Ethics - Aristotle (classic novels to read txt) 📗

and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].

The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.

P. 54, 1. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho einai agathon)]

P 56, 1. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s Analogy, First Part, chap 11.

P 58, 1. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances we will have to act under.

P. 59, 1. 19. “Moral Courage” is our phrase.

P 61, 1. 6. The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase.

“The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with Courage, i.e. Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is honour.”

P 62, 1. 14. For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.

P 63, 1. 11. This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.

P 63, 1. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]

P 63, 1. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in vanos tumultus gens.

P. 64, 1. 5. In Coronea in Boeotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the [Greek: politika] Coroneans.

P. 64, 1. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate.

P. 68, 1. 8. The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].

P. 97, 1. 2. Perhaps “things which reflect credit on them” as on page

95.

 

P. 100, 1. 12. Book VII.

P. 101, 1. 11. Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.

P. 102, 1. 1. But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.

P. 102, 1. 6. Things are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is close therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being applied to a term and not to its various significates.

P. 102, 1. 24. See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai tagatha k.t.l.]

P. 104, 1. 10. A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to his own person.

P. 105, 1. 5. See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.

P. 105, 1. 31. Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particular i.e. as whole to part. There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.

P. 106, 1. 19. There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so therefore pro tanto is he.

Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he does the facts of a good man but for the perfection of his own individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.

The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III. chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon.

P. 107, 1. 17. Terms used for persons.

P. 107, 1. 34. By [Greek:–-] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by [Greek:–-] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.

P 108, 1 14. The profits of a mercantile transaction (say �1000) are to be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real point to be settled); then,

A � B . 400 600.

A 400 : . B 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).

A+400 : B+600 : : A � B. This represents the actual distribution; its fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.

P. 109, 1. 10. i.e. Corrective Justice is wrought out by subtraction from the wrong doer and addition to the party injured.

P. 110, 1. 3. Her Majesty’s “Justices.”

P. 111, 1. 1. I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he put them where they made the best sense.

P. 111, 1. 8. This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend to be able to get it out of the words.

P 111, 1. 27. This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and another against the office.

P. 112, 1. 5. [Greek:–-] denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.

P. 113, 1. 33. The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most valuable, and vice versa.

Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:–-] at [Greek:–-], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the wares as between the persons, i.e. the ratio of equality.

If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.

Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both [Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes = 1 house.

Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house—_wrong_. –— –— 100 pr. shoes : 1 house—right –— –— 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house—_wrong_.

P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury.

P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, i.e. numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.

P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek: kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], i.e. “we admit there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc. With Cardwell’s, [Greek: kineton] will mean “which not only does but naturally may vary.”

P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act materially unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.

P. 121, l. 13. “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].

P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast gives it as follows:

“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that