Psychology and Pedagogy of Anger - Roy Franklin Richardson (ebook audio reader .txt) 📗

are recalled with no plan or intention of repeating his remarks to him. The contemplation of his unworthiness is accompanied by an agreeable feeling. B. became righteously indignant at X. because of an incident of ungentlemanly conduct toward a friend. He observes, “A moment later (that is after the first instance of anger) I imagined myself in my alcove in the Library, and imagined some other person, I did not know, who came in and said to me, ‘What do you think of X?’ I replied with a good deal of pleasurable indignation, ‘I think he is a damned ass.’ Three-quarters of an hour later as I was walking along the street, the emotion arose again, and I imagined some one asking the same question, I replied the same as before with a like feeling of pleasure. I really wanted some one to ask me what I thought of X.” The subject may be aware that what he says to and about the opponent is a little unfair, but at the time that the emotion is progressing, he ignores it and wants to believe ill of the offender.

The results of this study abundantly show that a make-believe attitude plays an important role in the anger consciousness, in both the development of the anger and the reactive consciousness. It is believed momentarily, when the anger is most intense, that the offender is really a bad man. Pausing for introspection in the midst of such emotional reaction, it is frequently reported, “I knew very well I would say nothing of the sort and that X. was not so bad as I believed him.” While the emotion is most intense, ill reports about the offender which were previously ignored are now believed and assumed as true, and satisfaction is derived by degrading the best qualities of the offender, by believing stories of ill repute, by suspecting or imagining evil of him. The degree in which this tendency is present, depends partly on the intensity of the emotion, and evidently in part on the individual habits of reaction to anger. The chronic irascible gossiper is evidently a characteristic type of person who has specialized in this mode of reaction to anger.

Substitutions by Witticism and Irony. Witticism, sarcasm, irony, teasing and joking make up a large class of vocal and imaginal reactions which may take the place of the initially restrained emotional tendency. The crude remarks, transformed into wit or fitting sarcasm, overcome the consciousness restraint that was initially present in the emotion and lessen resistance. It is accompanied by a pleasant feeling and may be keenly delightful. A thrust in a half serious tone accompanied by a smile, the jest and hostile joke follow a state of mind characterized by restraint. In the observations of the subjects studied there is evidence supporting Freud’s (8) theory of wit. What he calls “tendency wit”; that is, wit with a definite aim has two divisions, the hostile joke and the obscene joke. The first is a reaction to irascible anger and the latter to the sexual emotions. The introspection of the reactive stage of anger consciousness shows the Freudian mechanism for “tendency wit.” The following case will illustrate a crude kind of wit. H. whose husband had stayed out late at night became angry following a period of worry. Fluctuating intensities of anger and periods of worry lasted over an hour. After a number of reactions such as planning verbal attacks; recalling his thoughtless behavior at other times; crying, assuming an attitude of self-pity; devising some means of making him sorry; at times trying to assume the attitude that it was no use to be angry; taking observations of the emotion at a number of places, motivated by a wish that her husband would see the results and feel sorry; imagining herself going to him and talking rather abusively. Finally she found a remark that gave the keenest pleasure of all. “I imagined myself saying, ‘Petty dear, you have been out pretty late tonight.’” This was a condensed veiled statement expressing about all she would like to say. “Petty” is a character portrayed in a current illustrated newspaper as being mean to his wife and flaring up angrily at every little incident. The character of “Petty” was fully understood by her husband. The crude hostile reaction was followed by a rather condensed acute remark; it was reported as pleasant, “because it seemed so fitting.”

C. in a discussion with X. became angry and gives the following observation, “I noted I was getting angry and wanted to say something hostile, but instead I turned away suddenly and laughed, saying in a joking, half-serious manner, ‘Oh you old bottle head, you don’t know anything.’ Although I laughed, I really meant it. That gave complete satisfaction. He laughed too.” Let us illustrate further. A., with four others, was walking along the street, coming from a clinic at the hospital, where a case of flight of ideas had just been observed. X., one of the party, was talking in a manner that seemed to A. a little superfluous. He resented his attitude, and turning he said to X. in a joking manner, “What did you say? The malady must be catching,” (referring to the case observed). X. retorted, “I never have any fixed ideas.” A. replied, “No, they do fly away pretty fast.” A. observed, “I felt pleased and victorious with my remark, my resentment was entirely gone and I entered into conversation with X. in a friendly manner.”

Witticism is one of the more refined modes of substitution for the more directly hostile attack. Sarcasm is cruder. Its mechanism depends for the most part upon the inflection and tone of voice in speaking. The words themselves in sarcasm are innocent enough, but the mode of expression and the meaning involved are the sources of hostility. The following statement represent sarcastic remarks. A.—“I think I will come around to your Club,” emphasis on the word “your.” A.—again, “You surely must be right,” emphasis on “surely.” J.—“You are not the boss, then?”—emphasis on “not,” with a little sneer and an accompanying laugh. Sarcasm is a rather cheap and easy reaction to anger. It is consequently more easily attained than wit. The period of conscious restraint preceding sarcasm is usually less, unless the witticism is already made for the occasion. Its feeling effect is also not so pleasant as of wit. At times sarcasm may be combined with rather crude wit, but wit of a more refined type will exclude sarcasm. The following is a combination of this kind. C., having become angry at X. for his “bragging attitude,” says, “I was conscious of the tendency to say something hostile, but could think of nothing appropriate. In the course of his remarks X. finally said, ‘I never read anything for an experiment as I fear it might bias my results.’ I suddenly found a remark that seemed entirely fitting at the time and at once the restraint was off. I said a little sarcastically, ‘No, you never want to read anything, it might hurt your intellect.’ As soon as the statement was made I saw I had gone too far and felt a little cheap. I at once noted that he did not take my remark seriously, and felt relieved. My former resentment had entirely disappeared.”

Substitution by Disguise. There are many devices less refined than wit which are commonly resorted to in slightly disguising the hostile attack. The offender may be attacked indirectly and impersonally. The following case will illustrate. F. became angry at a merchant because, when he went to pay for an article, the price was marked more than he had previously agreed to pay. Feeling resentful, he said, “I suppose the bill is all right, the clerk said it would be less, but people in this town don’t know what they are talking about anyway.” F. observes, “What I really meant was that you don’t know what you are talking about.” To avoid making the direct attack, the indefinite pronoun is substituted at times for the definite. The use of “some one” or “somebody” instead of “you,” in talking to the offender blunts the remark. The device is rather cheap affording little pleasure and has but a short fore-period of restraint. It is carried to an extreme when the subject pretends he does not know the perpetrator of the offense and in fact may assume it is some one else, so that he may speak his mind directly to the offender. I. observes, “I was angry, and talked to her about the affair as if I did not know that she did it. I wouldn’t have had her to know that I knew for anything. I told her what I thought of a person who had acted in that way and noted that she looked cheap. That pleased me.” Some gossip and vituperate against their enemies and derive a moiety of ill-gotten pleasure if a sympathetic hearer is found. One subject states, “I went to tell X., hoping he would be angry too, and felt just a little disappointed when he was not.” Hints and insinuations often become devices to avoid a too hostile direct attack.

Imaginary Exaltation of Self. Another rather important reaction of the attributive type is an idealistic one. Imagination and ideational processes are active. Lowered self-feeling has been accomplished in the subject usually by a number of repeated offenses by some one that the subject really respects. The offender is frequently not imagined as degraded, but he is left as he is, and the subject proceeds to imagine,—it may be to fancy or day-dreams that he is the offender’s superior. As the reaction to moments of humiliation, he may later plan to surpass him. An attitude of make-believe may be momentarily assumed that he is already the offender’s superior. Fantastic schemes of a successful career may appear in which he imagines some distant future, in which he has gained renown and the offender is glad to recall that he knew him in other days. Sometimes he is imagined as seeking his friendship or advice, or favor, and is refused with dignity. At the next moment he may be graciously bestowing favors upon the offender. Such imaginative processes are observed to afford pleasure to the subject at the time and may lead to a new level of self-confidence which has important influences on later behavior. Usually idealistic reactions of this character appear in consciousness after more directly hostile reactions have failed to satisfy the subject. A few cases will illustrate. A., recalling an incident of the day before which humiliated him, became angry. At first he began saying in voco-motor fashion as if talking directly to X., “You are a conceited fellow. You are hard to get along with. I will beat you. You are too nervous to get very far.” “I imagined myself treating him in a superior, dignified manner.” A. then laid plans how he would work, stick to one thing, make himself a recognized authority, and how he would have little to do with X. He imagined X. coming to him for favors when he had attained the success he had planned, and himself taking a rather indifferent attitude toward his requests. A. observes that his entire reverie was pleasant, although the anger was unpleasant in the beginning. C. reports a case of anger at X. who had taken a rather critical attitude toward a problem which he was studying. He observes, “At first there was a slight humiliated feeling. This was displaced by resentment. I imagined myself standing before X. and giving him two good retorts which I considered would have their ill effects on him. At this point the theme changed, ‘I will leave you alone and have nothing to do with you,’ I felt