The Seventh Manchesters - S. J. Wilson (leveled readers .TXT) 📗

line at this time, for

we did not go in again before the whole division was relieved. After our

allotted period at Le Preol it was the brigade’s turn for divisional

reserve, and this was accompanied by another move back to Hingette, near

Locon. One of our functions in this position was to back up the

Portuguese if they should be attacked, for they lay on the left of the

42nd. This entailed a careful reconnaissance of all the ground behind

their positions, and the siting and construction of defended localities

in that area. So the battalion found itself digging and wiring once more

in new soil.

 

The 55th division, having recovered from the severe handling they had

received in the enemy reply to “Cambrai,” eventually took over the line,

and on February 12th the 7th marched back to Burbure, near Lillers. The

end of the 42nd’s tour of duty in this sector had been marked the

previous night by a highly successful raid by the 9th Manchesters which

had taken the Boche completely by surprise, and had furnished quite a

number of prisoners and machine guns. The warning rumblings of the

German offensive storm now steadily increased to a marked degree. His

guns were growing in number, range and activity, and what had once been

peaceful back areas were steadily becoming more uncomfortable. This was

displayed all along the front, so that it was impossible to deduce from

that fact alone where his blow would fall. There was a good deal of

suspicion, however, about the Portuguese front, and the duties of the

42nd, as 1st Army reserve, were clear if the attack took place there.

 

Eventually the division, without having to move again, became G.H.Q.

reserve, which meant that we were liable to be sent to any part of the

British line when Germany commenced to strike. With the aid of motor

buses, parties of officers and men made reconnaissances of the defended

localities behind the Loos and Hulluch sector, so that by now we were

more or less conversant with the larger part of the 1st Army front. The

divisional commander lectured officers and N.C.O’s. of all brigades

concerning the work of defence, and it was about this time that he

instituted the divisional motto:—“Go one better”—which was taken up

and acted upon with such popular enthusiasm by everyone connected with

the 42nd. In fact, if a coat of arms of the East Lancashire Division had

been designed in 1918, the following three features would have stood out

clearly:—

 

[Illustration]

 

During the month of February the drain upon the manpower of the British

Empire caused by the war made itself apparent. It was found to be

impossible to maintain in the field four battalions per brigade, and a

reduction to three was ordered. Then took place the solution of a most

confusing Chinese puzzle. Some battalions were broken up, and the

fragments sent to others either in the same division or in other

divisions, while in the case of many units, particularly territorials,

there was a transfer of a sort of cadre which was amplified to full

strength in its new division. The 42nd division lost the 6th L.F’s., the

4th East Lancashires and the 9th Manchesters, and the 8th Manchesters

were transferred to the 126th brigade, which was now composed of 5th

East Lancs., the 8th and 10th Manchesters, while the 127th brigade was

left with the 5th, 6th and 7th Manchesters. A whole company of seven

officers and 200 men of the 2/10th Manchesters from the 66th division

came to wear the Fleur de Lys, and we were glad to welcome them as

comrades. In the heavy fighting that followed they proved themselves to

be good stuff of the regular Oldham type, while they themselves forgot

their natural initial heart burnings and grew proud of the Cap badge and

flashes that they had adopted.

 

Our period of rest was divided between Burbure and Busnes, and in both

places the mesdemoiselles and the estaminets were a source of real

delight to the men of the 7th. As might be expected, some good, solid

training was achieved, and this was interspersed by most enjoyable

football competitions and cross-country running. In fact, the middle of

March found the division extremely fit.

 

CHAPTER VII.

 

Stopping the Hun.

 

“Good God! What is the matter with the Boche to-night?” Such were our

ejaculations on the night of March 21st at Busnes. The coming of

darkness had brought with it the long-drawn out, familiar “A-zoom,

a-zoom—CRASH—CRASH—CRASH,” of enemy planes but in closer proximity

than ever before. Previously they had confined their attentions to

Bethune each night, but on this particular evening Lillers was the

objective, and plane after plane came over maintaining an almost

continuous bombardment throughout the night. An ammunition train

standing in the station, was hit, and the terrific explosions that

followed at irregular intervals accompanied by huge fires added to the

evening’s excitements. Next day, wires from G.H.Q. enlightened us. The

German offensive opened on the morning of March 21st, the fifth and

third armies being engaged. The front line defence had been overwhelmed,

but we were led to suppose that the enemy was being held up amongst the

defended localities.

 

We afterwards learnt that intensive bombing of back areas and

particularly of railheads and junctions had taken place that night in

the whole of the British area. One of the objects of this was to impede

the movements of reserve divisions, and when it is known that detailed

instructions had been issued for the entrainment of the 42nd at Lillers

in case we should be required at some distance, such a policy as this is

easily understood. But the German had reckoned without the London

omnibus driver, who before the war had served another kind of “General.”

Arrangements were rapidly completed in twenty-four hours, so that on

the morning of March 23rd the whole division, in battle order, found a

huge fleet of buses ready to convey them to—“Somewhere in France.” The

French villagers smiled confidently at us as we journeyed northwards in

the direction of the Portuguese front, but they did not know, poor

souls, that this was the only way the large convoy could “about turn,”

nor did they know, although perhaps they guessed, that the Portuguese

front would collapse the following month and they would be fleeing for

their lives before the blonde beast. We eventually turned our faces

south and rode the whole of that day without stopping over the dusty

roads of France. The Hun had been extraordinarily lucky in weather,

there having been hardly a drop of rain for more than three weeks, so

that the ground was perfectly dry for his operations.

 

Nightfall found us still travelling, and the day of 24th March had

almost broken before we “debussed” to find ourselves in the devastated

area of the Somme lands, near the village of Ayette. There was no rest

to be had. Uncertainty as to the situation in front and also as to the

future possibilities necessitated an immediate adoption of tactical

positions, and the 127th brigade took up a defensive line, on an outpost

principle, to cover the ground between Ablainzevelle and Courcelles.

Until this had been achieved no man was able to turn his thoughts to

sleep, in fact the sun had been up some hours before this was possible.

The day produced a complexity of events in the handling of which Col.

Bromfield proved himself to be at once human and masterful. In the first

place, a “battle surplus” had to be decided upon. This was a small group

of officers and men, selected as far as possible from each rank and from

each type of specialists, who remained behind the line whilst the

battalion was in action. In the event of the battalion being obliterated

by casualties, they would form the nucleus of a new unit. Choice

generally fell upon those who were considered due for a rest from the

line. When the necessary officers and men had been abstracted the

Company Commanders were Capt. Tinker, “A,” Capt. Nidd, “B,” 2nd-Lt.

Harland, “C,” and Capt. J. Baker, “D.” Headquarters comprised the C.O.,

Capt. J. R. Creagh, Adjutant; Lt. C. S. Wood, Signals; and Lt. S. J.

Wilson, I.O.; while Capt. Philp, the M.O., and Padre Hoskyns were in

confident control of aid post arrangements.

 

We had now become a part of the third army, and as such we were destined

to remain until the conclusion of the war. General Byng was not a

stranger to the 42nd, for it was as a part of his corps on Gallipoli

that they made their first fight against the Turk. As the reports have

it, “the situation was obscure” on this portion of the third army front.

As far as we were concerned the 40th division had experienced a very

severe handling but were still fighting gamely. They had recaptured Mory

twice and were now expected to be in possession of the greater part of

the village, while the Guards on their left were only yielding ground

inch by inch. What had happened to the right of this was not very clear.

The orders of the 127th brigade were to go up and relieve some fragments

of the 40th division in Mory on the night of the 24th, and when darkness

fell we set out with this object in view, but such plain,

straightforward work as that was not to be achieved in these queer days.

Events moved quickly and a change in the situation was an hourly

occurrence; it therefore devolved upon unit commanders, and as far as

possible commanders of higher formations to act with initiative and

resource.

 

[Illustration: ROUND ABOUT BAPAUME]

 

The head of the brigade column had reached Gomiecourt when word was

received that the enemy was attacking again, and there were vague

reports that Behagnies had either been captured or was being hard

pressed. It was considered inadvisable to continue the journey to Mory,

and more important to hold up this possible enveloping movement. We were

therefore deflected to the right, and then those things were done which

we used to practise on the desert, but never expected to put into use in

France. We moved across the open in artillery formation by battalions

and finally deployed into a defensive position. Meanwhile the guns

were hammering away at S.O.S. speed from their hastily improvised

positions either on or near the roads. The difficulty of all this work

was not diminished by the darkness, and it was with some astonishment

that we found the 125th brigade coming through our lines diagonally. One

or two stragglers from other divisions came in and told stories of heavy

enemy attacks, but a gunner major rode back from the front on a white

horse, and said the situation was not so bad as these men’s reports had

intimated. Still, there seemed to be a good deal of confusion, and the

7th were somewhat bewildered, not knowing quite what to expect next.

Meanwhile they longed hard for daylight in order to get their

whereabouts and some idea of the lie of the land.

 

As daylight approached on the 25th it was obvious, from the increasing

proximity of rifle fire on our left, that Mory had fallen and the line

was falling back steadily. Quiet seemed to reign now, however, in the

direction of Behagnies. We later discovered that the L.F’s. had received

orders to push on and cover the Behagnies-Sapignies Road, and this they

had successfully achieved in the night. At the same time the 126th

brigade was in touch with the enemy in front of Ervillers, so that on

the morning of the 25th all three brigades were in the front line and

were rigging up an impromptu battle with the Hun. The enemy soon made

his intentions clear and he commenced a vigorous assault. What