A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

successive ages of history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnote ref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems which had their importance only so long as they lived and were then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.

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[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]

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Growth of the Philosophic Literature.

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the earliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final essence or truth was the âtman, that a search after it was our highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we want (neti neti). Philosophical enquires were however continuing in circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddha who closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumerated sixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly be traced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probably going on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no reference to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than those of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records. It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sad circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and recorded it in sûtras. These sûtras were intended probably for people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained in the aphorisms. The sûtras thus contain sometimes allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own

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[Footnote 1: Brahmajâla-sutta, Dîgha, 1. p. 12 ff.]

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views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except when there is a specially new development, the system is to be interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators treating their contributions as forming one whole.

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced

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work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular system are expressed in such close interconnection with the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at which they ceased to grow and came to a stop—a purpose for which a work like the present one may only be regarded as forming a preliminary introduction.

Besides the sûtras and their commentaries there are also independent treatises on the systems in verse called kârikâs, which try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct manner; the Sâ@mkhya kârikâ may be mentioned as a work of this kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, commentaries, or general observations on any system written in verses called the vârttikas; the S'lokavârttika, of Kumarila or the Vârttika of Sures'vara may be mentioned as examples. All these of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose in which the writers either nominally followed some selected sûtras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class the Nyâyamañjarî of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example and of the latter the Pras'astapâda bhâ@sya, the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusûdana Sarasvatî or the Vedânta-paribhâ@sâ of Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some minor publications are seen to come out.

The Indian Systems of Philosophy.

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the nâstika and the âstika. The nâstika (na asti "it is not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible

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nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Cârvâka. The âstika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Vedânta, Mîmâ@msâ, Nyâya and Vais'e@sika, generally known as the six systems (@sa@ddars'ana [Footnote ref 1]).

The Sâ@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kâpila, but the earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga system is attributed to Patañjali and the original sûtras are called the Pâtañjala Yoga sûtras. The general metaphysical position of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (Îs'vara) as distinct from Âtman and lays much importance on certain mystical practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement of liberation, whereas the Sâ@mkhya denies the existence of Îs'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system of Sâ@mkhya associated with Kâpila and the Yoga system associated with Patañjali are but two divergent modifications of an original Sâ@mkhya school, of which we now get only references here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted as two should more properly be looked upon as two different schools of the same Sâ@mkhya system—one may be called the Kâpila Sâ@mkhya and the other Pâtañjala Sâ@mkhya.

The Pûrva Mîmâ@msâ (from the root man to think—rational conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.

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[Footnote 1: The word "dars'ana" in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the Vais'e@sika sûtras of Ka@nâda (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "ditthi" (Sanskrit—dr@sti from the same root d@rs' from which dars'ana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars'ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (sarvadars'anavâcyo' rtha@h—@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya I.). Ratnakîrtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the same sense ("Yadi nâma dars'ane dars'ane nânâprakâram sattvatak-@sanam uktamasti." K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi in Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts, p.20). Mâdhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na. The word "mata" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views "tairthika." The words "siddha," "jñânin," etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are used rather in the sense of "seers" or "perfects."]

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The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex Vedic context. The Mîmâ@msâ formulated some principles according to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary discussions in the Mîmâ@msâ that it may be called a system of philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this day. The sûtras of Mîmâ@msâ are attributed to Jaimini, and S'abara wrote a bhâ@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of Mîmâ@msâ literature after Jaimini and S'abara are Kumârila Bha@t@ta and his pupil Prabhâkara, who criticized the opinions of his master so much, that the master used to call him guru