Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

The Guards, especially the Scots, and some of the independent companies were well aware that the campaign in Nordland Province had been an unmitigated disaster. They could look back on nearly three weeks of continuous setbacks and retreats. They had never seen a British aircraft and their experience with the navy was one that they would rather forget. They were told repeatedly that the Germans were operating at the end of a very vulnerable supply line, but still they kept coming and the destruction of roads and bridges did not slow them down. The enemy appeared to be suffering less from a shortage of weapons and ammunition than their own units.

The proclamation was intended primarily for the British troops but it inevitably found its way to forces from other nations. It mentions the French success at Narvik but fails to mention the contributions of the Norwegian and Polish soldiers who carried so much of the burden and losses in the fighting around Narvik. The proclamation did nothing to enhance the reputation of the British among those troops.

The optimistic mood among the British leaders also infected the Norwegians. The Norwegian leadership was fully aware of the disastrous events in France and continued to be haunted by the fear that the rug could be pulled from underneath them at any time. The 6th Division, however, anticipated optimistically that the operations against Dietl in Narvik and the Bjørnefjell area would end within a few days in his surrender or internment in Sweden. Plans were already prepared to bring the main elements of the division by sea to Sonja (north of Hemnesberg) for operations against Mo from the west, in conjunction with an attack from Bodø. The Norwegians were assured that the Bodø area would be held. Even if most Allied ground forces were later withdrawn, Fleischer and Ruge hoped that their forces would continue to be supplied from Allied resources and would be provided naval and air support.

The Battle of Posthus and the Retreat to Fauske

Posthus was a good defensive position. The British forces in this position included four companies of the Irish Guards, three independent companies, and a platoon of field artillery. Norwegian forces included one infantry company, a mortar platoon, Captain Ellinger’s unit, and a ski detachment. The British had decided to fight a tough delaying action rather than a prolonged defense. The object was to gain time for the preparations of defensive positions on the Bodø Peninsula.

Posthus is a small village located about 15 kilometers inland from the southern arm of Skjerstadfjord. Saltelva (Salt River) runs through the village and is of considerable width at this point. There were several bridges in the area. The main bridge brought the road from the east to the west shore of the river. There was a suspension bridge spanning the Vatselva tributary that comes into Saltelva from the east, and another bridge across Saltelva about four kilometers north of the village. The area was characterized by dense woods that limited fields of fire and by steep hillsides leading to rugged mountains and ridgelines. It was a good defensive position provided fields of fire were cleared and adequate flank security existed to counter the German preference for flanking operations.

The British occupied the Posthus positions in their customary double line of defense, primarily along the west side of the river. This time they sent out an outpost line and right flank security. These forces came from Independent Co 2, part of which had still not arrived in the area at the beginning of the engagement. Independent Co 1, which had preceded the retiring Scots Guards, was also involved in the fighting according to most sources but if so, it is not clear where they were positioned. They may have augmented the outposts and flank security detachments. The first line of defense consisted of three companies from the Irish Guards, echeloned to the right. Company 1 was posted on a wooded ridgeline on the east side of the river, just to the south of the village. Companies 3 and 4 covered the road on the west side of the river but their location also allowed coverage of the east shore. A Norwegian ski detachment augmented the security of the right flank and another security detachment and the mortars were located on the hillside off the British right flank. Captain Ellinger’s detachment was located immediately behind the British first line of defense. One company from the Irish Guards and Independent Co 3 occupied the British second line of defense, about three kilometers to the north. A platoon of artillery was located along the road, about one kilometer from the infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Stockwell, the former commander of Independent Co 2, commanded all British forces at Posthus.15

The exhausted Scots Guards withdrew through the positions of the Irish Guards at midnight on May 24. Fitzgerald notes that the two units passed each other in silence, without the customary jeering and exchange of good-humored insults. The bridge across Saltelva was blown behind them, leaving Co 1 of the Irish Guards rather isolated on the east side of the river except for a long detour over Vatselva into the village and across another bridge further downstream. Posthus was, along with Stien, the sharpest encounter between British and Germans forces in Nordland Province. The fighting raged for the better part of two days.

The German attack began in the morning of May 25 on the east side of the river. The lead element consisted of bicycle troops. They rode directly into Norwegian machinegun fire from the west side of the river as they rounded the bend in front of Co 1 of the Guards, and suffered a number of casualties. The attack followed the now familiar and effective pattern of probing and the build-up of pressure along the front to fix the defenders while other units fanned out to search for openings or weak spots in the flanks. In the meantime, supporting mountain howitzers, mortars, and machineguns