Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

went into positions to support the attack. The German forces involved in the fighting on the first day consisted of Lieutenant Colonel Sorko’s reinforced 2/137th Bn, well supported by the Luftwaffe.

There was a lull of several hours while the German infantry deployed after the bicycle troops were ambushed. The initial phase of the German attack drove back the British outposts but was halted by heavy fire from British artillery and Norwegian mortars. An attempt to storm the positions of Co 1 of the Irish Guards around 1400 hours on the heels of a strafing attack by five German aircraft against the mortars and artillery failed, but the company soon found its left flank enveloped. The lull that followed the German attack gave Co 1 a chance to disengage before its line of retreat was cut. The company commander, Captain Eugster, sent two platoons off the ridgeline with orders to cross Vatselva via the suspension bridge. He remained with one platoon to cover their withdrawal for half an hour. When the time came for the last platoon to withdraw, it found that the bridge had been destroyed prematurely. The river was too swift and deep to ford and, with the Germans hot on their heels, the troops linked rifle straps and sent a good swimmer across to fasten one end to the opposite shore. The platoon was able to cross with only minutes to spare before the Germans reached the riverbank. The company moved north along the east side of Saltelva and crossed to the west side via the suspension bridge located a short distance north of the British second line of defense.

German air attacks had forced the battalion commander to relocate his CP. Because of the movement of the CP, the battalion commander did not learn about the withdrawal of Co 1 until about 1800 hours. He sent Co 2 and Independent Co 3 to the east side of the river to shore up that flank by occupying the dominant high ground between the two rivers. These units were in position on the high ground between the two rivers by 0430 hours on May 26.

The Germans, however, did not press the attack on the east side of Saltelva. During the night, while the British commander moved almost half of his combat power to the east side of Saltelva, German combat engineers constructed a pontoon bridge about a kilometer south of the main bridge at Posthus. Sorko’s command, now reinforced by units from Schratz’ group, crossed the pontoon bridge in a steady stream. By early morning, the Germans had successfully switched their main attack to the west side of the river at the same time as the British had moved half of their combat power to the east side of the river. They were also trying to secure the log bridge over the river at Posthus. The destruction of this bridge had been only partly successful. Company 4 and the Norwegian detachment were able to keep the Germans from crossing the remnants of the bridge and inflicted a number of casualties on the attackers.

The Germans drove back the British outposts on the west side of the river and began a flanking movement via the high ground to the southwest of Posthus Bridge. Stockwell committed his last reserve, part of Independent Co 2, in a vain attempt to counter the envelopment. The second line of defense was now empty. As happens so often in an engagement, the initiative was with the attacker. The two companies on the east side of the river were mere onlookers to the main event on the other side of the river.

Brigadier Gubbins gave the order to retreat around 1130 hours but the order was not carried out until about 1900 hours. Independent Co 2 withdrew after its unsuccessful attempt to counter the German envelopment and took up a delaying position near the suspension bridge in order to allow the two companies on the east side of the river to cross back to the west side and the road leading to Rognan. Independent Co 3 received the order to cross the river but could not reach the bridge before it was destroyed. Company 2 of the Guards did not receive the order to withdraw until a Norwegian liaison officer arrived and told them. This happened after the bridge had been destroyed. The two companies were left to make their retreat on the roadless east side of the river.

The disengagement of Cos 3 and 4 was helped by the unexpected appearance of a lone British aircraft that strafed the German troops. Three aircraft had flown from Bardufoss and landed at Bodø Airfield to refuel. They took off again as the Germans were bombing the airfield. One crashed, one returned, and the third is the one that made its appearance above the withdrawing Irish Guards. In the history of the Irish Guards, it is claimed that this lone aircraft shot down three Heinkels. Derry and Ash claim that the two Gladiators that remained after the third crashed shot down two German aircraft and damaged two more. German sources do not mention the loss of any fighters or bombers but they do record the loss in this area of two transports on their way to Narvik.

The Norwegian volunteers under Captain Ellinger occupied two delay positions along the route of withdrawal, one at Sundby and one at Meby. These delays provided the Irish Guards with the time they needed to embark on ferries and fishing boats that brought them across the fjord to Langset, from where the road continued to Finneid and Fauske. The German pursuit was slowed because at that time there was no road between Rognan and Langset. Later that year, in London, Colonel Stockwell introduced Captain Ellinger at the Irish Guards Officer Mess as the man who saved their lives in Norway.

Of the two British companies that made their withdrawal on the east side of the river, Independent Co 3 managed to re-cross the river and board the last