connection of the man with the tone of the bell occurs unconsciously. This may go still further. That man, when I first saw him, might have worn, perhaps, a red necktie, let us say poppy-red—it may now happen that every time I hear that bell-note I think of a field of poppy-flowers.

Now who can pursue this road of association?

 

3. “Accluding occurrence,” in which, in the process of the longest possible calm retention of an idea, another appears of itself and associates with the first. E. g., I meet a man who greets me although I do not recognize him. I may perhaps know who he is, but I do not spontaneously think of it and can not get at his identity constructively, because of lack of material. I therefore expect something from this “accluding occurrence” and with my eyes shut I try as long as possible to keep in mind the idea of this man. Suddenly, I see him before me with serious face and folded hands, on his right a similar individual and a similar one on his left, above them a high window with a curtain—the man was a juryman who sat opposite me. But the memory is not exhausted with this. I aim to banish his image as seated and keep him again before my eyes.

I see an apparent gate beyond him with shelves behind; it is the image of a shopkeeper in a small town who is standing before <p 258>

the door of his shop. I hold this image straining before my eyes—

suddenly a wagon appears with just that kind of trapping which I have only once seen to deck the equipage of a land-owner. I know well who this is, what the little town near his estate is called, and now I suddenly know that the man whose name I want to remember is the merchant X of Y who once was a juryman in my court. This means of the longest possible retention of an idea, I have made frequent use of with the more intelligent witnesses (it rarely succeeds with women because they are restless), and all in all, with surprising effects.

 

4. “Retrospective occurrence,” which consists of the development of associations backward. E. g.—do what I will, I can not remember the name of a certain man, but I know that he has a title to nobility, which is identical with the name of a small town in Obertfalz. Finally, the name of the town Hirschau occurs to me, and now I easily associate backwards, “Schaller von Hirschau.”

It is, of course, natural that words should unroll themselves forwards with habitual ease, but backwards only when we think of the word we are trying to remember, as written, and then associate the whole as a MS. image. This is unhappily difficult to use in helping another.

 

Topic 6. RECOLLECTION AND MEMORY.

 

Section 51.

 

In direct connection with the association of ideas is our recollection and memory, which are only next to perception in legal importance in the knowledge of the witness. Whether the witness *wants to tell the truth is, of course, a question which depends upon other matters; but whether he *can tell the truth depends upon perception and memory. Now the latter is a highly complicated and variously organized function which is difficult to understand, even in the daily life, and much more so when everything depends upon whether the witness has noticed anything, how, how long, what part of the impression has sunk more deeply into his mind, and in what direction his defects of memory are to be sought. It would be inexcusable in the lawyer not to think about this and to make equivalent use of all the phenomena that are presented to him. To overlook the rich literature and enormous work that has been devoted to this subject is to raise involuntarily the question, for whom was it all done? Nobody needs a thoroughgoing knowledge of the essence of memory more than the lawyer.

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I advise every criminalist to study the literature of memory and recommend the works of M<u:>nsterberg, Ribot, Ebbinghaus, Cattell, Kr<a:>pelin, Lasson, Nicolai Lange, Arreat, Richet, Forel, Galton, Biervliet, Paneth, Fauth, Sander, Koch, Lehmann, F<e’>r<e’>, Jodl,[1] etc.

 

[1] H. M<u:>nsterberg: Beitr<a:>ge II, IV.

H. Ebbinghaus: <U:>ber das Ged<a:>chtnis. Leipzig 1885.

J. M. Cattell: Mind, Vols. 11-15. (Articles.) J. Bourdon: Influence de l’Age sur la Memoire Imm<e’>diate. Revue Philosophlque, Vol. 35.

Kr<a:>pelin: <U:>ber Erinnerungst<a:>usehungen. Archiv. f. Psychiatrie, XVII, 3.

Lasson: Das Ged<a:>chtnis. Berlin 1894,

Diehl Zum Studium der Merkf<a:>higkeit. Beitr. z. Psyehol. d. Aussage, II. 1903.

 

Section 52. (a) The Essence of Memory.

 

Our ignorance concerning memory is as great as its universal importance, and as our indebtedness to it for what we are and possess.

At best we have, when explaining it, to make use of images.

 

Plato accounts for memory in the “Theaetetus” by the image of the seal ring which impresses wax; the character and duration of the impression depends upon the size, purity, and hardness of the wax. Fichte says, “The spirit does not conserve its products,—

the single ideas, volitions, and feelings are conserved by the mind and constitute the ground of its inexhaustibly retentive memory.

… The possibility of recalling what has once been independently done, this remains in the spirit.” James Sully compares the receptivity of memory with the infusion of dampness into an old MS. Draper also brings a physical example: If you put a flat object upon the surface of a cold, smooth metal and then breathe on the metal and, after the moisture has disappeared, remove the object, you may recall its image months after, whenever you breathe on the place in question. Another has called memory the safe of the mind. It is the opinion of E. Hering[2] that what we once were conscious of and are conscious of again, does not endure as image but as echo such as may be heard in a tuning fork when it is properly struck. Reid asserts that memory does not have present ideas, but past things for its object, Natorp explains recollection as an identification of the unidentical, of not-now with now. According to Herbart and his school,[3] memory consists in the possibility of recognizing the molecular arrangements which had been left by past impressions in the gan-

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glion cells, and in reading them in identical fashion. According to Wundt and his pupils, the problem is one of the disposition of the central organs. And it is the opinion of James Mill that the content of recollection is not only the idea of the remembered object, but also the idea that the object had been experienced before. Both ideas together constitute the whole of that state of mind which we denote as memory. Spinoza[1b] deals freely with memory, and asserts that mankind does not control it inasmuch as all thoughts, ideas, resolutions of spirits, are bare results of memories, so that human freedom is excluded. Uphues[2b] distinguishes between memory and the conception which is presupposed in the recognition of an object different from that conception. This is the theory developed by Aristotle.

 

[2] E. Hering: <U:>ber das Ged<a:>chtnis, etc. Vienna 1876.

 

[3] Cf. V. Hensen: <U:>ber das Ged<a:>chtnis, etc. Kiel 1877.

 

[1b] Ethics. Bk. III, Prop. II, Scholium.

 

[2b] G K. Uphues: <U:>ber die Erinnerung. Leipzig 1889.

 

According to Berkeley and Hume recognition is not directed upon a different object, nor does it presuppose one; the activity of recognition consists either in the exhibition or the creation of the object.

Recognition lends the idea an independence which does not belong to it and in that way turns it into a thing, objectifies it, and posits it as substantial. Maudsley makes use of the notion that it is possible to represent any former content of consciousness as attended to so that it may again come into the center of the field of consciousness.

Dorner[3] explains recognition as follows: “The possible is not only the merely possible in opposition to the actual; it is much more proper to conceive being as possible, i. e., as amenable to logical thinking; without this there could be no recognition.”

K<u:>lpe[4] concerns himself with the problem of the difference between perceptive images and memory images and whether the latter are only weaker than the former as English philosophers and psychologists assert. He concludes that they are not so.

 

[3] H Dorner: Das menschliche Erkennen. Berlin 1877.

 

[4] O. K<u:>lpe: Grundriss der Psychologie. Leipzig 1893.

 

When we take all these opinions concerning memory together we conclude that neither any unity nor any clear description of the matter has been attained. Ebbinghaus’s sober statement may certainly be correct: “Our knowledge of memory rises almost exclusively from the observation of extreme, especially striking cases. Whenever we ask about more special solutions concerning the detail of what has been counted up, and their other relations of dependence, their structure, etc., there are no answers.”

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Nobody has as yet paid attention to the simple daily events which constitute the routine of the criminalists. We find little instruction concerning them, and our difficulties as well as our mistakes are thereby increased. Even the modern repeatedly