A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗
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[Footnote 1: See pratyabhijñânirâsa of the Buddhists, Nyâyamañjarî, V.S.
Series, pp. 449, etc.]
[Footnote 2: See Tarkarahasyadîpikâ of Gu@naratna, p. 30, and also Nyâyamañjarî, V.S. edition, p. 450.]
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The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyâkâritva).
It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse characteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in Sanskrit is called arthakriyâkâritva which literally translated means—the power of performing actions and purposes of some kind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is the performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or sat. Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect
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[Footnote 1: Compare Milindapañha, II. I. 1—The Chariot Simile.]
[Footnote 2: Compare Tarkarahasyadîpikâ of Gu@naratna, A.S.'s edition, pp. 24, 28 and Nyâyamañjarî, V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi by Ratnakîrtti in Six Buddhist Nyâya tracts.]
[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word "arthakriyâkâritva" is different from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrântika theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both in Ratnakîrtti as well as in Nyâya writers who referred to this doctrine. With Vinîtadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word "arthakrîyâsiddhi" meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate puru@sasya praycjana@m dârupâkâdi tasya siddhi@h ni@spatti@h—the word artha means need; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc.; siddhi of that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later arthasiddhi means action (anu@s@thiti) with reference to undesirable and desirable objects (heyopâdeyârthavi@sayâ). But with Ratnakîrtti (950 A.D.) the word arthakriyâkâritva has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence sattva). Thus he says in his K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi, pp. 20, 21, that though in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as arthakriyâkâritva (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakîrtti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva they usually refer to this doctrine in Ratnakîrtti's sense.]
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which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments, there should also be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power. This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of momentariness shown by Ratnakîrtti.
Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.
We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (avayavi) and the part (avayava), (3) the relation of generality (samanya) to the specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the
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relation of power (s'akti) to the power-possessor (s'aktimân). Thus on the relation of cause and effect, S'a@nkara held that cause alone was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent illusions due to ignorance, Sâ@mkhya held that there was no difference between cause and effect, except that the former was only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects. Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by another and this determination is nothing more than "that happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole, Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and thus there is no such thing as "whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhists hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there is no such thing as fingerness (a@ngulitva) as the abstract universal of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we know that the Sautrântika Buddhists did not believe in the existence of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation. In the external world there are as many individual simple units (atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation as that of inherence (samavâya) in which relation the attributes are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not
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believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the power.
Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.
In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of pa@ticcasamuppâda was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathâgata existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sîla, samâdhi and paññâ and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahâyâna scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non-essentialness and voidness of all dhammas began to be preached. This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagârjuna, Âryyadeva, Kumârajîva and Candrakîrtti, is more or less a corollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathâgata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. The Tathatâ doctrine which was preached by As'vagho@sa oscillated between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called tathatâ, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent entity could exist. The Vijñânavâda doctrine which also took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the S'ûnyavâda doctrine and the Tathatâ doctrine; but when carefully examined it seems to be nothing but S'ûnyavâda, with an attempt at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was
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non-essential how did it originate? Vijñânavâda proposes to give an answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind generated by the beginningless vâsanâ (desire) of the mind. The difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathatâ doctrine that there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijñânavâda doctrine. The Vijñânavâdins could not admit the existence of such a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijñânavâda literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we are not in a position to judge what answers Vijñânavâda could give on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the same time and the difficulty of conceiving s'ûnya (void), tathatâ, (thatness) and the âlayavijñâna of Vijñânavâda is more or less the same.
The Tathatâ doctrine of As'vagho@sa practically ceased with him. But the S'ûnyavâda and the Vijñânavâda doctrines
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