A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 - Surendranath Dasgupta (free ebook reader for android .txt) 📗

effect. But to such a logical extreme did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2]. Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an account of things that on proceeding according to its directions we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, which we acknowledge as superior to mere a priori abstractions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary experience, could not satisfy our inner a priori demands for finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism

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[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mîmâ@msâ of Kumârila and Prabhâkara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined a priori while error is determined by experience.]

[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva. But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of arthakriyâkâritva.]

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would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement, an absolute judgment.

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions were here considered bad or good according as they brought about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed only if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit of karma (karmaphala) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its fruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads

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which had anticipated the new systems in all these directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the Upani@sads, and built their systems independently by their own rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads were thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to harmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificial creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are indeed fulfilled in the Sâ@mkhya philosophy, germs of which may be discovered in the Upani@sads.

The Germs of Sâ@mkhya in the Upani@sads.

It is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large number of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, mantra, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result [Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appears as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the monistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara and particularly in Maitrâya@nî from which it appears that the Sâmkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the date of Maitrâya@nî has not yet been definitely settled, and the details

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[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (E. R.E.).]

[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This has been dealt with in detail in my Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought, in the first chapter.]

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found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion of the Sâ@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It is not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of relativism of the Jains.

Sâ@mkhya and Yoga Literature.

The main exposition of the system of Sâ@mkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the Sâ@mkhya kârikâ, the Sâ@mkhya sûtras, and the Yoga sûtras of Patañjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The Sâ@mkhya kârikâ (about 200 A.D.) was written by Îs'varak@r@s@na. The account of Sâ@mkhya given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and this has been treated separately. Vâcaspati Mis'ra (ninth century A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as Tattvakaumudî. But before him Gaudapâda and Râjâ wrote commentaries on the Sâ@mkhya kârikâ [Footnote ref 1]. Nârâyanatîrtha wrote his Candrikâ on Gaudapâda's commentary. The Sâ@mkhya sûtras which have been commented on by Vijñâna Bhik@su (called Pravacanabhâ@sya) of the sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the Sâ@mkhya sûtras. Vijñâna Bhiksu wrote also another elementary work on Sâ@mkhya known as Sâ@mkhyasâra. Another short work of late origin is Tattvasamâsa (probably fourteenth century). Two other works on Sâm@khya, viz Sîmânanda's Sâmkhyatattvavivecana and Bhâvâga@nes'a's Sâ@mkhyatattvayâthârthyadîpana (both later than Vijñânabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also been freely consulted. Patañjali's Yoga sûtra (not earlier than 147 B.C.) was commented on by Vâysa (400 A.D.) and Vyâsa's bhâsya commented on by Vâcaspati Mis'ra is called Tattvavais'âradî, by Vijñâna Bhik@su Yogavârttika, by Bhoja in the tenth century Bhojav@rtti, and by Nâges'a (seventeenth century) Châyâvyâkhyâ.

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[Footnote 1: I suppose that Râjâ's commentary on the Kârikâ was the same as Râjavârttika quoted by Vâcaspati. Râjâ's commentary on the Kârikâ has been referred to by Jayanta in his Nyâyamañjarî, p. 109. This book is probably now lost.]

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Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may mention the two treatises Mechanical, physical and chemical theories of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga Study of Patanjali published by the Calcutta University, and Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought which is shortly to be published, and my Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus, awaiting publication with the Calcutta University.

Gu@naratna mentions two other authoritative Sâ@mkhya works, viz. Mâ@tharabhâ@sya and Âtreyatantra. Of these the second is probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sâ@mkhya, for we know that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it was called Âtreyasa@mhitâ or Âtreyatantra. Nothing is known of the Mâtharabhâsya [Footnote ref 1].

An Early School of Sâ@mkhya.

It is important for the history of Sâ@mkhya philosophy that Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sâ@mkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. According to Caraka there are six elements (dhâtus), viz. the five elements such as âkâs'a, vâyu etc. and cetanâ, called also puru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold prak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mkâra and the five elements)[Footnote ref 2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate sensing (ûha) and conceiving (vicâra) before definite understanding (buddhi) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance

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[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sâ@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following three sections at the time of first reading.]

[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapâ@ni, the commentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. Prak@rtivyatiriktañcodâsîna@m puru@samavyaktatvasâdharmyât avyaktâyâm prak@rtâveva prak@sipya avyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@nâti. Harinâtha Vis'ârada's edition of Caraka, S'ârîra, p. 4.]

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of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmâtras at all [Footnote ref 1]. The conglomeration of the sense-objects (indriyârtha) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhûtas and prak@rti, mahat and aha@mkâra taking place through rajas make up what we call man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also the puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or salvation. If the âtman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one others would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also paramâtman, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, cannot be produced without this combination. All