A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of change could not be affirmed of things that are permanent. But we can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and so a process (sa@msâra) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

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[Footnote 1: See Mâdhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), p. 50.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. pp. 93-100.]

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may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character and takes up another at the same identical moment which is inconceivable [Footnote ref 1].

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what is then the nirvâ@na which is described as the final extinction of all afflictions (kles'a)? To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does not agree to such a definition of nirvâ@na. Nirvâ@na on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anntpannam}. In nirvâ@na all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist in nirvâ@na, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never existed [Footnote ref 2]. Nirvâ@na cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (bhâva), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes (sa@msk@rta) and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are communicated as being in a state of change and process coming one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvâ@na is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (prapañcaprav@rtti). It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena (na câprav@rttimatram bhâvâbhâveti parikalpitum pâryyate evam na bhâvâbhâvanirvâ@nam, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings [Footnote ref 3].

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like the mirage, the dream, the mâyâ, and the magic without any real nature (ni@hsvabhâva). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

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[Footnote 1: See Madhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. p. 194.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. pp.162 and 201.]

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one is trying to win a real nirvâ@na [Footnote ref 1]. It is this false egoism that is to be considered as avidyâ. When considered deeply it is found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (avidyâ), there would have been no conformations (sa@mskâras), and if there were no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the sa@mskâras," and it can be said of the sa@mskâras "we are being produced by the avidyâ." But there being avidyâ, there come the sa@mskarâs and so on with other categories too. This character of the pratîtyasamutpâda is known as the coming of the consequent depending on an antecedent reason (hetûpanibandha).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence on conglomeration or combination (pratyayopanibandh). It is by the combination (samavâya) of the four elements, space (âkâs'a) and consciousness (vijñâna) that a man is made. It is due to earth (p@rthivî) that the body becomes solid, it is due to water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due to âkâs'a that there is porosity, and it is due to vijñâna that there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come the sa@mskâras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness (râga, dve@sa, moha); from these proceed the vijñâna and the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name and form (nâmarûpa), from these proceed the senses (@sa@dayatana), from the coming together of those three comes contact (spars'a); from that feelings, from that comes desire (tr@s@nâ) and so on. These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all [Footnote ref 2]. The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism (s'âs'vatavâda) or nihilism (ucchedavâda), and it is for this reason

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[Footnote 1: See Mâdhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.]

[Footnote: Ibid. pp. 209-211, quoted from Sâlistambhasûtra.
Vâcaspatimis'ra also quotes this passage in his Bhâmatî on
S'a@nkara's Brahma-sûtra.]

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that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (madhyamaka) [Footnote ref 1]. Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth (samv@rtisatya) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true reality (paramârthasatya) in them or anything else. Morality plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nâgârjuna's Suk@rllekha as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (asâra) give according to the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (s'îla) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (mâtsaryya), deceit (s'â@thya), duplicity (mâyâ), lust, indolence (kausîdya), pride (mâna), greed (râga), hatred (dve@sa) and pride (mada) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall attain the degree of an anâgâmin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her, according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you (certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (brahmavihâra).

41. By the four dhyânas completely abandoning desire (kâma), reflection (vicâra), joy (prîti), and happiness and pain (sukha, du@hkha) you will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in me; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

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[Footnote 1: See Mâdhyamikav@rtti (B.T.S.), p. 160.]

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nature (prak@rti), not from themselves (svabhâvât), nor from the Lord (îs'vara), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from ignorance (avidyâ) and desire (t@r@s@nâ).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (s'îlabrataparâmars'a), wrong views (mithyâd@r@s@ti) and doubt (vicikitsâ) are the three fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one rules (of the prâtimok@sa) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (anitya) without substance (anâtma) without help (as'ara@na) without protector (anâtha) and without abode (asthâna) thou O Lord of men must become discontented with this worthless (asâra) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity of the quieting and the subduing nirvâ@na not subject to age, death or decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom (prajñâ) there is also no contemplation (dhyana), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a grove.

Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijñânavâda Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijñânavâda or Yogâcâra has often been referred to by such prominent teachers of Hindu thought as Kumârila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great extent with the S'ûnyavâdins whom we have already described. All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists by itself (nirmmitapratimohi) [Footnote ref 1]. There are two functions involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions (khyâti vijñâna), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions (vastuprativikalpavijñâna). The two functions however mutually determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished (abhinnalak@sa@ne anyonyahetuke). These functions are set to work on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent in them in relation to the world of appearance (anâdikâla-prapañca-vâsanahetukañca) [Footnote ref 2].

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

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[Footnote 1: Lankâvatârasûtra, pp. 21-22.]

[Footnote 2 Ibid. p. 44.]

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unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped (abhûta-parikalpa-vâsanâ-vaicitra-nirodha) [Footnote ref 1]. All our phenomenal knowledge is without any essence or truth (nihsvabhâva) and is but a creation of mâyâ, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the mind (svacitta), which has been accustomed to create imaginary appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement these creations take place as subject and object has no appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence and extinction (utpâdasthitibha@ngavarjjam) and is called the âlayavijñâna. The reason why this âlayavijñâna itself is said to be without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence in the sense in which the term is used and we could not affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing external but of our own mind (svacitta), and there is also the beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which takes things as the perceiver