A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

as the result of the destruction of the process of knowledge through continual meditation that there is no soul [Footnote ref 1].

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavâdins, Sautrântikas and the Vaibhâ@sikas or the Sarvâstivâdins appears to refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest with Buddhist philosophy. Thus Abhidharmakos'a (v. 24…) describes the Sarvâstivâdins as those who maintain the universal existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavâdins are those "who maintain that the present elements and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition." There were four branches of this school represented by Dharmatrâta, Gho@sa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrâta maintained that when an element enters different times, its existence changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes though the essence remains the same. Gho@sa held that "when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspects without being severed from its future and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra held that an entity is called present, past and future according as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva maintained the view that just as the same woman may be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the preceding or the succeeding moment.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvâstivâdins, for they maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhâ@sika finds them all defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrâta's

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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's Tarkarahasyadîpikâ, pp. 46-47.]

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view is only a veiled Sâ@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The Vaibhâ@sika finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time. The Sautrântika however thought that the Vaibhâ@sika's doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the Vaibhâ@sika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

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never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhâ@sika suggests, but past passions leave residues which become the causes of new passions of the present moment [Footnote ref.1].

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of the Vâtsiputtrîyas and the Sarvâstivâdins as represented by Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of the existence of soul in Abhidharmakos'a. The argument of Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements or entities of a personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being would be without any practical efficiency (arthakriyâkâritva) which alone determines or proves existence. The soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are only the elements of a personal life. But the Vâtsiputtrîya school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is separate from it, so the soul is an individual (pudgala) which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a person) does not represent an unity. "It is only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

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[Footnote 1: I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of Abhidharmakoia by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.]

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belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions in different places, just as the expressions 'fire moves,' 'sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being called Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say "this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be known by descriptions such as "this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away having reached an age." Only so much description can be understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

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conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation 'individual' but a common name for the different elements of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question whether the "living being is identical with the body or not" is just because there did not exist any living being as "individual," as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was also denied. In truth the "living being" is only a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements [Footnote ref 1].

The only book of the Sammitîyas known to us and that by name only is the Sammitîyas'âstra translated into Chinese between 350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however probably lost [Footnote ref 2].

The Vaibhâ@sikas are identified with the Sarvâstivâdins who according to Dîpava@msa V. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahîs'âsakas, who in their turn had separated from the Theravâda school.

From the Kathâvatthu we know (1) that the Sabbatthivâdins believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual process, (3) that consciousness or even samâdhi was nothing but

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[Footnote 1: This account is based on the translation of A@s@tamakos'asthânanibaddha@h pudgolavinis'caya@h, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakos'a, by Prof Th. Stcherbatsky, Bulletin de l' Académie des Sciences de Russie, 1919.]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Vallée Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitîyas in the E. R.E. He there says that in the Abhidharmakos'avyâkhyâ the Sammitîyas have been identified with the Vâtsîputtrîyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibhâ@sikas of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvâna can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth called antarâbhava; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (tyagânvaya) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (paribhogânvaya pu@nya); (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (anitye) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (skandhas) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallée Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitîyas as sketched by Gu@naratna which we have noticed above.]

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a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away [Footnote ref 1]. The Sabbatthivâdins or Sarvâstivâdins have a vast Abhidharma