Elements of Military Art and Science - Henry Wager Halleck (best free ebook reader .TXT) 📗

One bridge-equipage is required for each corps d'armée.

If we add to these the staff, and the several officers and employés of the administrative departments, we have an army of nearly fifty thousand men.

This, it will be remembered, is the organization of an army in the field; in the entire military organization of a state, the number of staff officers will be still higher.

In 1788, France, with a military organization for about three hundred and twenty thousand men, had eighteen marshals, two hundred and twenty-five lieutenant-generals, five hundred and thirty-eight maréchaux-de-camp, and four hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. A similar organization of the general staff was maintained by Napoleon. At present the general staff of the French army consists of nine marshals, (twelve in time of war;) eighty lieutenant-generals in active service, fifty-two in reserve, and sixty two en retraite—one hundred and ninety-four in all; one hundred and sixty maréchaux-de-camp in active service, eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety en retraite—four hundred and thirty-six in all. The officers of the staff-corps are: thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colonels, one hundred majors, three hundred captains, and one hundred lieutenants. Those of other European armies are organized on the same basis.

It will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our own general staff is exceedingly defective, and entirely unsuited to the object for which it is created. We have two brigadier-generals for the command of two brigades, and one general of division, with the title of major-general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general commanding the army, lieutenant-general, general of division, and chief of staff of the army. But as it is impossible with this number to maintain a proper organization, the President (with the advice and consent of the Senate) has, from time to time, increased this number to three major-generals, and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous officers of staff with lower grades. Nearly all these officers are detached from their several regiments and corps, thus injuring the efficiency of regiments and companies; and we have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplying the defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the anomaly of officers being generals, and at the same time not generals; of holding certain ranks and grades, and yet not holding these ranks and grades! Let Congress do away this absurd and ridiculous system, and establish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff, and restore the grades of general and lieutenant-general. In the war of 1812, instead of resorting to a proper organization when an increase of the general staff was required, we merely multiplied the number of major-generals and generals of brigade by direct appointment, or by conferring brevet rank. It is now conceded that there never was a more inefficient general staff than that with which our army was cursed during the war; and the claims of brevet rank have ever since been a source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, driving from the army many of its noblest ornaments.

In the event of another war, it is to be hoped that Congress will not again resort to the ruinous system of 1812. Possibly it may by some be objected to the creation of generals, lieutenant-generals, &c., that it increases the expense of the army and the number of its officers. This need not be. The number, pay, &c., may remain the same, or nearly the same, as at present. But by increasing the grades you avoid in a considerable measure the difficulties of seniority claims and brevet rank—the principal curses of our present system. If we merely increase the number of each existing grade, giving a part of these rank above their name and office, we merely multiply evils. But we will leave this subject for the present, and recur to the general discussion of staff duties.

The following remarks of Jomini on the importance of the staff of an army are worthy of attention. "A good staff," says he, "is, more than all, indispensable to the constitution of an army; for it must be regarded as the nursery where the commanding general can raise his principal supports—as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid his own. When harmony is wanting between the genius that commands, and the talents of those who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure; for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in execution. Moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being more durable than the genius of any single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may safely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of all safeguards. The petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplaced egotism, oppose this last position: nevertheless, every military man of reflection, and every enlightened statesman, will regard its truth as beyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is to an army what a skilful minister is to a monarchy—it seconds the views of the chief, even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; it prevents the commission of faults, even though the commanding general be wanting in experience, by furnishing him good councils. How many mediocre men of both ancient and modern times, have been rendered illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates! Reynier was the chief cause of the victories of Pichegru, in 1794; and Dessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of Moreau. Is not General Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof? Diebitsch with those of Barclay and Witgenstein? Gneisenau and Muffling with those of Blücher? Numerous other instances might be cited in support of these assertions."

"A well-established staff does not always result from a good system of education for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematician and a fine scholar, without being a good warrior. The staff should always possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought for by the officers of the several arms, and to draw together, in this way, men who are already known by their aptitude for war. Engineer and artillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that it will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction, and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of those two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding general, and who are the most capable of directing the operations of war."

"At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution," says this able historian elsewhere, "in the French army the general staff, which is essential for directing the operations of war, had neither instruction nor experience." The several adjutant-generals attached to the army of Italy were so utterly incompetent, that Napoleon became prejudiced against the existing staff-corps, and virtually destroyed it, drawing his staff-officers from the other corps of the army. In his earlier wars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers; but in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly required for the sieges carried on in Germany and Spain, and considerable difficulty was encountered in finding suitable officers for staff duty. Some of the defects of the first French staff-corps were remedied in the latter part of Napoleon's career, and in 1818 it was reorganized by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and a special school established for its instruction.

Some European nations have established regular staff-corps, from which the vacancies in the general staff are filled; others draw all their staff-officers from the corps of the army. A combination of the two systems is preferred by the best judges. Jomini recommends a regular staff-corps, with special schools for its instruction; but thinks that its officers should be drawn, at least in part, from the other corps of the army: the officers of engineers and artillery he deems, from their instruction, to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty. The policy of holding double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps of the army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by all competent judges as ruinous to an army, destroying at the same time the character of the staff and injuring the efficiency of the line.

The following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers of an army, made at the beginning of the war of 1812, are from the pen of one of the ablest military writers this country has yet produced:—

"Generals have been divided into three classes,—Theorists, who by study and reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rules or maxims of the art they profess; Martinets, who have confined their attention merely to the mechanical part of the trade; and Practical men, who have no other or better guide than their own experience, in either branch of it. This last description is in all services, excepting our own, the most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class, viz., men destitute alike of theory and of experience."

"Self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. Without the former, no man ever became a good officer; under the influence of the latter, generals have committed great faults. The former is the necessary result of knowledge; the latter of ignorance. A man acquainted with his duty can rarely be placed in circumstances new, surprising, or embarrassing; a man ignorant of his duty will always find himself constrained to guess, and not knowing how to be right by system, will often be wrong by chance."

"These remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively to the science of war. They apply to all other sciences; but in these, errors are comparatively harmless. A naturalist may amuse himself and the public with false and fanciful theories of the earth; and a metaphysician may reason very badly on the relations and forms of matter and spirit, without any ill effect but to make themselves ridiculous. Their blunders but make us merry; they neither pick pockets, nor break legs, nor destroy lives; while those of a general bring after them evils the most compounded and mischievous,—the slaughter of an army—the devastation of a state—the ruin of an empire!"

"In proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the reasons for acquiring instruction are multiplied and strengthened. Are you an honest man? You will spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge of your duty. Are you a man of honor? You will be careful to avoid self-reproach. Does your bosom glow with the holy fervor of patriotism? You will so accomplish yourself as to avoid bringing down upon your country either insult or injury."

"Nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency. Has hunger made you a soldier? Will you not take care of your bread! Is vanity your principle of action? Will you not guard those mighty blessings, your epaulets and feathers! Are you impelled by a love of glory or a love of power? And can you forget that these coy mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct?"

"But the means of instruction, say you, where are they to be found? Our standing army is but a bad