Psychology and Pedagogy of Anger - Roy Franklin Richardson (ebook audio reader .txt) 📗

may be called a genetic view is illustrated in McDougall’s (15) statement, “The condition of its (anger) excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts.” Dewey (6) in his conception of instincts has pointed out that we are not angry when we are fighting successfully. Only when the pugnacious instinct is impeded does emotion arise. An introspective view may be taken from Bain (2), “When we have suffered harm at the hands of another, it leaves a sting in the violation of the sanctity of our feelings. This pre-supposes a sentiment of self regarding pride, the presence of which gives rise to the best developed form of anger.” David Irons (12), who did some keen work in the analysis of the emotions, does not qualify his statement that anger appears only when we feel that we have been injured.

From the pathological side, Féré (7) and Magnan (11) have described slow accumulation of anger in paranoiacs, which seems to re-enforce the casual introspective view stated above. These insane persons first believe they are persecuted. They suspect all about them. Even their very best friends are trying to injure their business or reputation. Gradually reactionary impulses begin and they themselves become the persecutors and concern themselves with the business of revenge. They find gratification in every sort of angry outburst,—insult, abuse, threat, murderous attack, irony, witticism, etc.

The same view has been advanced by Steinmetz (18) in the observation of the behavior of primitive people. He holds that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority. It arises upon the experience of injury and its aim is to enhance self-feeling, which has been lowered by the injury suffered.

The next few pages will be devoted to an examination of the mental situations from which anger develops as found in the results of the introspections. About six hundred introspections from the various observers have been used for this study.

Feelings of Irritation. One of the characteristic mental situations from which anger arises is that connected with feelings of irritation. These feelings are described as unpleasant nervous tension with a tendency to motor activity. Awareness of the feeling may be present while attention is directed elsewhere. It may or may not be referred to any particular incident. C.—“It is a sort of diffused unpleasant consciousness that things in general are going wrong.”

Irritation in connection with pain or illness is a condition from which anger may develop. From this a trivial incident may give rise to anger. A note from E.’s records says, “I had a severe headache to-day and felt irritable. When X. would try to sympathize with me, the irritation would increase and I tended to be angry.” G, who has relatively few emotions of anger, introspected upon ten cases of anger, arising from a fore-period of irritation during a day’s illness. Subject I. states with reference to pain, “While the pain was on I felt as though I wanted to be angry at somebody or something, X. spoke to me and at once I was angry.” Feelings of irritation may increase, gradually, accompanying the increased intensity of pain. A. states, “Irritableness at the first beginning of the pain increased to intense anger at the moment the pain was most severe. There was a strong motor tension in the hands and face muscles with the impulse to look about, vaguely aware that I was trying to find something to refer the anger to.... A decrease of the pain was accompanied by a decrease of the anger to a feeling of irritation again.”

Feelings of irritation follow as a result of the thwarting of some desire or mental attitude and are consequently predetermined by the attitude of the moment. From this, anger develops for the most part, as a result of a series of stimuli, which have a cumulative effect. Each thwarting of the impulse intensifies the irritation until anger is developed. One or two failures may stimulate unpleasant feelings, which at the time are ignored; but with an increase of the number of stimuli, there is an accumulative effect in which the awareness of the previous failures becomes more intense than at the moment when they occurred. The following from B.’s observations will illustrate, “I was writing a letter to an important personage and was making special effort to write it neatly. I made an error and felt unpleasantly irritated. Still feeling quite unpleasant, I turned to look for my eraser and could not find it. I looked in several places. Each failure was followed by a sudden increase in intensity of unpleasant feelings.” Finally B. found himself using defamatory language prolifically, giving expression to a rather well developed case of anger. One is usually aware in anger of this type, that the emotion is the cumulative effect of a number of previous stimuli. It appears from the reports, that if the mental predisposition is intense enough, one or two failures may suffice to excite anger. In general the stronger the predisposition, the less number of failures is required before anger is fully developed.

Another characteristic of the feeling of irritation is its indefinite objective reference. It may not refer definitely to any object at first. The tendency is usually present to refer it to some object or person, regardless of the real cause of the feeling. E. states, “I felt I wanted to get angry at somebody or something and I did not care much what.” While it is common with all the persons studied, to be irritated and burst out angrily at objects, the tendency to transfer the anger from objects which may be the real objective cause to unoffending persons, is a matter in which there is a wide individual difference. C. when irritated by objects, finds a partial relief if he can lay the blame on some person and take an imaginary vent against him. He states, “I have been cross and grouchy all day; ‘felt out’ with everybody. Several times the association of X. and Y. came up with a little rising anger and an attitude that they were somehow to be blamed. I was aware that they were not to be blamed, but at times I would find myself ignoring this and taking pleasure in criticising them adversely.” This tendency to personify the source of anger is illustrated in another incident from C. He lost his umbrella. He looked for it in several places with an increased feeling of irritation; following a line of other associations, he imagined Z., a person whom he dislikes, walking off with it. He says, “All this was mildly pleasant. I was scarcely aware how improbable it was that Z. had taken it, till the act of introspecting on the emotion. I really wanted to believe that he had taken it.” The personal objective reference to somewhat suppressed feelings of irritation frequently facilitates the sudden development of the emotion. The tendency to refer the anger to some innocent person, ignoring for the moment the real facts and forgetting one’s sense of justice for the time being, is a matter in which there are marked individual differences in the subjects studied.

It is a common characteristic of the initial stage of anger, that although there is an awareness that the emotion is due to a series of irritating stimuli, the entire situation exciting the anger is ignored and the anger is referred to some person, frequently one recently associated in time. Thus objectified, anger seems to find a more ready expression. Anger is more successfully developed from a fore-period of irritation if the present predicament is in any way associated with a person or situation against which there is already an emotional disposition of dislike. A feeling of pleasurable satisfaction is often reported to follow the successful expression of anger after feelings of irritation.

Anger with a fore-period of irritation is common with all the subjects studied, but the manner in which the anger arises from these feelings is a matter of wide individual difference. They all get angry at objects when they act as hindrances. With B. and C., who live alone, this tendency is more marked. With all the persons studied, anger with a fore-period of irritation occurs more frequently against objects and situations than against persons. When persons are involved in anger of this type, they are usually those with whom there is close intimacy or with servants and children.

The sentiment of justice may facilitate the development of anger arising from feelings of irritation. Irritable feelings may more readily develop into anger if a situation is associated in which fairness and justice are violated, although the point of justice may be far removed from the actual cause of the irritation. Under the influence of irritation, there is frequently a little more sensitiveness to injustice if the idea of unfairness can facilitate in the objective reference to the emotion. The following instance will illustrate. A. was walking along the street at night in an irritable state of mind in connection with a series of incidents just past. In this state of mind he came to a place where a new house was being built and the builders had left an accumulation of dirt on the sidewalk. When it rained, the water would collect making the walk bad. He had previously noted that they had made enough progress with the building that it was unnecessary to leave the dirt on the walk. “On this occasion,” he states, “I now become quite indignant, and suddenly found myself in imagination telephoning the street commissioner in an angry attitude and tone of voice, telling him about the dirt and where the house was located, and ending with the sentence, ‘It is an outrage to tax payers.’” But this did not fully satisfy his resentment. He imagined himself the next day walking up to the overseer of the construction gang and assuming a rather indignant air, telling him among other things that the way he had left the walk was an outrage to the public. On the other hand, the sense of justice may be ignored for the time if it does not aid expression. In some extreme cases the subject may assume a make-believe attitude and trump up reasons to suit his own ends regardless of the facts. The tendency is strong to give some justifiable expression to the present mental predicament. In such cases reason serves the purpose of feeling. All other mental processes may become subservient to the rising indignation till the point of anger is reached, but with the expression of anger, the illusion of fairness usually disappears. The behavior that seemed so commendable while angry may excite shame or regret after the emotion has been vented.

Negative Self-feeling. A second characteristic mental situation from which anger arises, is that connected with negative self-feeling; the self-feeling has been lowered and anger follows. In the observation of all the observers, it appears at times in the initial stage of anger. Whatever outside situation occasions lowered self-feeling may indirectly give rise to anger. And just as there are feelings of irritation, which do not pass into anger, so there are negative self-feelings which are not followed by anger. In the description of this feeling, it appears in marked contrast to the anger that follows. As to time, it may last but a moment before anger arises. In other instances the feeling of humiliation may be rather prolonged or repeated before anger arises. The feeling is described as unpleasant, as a lack of motor tension, a feeling like shrinking up, an impulse to get away, a