Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗

Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage; so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding them there, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic."

"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe; his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle—these are instances, of the many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz."

"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness."

"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or reserve beyond."

"The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a more glorious sphere—that of the offensive. In our last war, instead of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number—instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal—they rendered benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors. Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."

A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy of their support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regard this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be substituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where this might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city, the Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the outer harbor of New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important. Strong fortifications on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of forts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less certain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect the same object, and to be kept continually at home for that special purpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce, its character and efficiency as a harbor defence would be lost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force—fixed within the limits of the defence of this particular place—and our estimates must be made accordingly.

The average durability of ships of war in the British navy, has been variously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten to twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his "Brief Inquiry," published in 1812, estimates the average durability at about eight years. His calculations seem based upon authentic information. A distinguished English writer has more recently arrived at the same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the Board of Admiralty during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. The data in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for building and repairing having been so expended as to render it impossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. But, in the returns now before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the timbers used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate comparisons.

According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber, for hulls, masts, and yards, in building an English 74 gun ship, is £61,382. Let us now compare this cost of timber for building, with that of the same item for repairs, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and 1820. The list would have been still further enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect:

Name of Ship No. of guns When built Repaired from Cost. Vengeance 74 1800 to 1807 £84,720 Ildefonso 74 1807 to 1808 85,195 Scipio 74 1807 to 1809 60,785 Tremendous 74 1807 to 1810 135,397 Elephant 74 1808 to 1811 67,007 Spencer 74 1800 1809 to 1813 124,186 Romulus 74 1810 to 1812 73,141 Albion 74 1802 1810 to 1813 102,295 Donegal 74 1812 to 1815 101,367 Implacable 74 1813 to 1815 59,865 Illustrious 74 1803 1813 to 1816 74,184 Northumberland 74 1814 to 1815 59,795 Kent 74 1814 to 1818 88,357 Sultan 74 1807 1816 to 1818 61,518 Sterling Castle 74 1816 to 1818 65,280

This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of timber alone used in their repair, an average of about $400,000 each. More timber than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid for out of the funds appropriated "for such as may be ordered in course of the year to be repaired." But the amount specifically appropriated for timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen years, equal the entire first cost of the same items. If we add to this amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to the operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of other materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the whole sum expended under these heads to equal the first cost, even within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between 1800 and 1820, was £18,727,551; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," £17,449,780; making an annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and $4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels built were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so decayed as to be broken up.

But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815.

Year. For the wear and tear of ships. Extra Expences for building, repairing etc. For entire sea service. 1800 £4,350,000 £772,140 £13,619,079 1801 5,850,000 933,900 16,577,037 1802 3,684,000 773,500 11,833,571 1803 3,120,000 901,140 10,211,378 1804 3,900,000 948,520 12,350,606 1805 4,680,000 1,553,690 15,035,630 1806 4,680,000 1,980,830 18,864,341 1807 5,070,000 2,134,903 17,400,337 1808 5,070,000 2,351,188 18,087,544 1809 3,295,500 2,296,030 19,578,467 1810 3,295,500 1,841,107 18,975,120 1811 3,675,750 2,046,200 19,822,000 1812 3,675,750 1,696,621 19,305,759 1813 3,549,000 2,822,031 20,096,709 1814 3,268,000 2,086,274 19,312,070 1815 2,386,500 2,116,710 19,032,700

It appears from this table that the appropriations for the service, during the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a little less than ninety millions of dollars per annum; and for the wear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near thirty millions.

Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and repairs of our men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report of the Secretary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th Congress,) will afford data for an approximate calculation:—

Name of Ship No. of guns Total cost of building, exclusive of armaments, stores, etc. When completed. Cost of repairs, exclusive of ordnance, etc. Repaired between Delaware 74 $543,368.00 1820 $354,132.56 1827 and 1838 N. Carolina 74 431,852.00 1825 317,628.92 1824 and 1836 Constitution 44 302,718.84 1797 266,878.34 1833 and 1839 United States 44 299,336.56 1797 571,972.77 1821 and 1841 Brandywine 44 [23]299,218.12 1825 [23]377,665.95 1826 and 1838 Potomac 44 [23]231,013.02 1822 [23] 82,597.03 1829 and 1835 Concord 20 115,325.80 1828 72,796.22 1832 and 1840 Falmouth 20 94,093.27 1827 130,015.43 1828 and 1837 John Adams 20 110,670.69 1829 119,641.93 1834 and 1837 Boston 20 91,973.19 1825 189,264.37 1826 and 1840 St. Louis 20 102,461.95 1828 135,458.75 1834 and 1839 Vincennes 20 111,512.79 1826 178,094.81 1830 and 1838 Vandalia 20 90,977.88 1828 59,181.34 1832 and 1834 Lexington 20? 114,622.35 1826 83,386.52 1827 and 1837 Warren 20? 99,410.01 1826 152,596.03 1830 and 1838 Fairfield 20 100,490.35 1826 65,918.26 1831 and 1837 Natches[24] 20? 106,232.19 1827 129,969.80 1829 and 1836 Boxer 10 30,697.88 1831 28,780.48 1834 and 1840 Enterprise 10 27,938.63 1831 20,716.59 1834 and 1840 Grampus 10 23,627.42 1821 96,086.36 1825 and 1840 Dolphin 10 38,522.62 1836 15,013.35 1839 and 1840 Shark 10 23,627.42 1821 93,395.84 1824 and 1839

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