The Seventh Manchesters - S. J. Wilson (leveled readers .TXT) 📗
- Author: S. J. Wilson
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therefore, it was necessary to crowd in rapid training in attack on this
principle, so that each man should be well acquainted with his function.
After the battle surplus had been eliminated the company commanders were
as follows:—“A” company, Capt. Nelson, “B” Lt. S. J. Wilson, “C” Capt.
Allen, M.C., and “D” Lieut. Gresty, M.C. Lt.-Col. Manger commanded the
battalion, while Capt. Creagh had returned and was Adjutant. Two days
before the attack Capt. Nelson went into hospital with dysentery which
had frequently recurred in a violent form during the preceding weeks. A
slight readjustment was thus demanded amongst the officers to give
every company a fair share of leadership and Lieut. Hammond was sent to
command “A” company.
Briefly the plan of attack was as follows. The divisional frontage was
covered by the 125th brigade on the right and the 127th brigade on the
left, with the remaining brigade in support. As far as the 127th brigade
was concerned, the attack was to be accomplished in five bounds. The
first objective, along the whole of the brigade front, was the work of
the 5th Manchesters, and consisted in capturing the German front line
which ran chiefly along Chapel Wood Switch. The next four objectives,
called for convenience the Red, Brown, Yellow and Blue Lines, were to
engage the attention of the 7th on the right and the 6th on the left of
the brigade front, and were to be taken by the leap-frog method by
companies. Thus, in the 7th, “C” company’s objective was the Red Line,
“A” the Brown, “D” the Yellow, and “B” the Blue Line. These lines were
by no means parallel to one another, their shape being largely
controlled by the configuration of the ground and the German trenches.
It is also important to note that the Hindenburg system was being taken
in enfilade on this part of the front. Two or three great parallel
trenches ran along in the direction of the advance, and they were full
of deep dug-outs capable of holding thousands of men. Our main security
lay in the fact that a simultaneous attack was taking place along a
widely extended front, and the enemy would not be able to fill these
dug-outs with counter-attacking troops drawn from other fronts.
[Illustration: ATTACK ON THE HINDENBURG LINE, SEPT. 27th, 1918.]
Space does not allow of a detailed description of the orders for attack,
but it can easily be imagined that they were pretty considerable in view
of the heavy work to be accomplished by the artillery. As this portion
of the German line was known to be powerfully defended by large numbers
of troops, extensive trench systems, dug-outs and wire, it was part of
the strategy of Foch to concentrate artillery here, and records showed
that on the two days September 27th and 28th shells were consumed at an
unprecedented rate. In our sector alone, the programme comprised the
capturing of 3,500 yards in depth of the most strongly defended ground
in France, including the vicinities of the famous Highland and Welsh
Ridges of terrible memory in the Battle of Cambrai. Every yard of this
ground was subjected to a continuous creeping shrapnel barrage lasting
for almost three hours, while moving steadily ahead of this was a
terrific bombardment by all calibres from 4.5 howitzers upwards upon the
enemy’s main trenches and supposed defence points. The brigade frontage,
measured north to south, was 1,250 yards, and this was equally divided
between the 6th and 7th. As we were going over one company behind
another, each company was responsible for nearly 700 yards—a very large
front considering our depleted numbers. There is no doubt, as far as we
were concerned, the task looked formidably ambitious.
On the morning of Sept. 26th final operation orders were issued, and
that night we moved up to our assembly positions in a huge dug-out near
Femy Wood, capable of holding the whole battalion. It was slow work
moving along the canal and across the Trescault-Havrincourt road, and it
is not surprising that eventually the intervals between platoons closed
up and the four companies were strung out in one long line. The
confidence felt in the success of the operations, was evident by the
fact that the 6-inch howitzers were installed in front of the Trescault
road within 500 yards of the enemy. Whilst we were assembling there
were motor lorries on the road unloading stacks of ammunition for them!
By the time the battalion had been packed into the dug-out dawn was
swiftly approaching, which meant the commencement of the battle, for
Zero for the third army was 5.25 a.m. The VIth corps, the 62nd division
of which touched up with our left, were to have three hours’ fighting
before we commenced, and for this reason we welcomed the shelter of the
dug-out while it was in progress. The configuration of the ground was
responsible for the manner in which the battle was to grow along the
whole front. The advance of the 127th brigade was to take place along
the shoulder of a long hill running broadly east to west. North of this
high ground was a long valley stretching through Ribecourt towards
Marcoing. Another shoulder similar to but higher than ours flanked the
valley on the north, and it was this, together with the commanding
village of Flesquieres, that the VIth corps were to make good before our
attack commenced. Again, the 125th brigade, who were on our right, and
also on the higher part of the shoulder, were to open the 42nd
divisional assault half an hour ahead of ourselves.
About 8 o’clock “C” company led the way out of the dug-out and took up
their assault positions near the front line. At the appointed hour,
following behind the 5th, they moved forward to the attack, in the
formation which we had practised so frequently, and which was the most
suitable for the large frontage that had to be covered. All four
platoons were in line, and each platoon was divided into four sections,
the two rifle sections on the flanks, and the two L.G. sections in the
middle and echeloned to the rear. This was the artillery formation
useful for covering the ground previous to the actual assault, each
section moving in file (_i.e._, two ranks) well opened out. When close
to the enemy position the platoons extended and formed two lines, with a
L.G. in the centre of each line, and riflemen on the flanks. Every
Company went over in this formation, and strict orders were issued that
no man was to enter the enemy trenches for the purpose of covering the
ground, but to keep out in the open, otherwise great confusion would
arise, and officers would lose control of their men.
Misfortune greeted “C” company from the start. Capt. Allen, M.C. and
2nd-Lt. Ray were killed immediately, and casualties were soon very
heavy. It was evident the enemy was making the most of his superior
position and the clear sweep of ground. The remnants of the company
pushed on, however, and reached their objective. “A” company followed
and they also suffered severely from the moment they advanced out of
Ferny Wood. Then it was noticed that most of the machine gun fire was
from the right flank, and our men were being subjected to a terrible
enfilading fire as they moved across the open. All the officers became
casualties, Lt. Hammond wounded, 2nd-Lt. McAlmont wounded, 2nd-Lt. T.
Woods wounded, and 2nd-Lt. Carley, killed. The few men of the company,
now led by C.S.M. Joyce, reached the Red Line and joined “C” company,
which, Lt. Edge, M.C., having been hit, was now under the command of
2nd-Lt. Jones. It was impossible, with the small number of men,
scattered over a wide front, to continue the advance for the moment. “D”
company, moving up according to programme, were treated similarly to the
previous two companies and men began to drop long before they
anticipated meeting any resistance. Thus, before they had gone very far
2nd-Lt. Thrutchley and 2nd-Lt. Wright were wounded, which left Lt.
Gresty, M.C. and 2nd-Lt. Milne to carry on the leadership, a task which
they performed in fine style. They quickly arrived at the Red Line, and
then took cover for a short period. Soon after this, “B” company came
along, but on nearing the Red Line, they found many men of “D” turned
about firing rifles and L.G. towards their right rear. It was now
obvious that the ground to the right of us had not been cleared at all,
and the enemy was left free to work his will upon us from the higher
ground. By this time a tank had arrived and materially assisted us in
dealing with the problem. Gresty then decided to push on and his company
mounted the rising ground in front. From this point they unfortunately
swerved to the left, probably being influenced by a road which ran
diagonally across the front towards Ribecourt, but nothing could stop
their irresistible dash. As they crossed this road Milne, with a handful
of his platoon, added to our already considerable number of prisoners,
by capturing a large crowd of Huns.
With characteristic impetuosity, reminiscent of the La Signy Farm days,
Gresty and the men of “D” following up under the barrage, rushed across
the Brown Line and made for the Yellow Line. They were now only a small
gallant band but they were undaunted. Prisoners captured were told to go
down to the rear, which they did right gladly without an escort, so that
the assaulting party who now in formation and well-nigh in size, began
to resemble a Rugby football team, could preserve their strength. Two 77
m.m. guns lay in their path, and at their approach the Boche gunners
spiked them and made off, leaving them an easy prey to the 7th. After
this, Gresty decided that he was on his objective, as indeed he was, but
he was more or less in the 6th sector, and when he was quickly joined by
a company of the 6th he began to realise it. There was trouble on his
right, however, as well as from the front, and the small party of men
were disposed to defend the ground they had captured, a difficult enough
task in view of the fact that they had to find positions to face in two
or three different directions. Touch was obtained with the 62nd division
in Ribecourt, and it was found that the VIth corps had had great success
in their part of the battle, so that already the advance was proceeding
towards Marcoing.
“B” company’s effort was really a separate story. As soon as “D” company
had disappeared over the crest in front of the Red Line they continued
the advance. 2nd-Lt. Pearson was on the extreme right and he had been
instructed to keep touch with the L.F’s. From the beginning, however, he
had not seen them, and his platoon was moving along “in the air,” and
naturally meeting with strong resistance. They had not expected to meet
the enemy for another 1,500 yards if events had worked out “according to
plan,” but they were now fighting them at every step. Gallant deeds were
performed in dealing with Hun machine guns, and many prisoners were
taken, but greatest of all were the achievements of Pte. Jack White.
Single-handed he rushed a machine gun post, bayonetted the man on the
gun and pursued the remainder of the team with fire, inflicting
casualties. Later on he again rushed forward alone to a strongly held
trench, but was killed practically on the parapet. His name was
recommended for a V.C., but unfortunately nothing more was heard of it.
In view of the heavy casualties, Lt. Wilson went across to Pearson and
told him to close his platoon slightly towards the left, in order to
keep
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