An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations - Adam Smith (ebooks children's books free .TXT) 📗
- Author: Adam Smith
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such land he pays only eight instead of ten per cent. of the
supposed rent.
A land-tax of this kind is certainly more equal than the land-tax
of England. It might not, perhaps, be altogether so certain, and
the assessment of the tax might freqnently occasion a good deal
more trouble to the landlord. It might, too, be a good deal more
expensive in the levying.
Such a system of administration, however, might, perhaps, be
contrived, as would in a great measure both prevent this
uncertainty, and moderate this expense.
The landlord and tenant, for example, might jointly be obliged to
record their lease in a public register. Proper penalties might
be enacted against concealing or misrepresenting any of the
conditions; and if part of those penalties were to be paid to
either of the two parties who informed against and convicted the
other of such concealment or misrepresentation, it would
effectually deter them from combining together in order to
defraud the public revenue. All the conditions of the lease might
be sufficiently known from such a record.
Some landlords, instead of raising the rent, take a fine for the
renewal of the lease. This practice is, in most cases, the
expedient of a spendthrift, who, for a sum of ready money sells a
future revenue of much greater value. It is, in most cases,
therefore, hurtful to the landlord; it is frequently hurtful to
the tenant ; and it is always hurtful to the community. It
frequently takes from the tenant so great a part of his capital,
and thereby diminishes so much his ability to cultivate the land,
that he finds it more difficult to pay a small rent than it would
otherwise have been to pay a great one. Whatever diminishes his
ability to cultivate, necessarily keeps down, below what it would
otherwise have been, the most important part of the revenue of
the community. By rendering the tax upon such fines a good deal
heavier than upon the ordinary rent, this hurtful practice might
be discouraged, to the no small advantage of all the different
parties concerned, of the landlord, of the tenant, of the
sovereign, and of the whole community.
Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of
cultivation, and a certain succession of crops, during the whole
continuance of the lease. This condition, which is generally the
effect of the landlord’s conceit of his own superior knowledge (a
conceit in most cases very ill-founded), ought always to be
considered as an additional rent, as a rent in service, instead
of a rent in money. In order to discourage the practice, which is
generally a foolish one, this species of rent might be valued
rather high, and consequently taxed somewhat higher than common
money-rents.
Some landlords, instead of a rent in money, require a rent in
kind, in corn, cattle, poultry, wine, oil, etc. ; others, again,
require a rent in service. Such rents are always more hurtful to
the tenant than beneficial to the landlord. They either take
more, or keep more out of the pocket of the former, than they put
into that of the latter. In every country where they take
place, the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much according
to the degree in which they take place. By valuing, in the same
manner, such rents rather high, and consequently taxing them
somewhat higher than common money-rents, a practice which is
hurtful to the whole community, might, perhaps, be sufficiently
discouraged.
When the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own
lands, the rent might be valued according to an equitable
arbitration of the farmers and landlords in the neighbourhood,
and a moderate abatement of the tax might be granted to him, in
the same manner as in the Venetian territory, provided the rent
of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain sum. It
is of importance that the landlord should be encouraged to
cultivate a part of his own land. His capital is generally
greater than that of the tenant, and, with less skill, he can
frequently raise a greater produce. The landlord can afford to
try experiments, and is generally disposed to do so. His
unsuccessful experiments occasion only a moderate loss to
himself. His successful ones contribute to the improvement and
better cultivation of the whole country. It might be of
importance, however, that the abatement of the tax should
encourage him to cultivate to a certain extent only. If the
landlords should, the greater part of them, be tempted to farm
the whole of their own lands, the country (instead of sober and
industrious tenants, who are bound by their own interest to
cultivate as well as their capital and skill will allow them)
would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs, whose abusive
management would soon degrade the cultivation, and reduce the
annual produce of the land, to the diminution, not only of the
revenue of their masters, but of the most important part of that
of the whole society.
Such a system of administration might, perhaps, free a tax of
this kind from any degree of uncertainty, which could occasion
either oppression or inconveniency to the contributor ; and
might, at the same time, serve to introduce into the common
management of land such a plan of policy as might contribute a
good deal to the general improvement and good cultivation of the
country.
The expense of levying a land-tax, which varied with every
variation of the rent, would, no doubt, be somewhat greater than
that of levying one which was always rated according to a fixed
valuation. Some additional expense would necessarily be incurred,
both by the different register-offices which it would be proper
to establish in the different districts of the country, and by
the different valuations which might occasionally be made of the
lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself. The expense
of all this, however, might be very moderate, and much below what
is incurred in the levying of many other taxes, which afford a
very inconsiderable revenue in comparison of what might easily be
drawn from a tax of this kind.
The discouragement which a variable land-tax of this kind might
give to the improvement of land, seems to be the most important
objection which can be made to it. The landlord would certainly
be less disposed to improve, when the sovereign, who contributed
nothing to the expense, was to share in the profit of the
improvement. Even this objection might, perhaps, be obviated, by
allowing the landlord, before he began his improvement, to
ascertain, in conjunction with the officers of revenue, the
actual value of his lands, according to the equitable arbitration
of a certain number of landlords and farmers in the
neighbourhood, equally chosen by both parties: and by rating him,
according to this valuation, for such a number of years as might
be fully sufficient for his complete indemnification. To draw the
attention of the sovereign towards the improvement of the land,
from a regard to the increase of his own revenue, is one or the
principal advantages proposed by this species of land-tax. The
term, therefore, allowed, for the indemnification of the
landlord, ought not to he a great deal longer than what was
necessary for that purpose, lest the remoteness of the interest
should discourage too much this attention. It had better,
however, be somewhat too long, than in any respect too short. No
incitement to the attention of the sovereign can ever
counterbalance the smallest discouragement to that of the
landlord. The attention of the sovereign can be, at best, but a
very general and vague consideration of what is likely to
contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his
dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular and
minute consideration of what is likely to be the most
advantageous application of every inch of ground upon his estate.
The principal attention of the sovereign ought to be, to
encourage, by every means in his power, the attention both of the
landlord and of the farmer, by allowing both to pursue their own
interest in their own way, and according to their own judgment ;
by giving to both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy
the full recompence of their own industry ; and by procuring to
both the most extensive market for every part of their produce,
in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest
communications, both by land and by water, through every part of
his own dominions, as well as the most unbounded freedom of
exportation to the dominions of all other princes.
If, by such a system of administration, a tax of this kind could
be so managed as to give, not only no discouragement, but, on the
contrary, some encouragement to the improvement or land, it does
not appear likely to occasion any other inconveniency to the
landlord, except always the unavoidable one of being obliged to
pay the tax.
In all the variations of the state of the society, in the
improvement and in the declension of agriculture ; in all the
variations in the value of silver, and in all those in the
standard of the coin, a tax of this kind would, of its own
accord, and without any attention of government, readily suit
itself to the actual situation of things, and would be equally
just and equitable in all those different changes. It would,
therefore, be much more proper to be established as a perpetual
and unalterable regulation, or as what is called a fudamental law
of the commonwealth, than any tax which was always to be levied
according to a certain valuation.
Some states, instead of the simple and obvious expedient of a
register of leases, have had recourse to the laborious and
expensive one of an actual survey and valuation of all the lands
in the country. They have suspected, probably, that the lessor
and lessee, in order to defraud the public revenue, might combine
to conceal the real terms of the lease. Doomsday-book seems to
have been the result of a very accurate survey of this kind.
In the ancient dominions of the king of Prussia, the land-tax is
assessed according to an actual survey and valuation, which is
reviewed and altered from time to time.{ Memoires concurent les
Droits, etc. tom, i. p. 114, 115, 116, etc.} According to that
valuation, the lay proprietors pay from twenty to twentyfive per
cent. of their revenue; ecclesiastics from forty to fortyfive
per cent. The survey and valuation of Silesia was made by order
of the present king, it is said, with great accuracy. According
to that valuation, the lands belonging to the bishop of Breslaw
are taxed at twentyfive per cent. of their rent. The other
revenues of the ecclesiastics of both religions at fifty per
cent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order, and of that of
Malta, at forty per cent. Lands held by a noble tenure, at
thirty-eight and one-third per cent. Lands held by a base
tenure, at thirty-five and one-third per cent.
The survey and valuation of Bohemia is said to have been the work
of more than a hundred years. It was not perfected till after the
peace of 1748, by the orders of the present empress queen. {
Id.tom i p.85,84.} The survey of the duchy of Milan, which was
begun in the time of Charles VI., was not perfected till after
1760 It is esteemed one of the most accurate that has ever been
made. The survey of Savoy and Piedmont was executed under the
orders of the late king of Sardinia. {Id. p. 280, etc. ; also p,
287. etc. to 316.}
In the dominions of the king of Prussia, the revenue
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