Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗

can make it our duty to violate any command of God: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as forbidding us to engage in just war? Is it not rather intended to impress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great virtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy, but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? If the meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be the true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil justice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections.

But are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same degree? Does the Bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? On the contrary, Christ himself had his beloved disciple,—one whom he loved pre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others none the less on that account. We are bound to love our parents, our brothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but we do not, for this reason, love others any the less. A man is not only permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. We are bound to protect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary for the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of the assailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow that we hate him whom we thus destroy. On the contrary, we may feel compassion, and even love for him. The magistrate sentences the murderer to suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentence into execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner: nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest feelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life.

So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to my kindred and my neighbors do I love my countrymen. I love them more than I do foreigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of friendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the foreigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and the enslaved African, and willingly contribute to their relief, although their sufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen become oppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which God has formed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be made unhappy and suffering; this I am bound to take all proper measures in my power to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument to desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with my fellow-citizens in forcibly resisting his aggressions. In doing this I am actuated by no feelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; I have in my heart no malice, no spirit of revenge; I have no desire to harm individuals, except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. But as instruments of evil, I am bound to destroy their power to do harm. I do not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; I fight against him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured without destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. I am prohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle, or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. All conduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with disapprobation.

That war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the contrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the battle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the political events of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in all history. Soult and Wellington were opposing generals in numerous battles; but when the former visited England in 1838, he was received by Wellington and the whole British nation with the highest marks of respect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two distinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly relations between the two nations. And a few years ago, when we seemed brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by the northeastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded, through the intervention of General Scott, between the Governors of Maine and New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships contracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with Great Britain.

III. "It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars were abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned. Now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has created man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at an end; for God never places man under circumstances in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. Is it for the advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?"

The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely necessary to point out its logical defects.

My living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing, and certainly it would be no reason why I should neglect the security of my property. My living among murderers would not justify me in committing murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why I should not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law were unable to protect them. That other nations carry on unjust wars is no reason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we should neglect the means of self-defence.

It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in a world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but God has seen fit to order it otherwise. Our duties and our relations to our fellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as we would make for ourselves.

We live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our property—that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick and high between the robber and our merchandise. And more: we enact laws for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the guilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the prevention of other thefts and robberies.

We live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of our innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his death, if need be. Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we inflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life.

These relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all ethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of Christian morality. Even Dr. Wayland considers it not only the right, but the duty of individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact these laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course of reasoning to the relations of different societies.

We live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding the rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens, in order to reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as a nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors, and our cities. But the walls of our houses and stores are useless, unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or scale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully armed and equipped.

Further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for the protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them with the physical means of executing the laws, even though the employment of these means should cost human life. The prevention and punishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. So, as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to protect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. National aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual crime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more stupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater amount of human suffering. This may be a good reason for greater caution in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument against the moral right to use them.

IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:

"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just the kind, and the merciful."

The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of individuals. Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber, and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? Reason and experience prove the contrary. Active benevolence and kindness should always attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit it. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as well as love. "The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact does not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall be punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.

"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I reply, the proper appeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force, but to the consciences of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set forth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the consciences of men be aroused to justice."

Argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always be resorted to in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail to deter the wicked, force must be employed. I may reason with the robber and the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my house, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral appeals, I employ physical force,—I call in the strong arm of the law to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed.

"If," says Puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the highest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I should consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in other words, that I should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own preservation, in