An Essay On The Trial By Jury - Lysander Spooner (little red riding hood read aloud .TXT) 📗
- Author: Lysander Spooner
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Opinions In regard To It, I May Add The Following:
"There Is That Great Simplicity And Plainness In the Common Law,
That Lord Coke Has Gone So Far As To Assert, (And Lord Bacon
Nearly Seconds Him In observing,) That 'He Never Knew Two
Questions Arise Merely Upon Common Law; But That They Were
Mostly Owing to Statutes Ill-Penned and Overladen With Provisos.' "
3 Eunomus, 157 8.
If It Still Be Said That Juries Would Disagree, As To What Was
Natural Justice, And That One Jury Would Decide One Way, And
Another Jury Another; The Answer Is, That Such A Thing is Hardly
Credible, As That Twelve Men, Taken At Random From The People At
Large, Should Unanimously Decide A Question Of Natural Justice One
Way, And That Twelve Other Men, Selected in the Same Manner,
Should Unanimously Decide The Same Question The Other Way,
Unless They Were Misled by The Justices. If, However, Such Things
Should Sometimes Happen, From Any Cause Whatever, The Remedy
Is By Appeal, And New Trial.
[1] Judges Do Not Even Live Up To That Part Of Their Own Maxim,
Which Requires Jurors To Try The Matter Of Fact. By Dictating to
Them The Laws Of Evidence, That Is, By Dictating what Evidence
They May Hear, And What They May Not Hear, And Also By Dictating
To Them Rules For Weighing such Evidence As They Permit Them To
Hear, They Of Necessity Dictate The Conclusion To Which They
Shall Arrive. And Thus The Court Really Tries The Question Of
Fact, As Well As The Question Of Law, In every Cause. It Is
Clearly Impossible, In the Nature Of Things, For A Jury To Try, A
Question Of Fact, Without Trying every Question Of Law On Which
The Fact Depends.
[2] Most Disagreements Of Juries Are On Matters Of Fact, Which Are
Admitted to Be Within Their Province. We Have Little Or No
Evidence Of Their Disagreements On Matters Of Natural Justice. The
Disagreements Of Courts On Matters Of Law, Afford Little Or No
Evidence That Juries Would Also Disagree On Matters Of Law That
Is, Of Justice, Because The Disagreements Of Courts Are Generally
On Matters Of Legislation, And Not On Those Principles Of Abstract
Justice, By Which Juries Would Be Governed, And In regard To Which
The Minds Of Men Are Nearly Unanimous.
[3] This Is The Principle Of All Voluntary Associations
Whatsoever. No Voluntary Association Was Ever Formed, And In the
Nature Of Things There Never Can Be One Formed, For The
Accomplishment Of Any Objects Except Those In which All The
Parties To The Association Are Agreed. Government, Therefore, Must
Be Kept Within These Limits, Or It Is No Longer A Voluntary
Association Of All Who Contribute To Its Support, But A Mere
Tyrant Established by A Part Over The Rest.
All, Or Nearly All, Voluntary Associations Give To A Majority, Or
To Some Other Portion Of The Members Less Than The Whole, The
Right To Use Some Limited discretion As To Themeans To Be Used to
Chapter 5 (Objections Answered) Pg 137Accomplish The Ends In view; But The End Themselves To Be
Accomplished are Always Precisely Defined, And Are Such As Every
Member Necessarily Agrees To, Else He Would Not Voluntarily Join
The Association.
Justice Is The Object Of Government, And Those Who Support The
Government, Must Be Agreed as To The Justice To Be Executed by It,
Or They Cannot Rightfully Unite In maintaining the Government
Itself.
[4] Jones On Bailments,
[5] Kent, Describing the Difficulty Of Construing the Written Law,
Says:
"Such Is The Imperfection Of Language, And The Want Of Technical
Skill In the Makers Of The Law, That Statutes Often Give Occasion
To The Most Perplexing and Distressing doubts And Discussions,
Arising from The Ambiguity That Attends Them. It Requires Great
Experience, As Well As The Command Of A Perspicuous Diction, To
Frame A Law In such Clear And Precise Terms, As To Secure It From
Ambiguous Expressions, And From All Doubts And Criticisms Upon Its
Meaning " Kent, 460.
The Following extract From A Speech Of Lord Brougham, In the
House Of Lords, Confesses The Same Difficulty:
There Was Another Subject, Well Worthy Of The Consideration Of
Government During the Recess, The Expediency, Or Rather The
Absolute Necessity, Of Some Arrangement For The Preparation Of
Bills, Not Merely Private, But Public Bills, In order That
Legislation Might Be Consistent And Systematic, And That The
Courts Might Not Have So Large A Portion Of Their Time Occupied in
Endeavoring to Construe Acts Of Parliament, In many Cases
Unconstruable, And In most Cases Difficult To Be Construed." Law
Reporter, 1848, P. 525.
[6] This Condemnation Of Written Laws Must, Of Course, Be
Understood As Applying only To Cases Where Principles And Rights
Are Involved, And Not As Condemning any Governmental
Arrangements, Or Instrumentalities, That Are Consistent With Natural
Right, And Which Must Be Agreed upon For The Purpose Of Carrying
Natural Law Into Effect. These Things May Be Varied, As Expediency
May Dictate, So Only That They Be Allowed to Infringe No Principle Of
Justice. And They Must, Of Course, Be Written, Because They Do Not
Exist As Fixed principles, Or Laws In nature.
Chapter 6 (Juries Of The Present Day Illegal) Pg 138
It May Probably Be Safely Asserted that There Are, At This Day,
No Legal Juries, Either In england Or America. And If There Are
No Legal Juries, There Is, Of Course, No Legal Trial, Nor
"Judgment," By Jury.
In Saying that There Are Probably No Legal Juries, I Mean That
There Are Probably No Juries Appointed in conformity With The
Principles Of The Common Law.
The Term Jury Is A Technical One, Derived from The Common Law;
And When The American Constitutions Provide For The Trial By
Jury, They Provide For The Common Law Trial By Jury; And Not
Merely For Any Trial By Jury That The Government Itself May
Chance To Invent, And Call By That Name. It Is The Thing, And Not
Merely The Name, That Is Guarantied. Any Legislation, Therefore,
That Infringes Any Essential Principle Of The Common Law, In the
Selection Of Jurors, Is Unconstitutional; And The Juries Selected
In Accordance With Such Legislation Are, Of Course, Illegal, And
Their Judgments Void.
It Will Also Be Shown, In a Subsequent Chapter, [1] That Since
Magna Carta, The Legislative Power In england (Whether King or
Parliament) Has Never Had Any Constitutional Authority To
Infringe, By Legislation, Any Essential Principle Of The Common
Law In the Selection Of Jurors. All Such Legislation Is As Much
Unconstitutional And Void, As Though It Abolished the Trial By
Jury Altogether. In reality It Does Abolish It.
What, Then, Are The Essential Principles Of The Common Law,
Controlling the Selection Of Jurors?
They Are Two.
1. That All The Freemen, Or Adult Male Members Of The State,
Shall Be Eligible As Jurors. [2]
Any Legislation Which Requires The Selection Of Jurors To Be Made
From A Less Number Of Freemen Than The Whole, Makes The Jury
Selected an Illegal One.
If A Part Only Of The Freemen, Or Members Of The State, Are
Eligible As Jurors, The Jury No Longer Represent "The Country,"
But Only A Part Of "The Country."
If The Selection Of Jurors Can Be Restricted to Any Less Number
Chapter 6 (Juries Of The Present Day Illegal) Pg 139Of Freemen Than The Whole, It Can Be Restricted to A Very Small
Proportion Of The Whole; And Thus The Government Be Taken Out Of
The Hands Of " The Country," Or The Whole People, And Be Thrown
Into The Hands Of A Few.
That, At Common Law, The Whole Body Of Freemen Were Eligible As
Jurors, Is Sufficiently Proved, Not Only By The Reason Of The
Thing, But By The Following evidence:
1. Everybody Must Be Presumed eligible, Until The Contrary
Be Shown. We Have No Evidence, That I Am Aware Of, Of A
Prior Date To Magna Carta, To Disprove That All Freemen Were
Eligible As Jurors, Unless It Be The Law Of Ethelred, Which
Requires That They Be Elderly [3] Men. Since No Specific Age
Is Given, It Is Probable, I Think, That This Statute Meant
Nothing more Than That They Be More Than Twenty-One Years
Old. If It Meant Anything more, It Was Probably Contrary To
The Common Law, And Therefore Void.
2. Since Magna Carta, We Have Evidence Showing quite
Conclusively That All Freemen, Above The Age Of Twenty-One
Years, Were Eligible As Jurors.
The Mirror Of Justices, (Written Within A Century After
Magna Carta,) In the Section " Of Judges" That Is, Jurors
Says:
"All Those Who Are Not Forbidden By Law May Be Judges
(Jurors).
To Women It Is Forbidden By Law That They Be Judges; And Thence It
Is, That Feme Coverts Are Exempted to Do Suit In inferior Courts.
On The Other Part, A Villein Cannot Be A Judge, By Reason Of The
Two Estates, Which Are Repugnants; Persons Attainted of False
Judgments Cannot Be Judges, Nor Infants, Nor Any Under The Age Of
Twenty-One Years, Nor Infected persons, Nor Idiots, Nor Madmen,
Nor Deaf, Nor Dumb, Nor Parties In the Pleas, Nor Men
Excommunicated by The Bishop, Nor Criminal Persons. * * And
Those Who Are Not Of The Christian Faith Cannot Be Judges, Nor Those
Who Are Out Of The King'S Allegiance." Mirror Of Justices, 59 60.
In The Section " Of Inferior Courts," It Is Said:
"From The First Assemblies Came Consistories, Which We Now Call
Courts, And That In divers Places, And In divers Manners: Whereof
The Sheriffs Held One Monthly, Or Every Five Weeks According to
The Greatness Or Largeness Of The Shires. And These Courts Are
Called county Courts, Where The Judgment Is By The Suitors, If
There Be No Writ, And Is By Warrant Of Jurisdiction Ordinary. The
Other Inferior Courts Are The Courts Of Every Lord Of The Fee, To
The Likeness Of The Hundred courts. There Are Other Inferior
Courts Which The Bailiffs Hold In every Hundred, From Three Weeks
To Three Weeks, By The Suitors Of The Freeholders Of The Hundred.
All The Tenants Within The Fees Are Bounden To Do Their Sui
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