A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

and body (nâmarûpa) in order that there may be the six fields of contact [Footnote ref 6]; but on what does nâmarûpa depend? It occurred to him that without consciousness (viññâna) there could be no nâmarûpa [Footnote ref 8]. But what being there would there

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[Footnote 1: This word bhava is interpreted by Candrakîrtti in his Mâdhyamîka v@rtti, p. 565 (La Vallée Poussin's edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (punarbhavajanaka@m karma samutthâpayali kâyena vâcâ manasâ ca).]

[Footnote 2: Atthasâlinî, p. 385, upâdânantida@lhagaha@na@m. Candrakîrtti in explaining upâdâna says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for attaining it (yatra vastuni sat@r@s@nastasya vastuno 'rjanâya vi@dhapanâya upâdânamupâdatte tatra tatra prârthayate). Mâdhyamîka v@rtti, p. 565.]

[Footnote 3: Candrakîrtti describes t@r@s@nâ as âsvadanâbhinandanâdhyavasânasthânâdâtmapriyarûpairviyogo mâ bhût, nityamaparityâgo bhavediti, yeyam prârthanâ—the desire that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to us. Ibid. 565.]

[Footnote 4: We read also of phassâyatana and phassakâya. M. N. II. 261, III. 280, etc. Candrakîrtti says that @sa@dbhirâyatanadvârai@h k@rtyaprak@riyâ@h pravarttante prajñâyante. tannâmarûpapratyaya@m @sa@dâyatanamucyate. sa@dbhyas`câyatanebhya@h @sa@tspars`akâyâ@h pravarttante. M.V. 565.]

[Footnote 5: Âyatana means the six senses together with their objects. Âyatana literally is "Field of operation." Sa@lâyatana means six senses as six fields of operation. Candrakîrtti has âyatanadvârai@h.]

[Footnote 6: I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering nâmarûpa as mind and body, Compendium, p. 271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called nâma in each birth. These together with rûpa (matter) give us nâmarûpa (mind and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf. M. V. 564. Govindânanda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's bhâsya on the Brahma sûtras (II. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of Namarûpa which may probably refer to the Vijñanavada view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says—To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first vijñana or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana, and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rûpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum while rûpa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijñaña entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through the association of previous karma. See Vedantakalpataru, pp 274, 275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijñaña into the womb compare D N II. 63.]

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be viññâna. Here it occurred to him that in order that there might be viññâna there must be the conformations (sa@nkhâra) [Footnote ref 1]. But what being there are there the sa@nkhâras? Here it occurred to him that the sa@nkhâras can only be if there is ignorance (avijjâ). If avijjâ could be stopped then the sa@nkhâras will be stopped, and if the sa@nkhâras could be stopped viññâna could be stopped and so on [Footnote ref 2].

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and death (jarâmarana) could not have happened if there was no birth [Footnote ref 3]. This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

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[Footnote 1: It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in S N III. p. 87, "Sankhata@m abdisa@nkharonta," sa@nkhara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the Compendium it is translated as will, action. Mr. Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used in a different sense from what we find in the word sa@nkhâta khandha (viz mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming sa@nkhâta khandha in Dhamma Sangam, p 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in Dharmasamgraha, p. 6. In addition to these forty cittasamprayuktasa@mskâra, it also counts thirteen cittaviprayuktasa@mskara. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p 563. Govindananda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's Brahma sutra (II. ii. 19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada as attachment, antipathy and infatuation.]

[Footnote 2: Samyutta Nikaya, II. 7-8.]

[Footnote 3: Jara and marana bring in s'oka (grief), paridevanâ (lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All these make up suffering and are the results of jâti (birth). M. V. (B.T.S.p. 208). S'a@nkara in his bhâsya counted all the terms from jarâ, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing the entirety of duhkhaskandha.]

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enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadâra@nyaka says that just as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove the doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy except the Cârvâkas believed in it and so little is known to us of the Cârvâka sûtras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth might be due, had to fall back upon another existence (bhava). If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candrakîrtti takes it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only take place on account of the works of a previous existence which determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upani@sad note "as a man does so will he be born" (Yat karma kurute tadabhisampadyate, Brh IV. iv. 5). Candrakîrtti's interpretation of "bhava" as Karma (punarbhavajanakam karma) seems to me to suit better than "existence." The word was probably used rather loosely for kammabhava. The word bhava is not found in the earlier Upani@sads and was used in the Pâli scriptures for the first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this bhava depend? There could not have been a previous existence if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance with desire is called upâdâna. In the Upani@sads we read, "whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" (Yatkraturbhavati tatkarmma kurute, B@rh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to the thing depends upon desire {t@r@s@nâ}, it is said that in order that there may be upâdâna there must be tanhâ. In the Upani@sads also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake himself to" (sa yathâkâmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati). Neither the word upâdâna nor t@rs@nâ (the Sanskrit word corresponding

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[Footnote 1: The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works such as the Nyâya, etc., are slight and inadequate.]

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to ta@nhâ) is found in the earlier Upani@sads, but the ideas contained in them are similar to the words "kratu" and "kâma." Desire (ta@nhâ) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation [Footnote ref 1]. These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together) called nâmarûpa. We are familiar with this word in the Upani@sads but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable reality [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa in the Visuddhimagga says that by "Name" are meant the three groups beginning with sensation (i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form" the four elements and form derivative from the four elements [Footnote ref 3]. He further says that name by itself can produce physical changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and effectuate the changes [Footnote ref 4]. But there exists no heap or collection of material for the production of Name and Form; "but just as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound; and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass;…in exactly the same way all the elements of being both those with form and those without, come into existence after having previously been non-existent and having come into existence pass away [Footnote ref 5]." Nâmarûpa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found to operate in the six doors of sense (sa@lâyatana). If we take nâmarûpa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend upon the viññâna (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared in the Milinda Pañha with a watchman at the middle of

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[Footnote 1: The word âyatana is found in many places in the earlier Upani@sads in the sense of "field or place," Châ. I. 5, B@rh. III. 9. 10, but @sa@dâyatana does not occur.]

[Footnote 2: Candrakîrtti interprets nâma as Vedanâdayo' rûpi@nas'catvâra@h skandhâstatra tatra bhave nâmayantîli nâma. saha rûpaskandhena ca nâma rûpam ceti nâmarûpamucyate. The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rûpa make nâmarûpa. M. V. 564.]

[Footnote 3: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 184.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. p. 185, Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. pp. 185-186, Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII.]

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the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction [Footnote ref 1]. Buddhagho@sa in the Atthasâlinî also says that consciousness means that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics we must say that it knows (vijânana), goes in advance (pubba@ngama), connects (sandhâna), and stands on nâmarûpa (nâmarûpapada@t@thânam). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense are discerned (ârammana-vibhâvana@t@thâne) and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of (mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness [Footnote ref 2]. Buddhagho@sa also refers here to the passage in the Milinda Pañha we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it is lost; but there are the four aggregates as nâmarûpa, it stands on nâma and therefore it is said that it stands on nâmarûpa. He further asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those in truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different from them [Footnote ref 3].

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jâti (birth) is the cause of decay and death, jarâmara@na, etc. Jâti is the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas [Footnote ref 4]. Coming to bhava which determines jâti, I cannot think of any better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already

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[Footnote 1: Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 182, Milinda Pañha (628).]

[Footnote 2: Atthasâlinî, p. 112…]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 113, Yathâ hi rûpâdîni upâdâya