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Group XXI reported that there were no signs of enemy activities in the Skjomen area. Dietl was not completely convinced and he ordered a ski patrol to make a 50-kilometer deep reconnaissance to the south and southwest. Its report confirmed that there were no enemy forces in this area.

Reports from Major Haussels flowing into the headquarters of the 3rd Division towards the end of May pointed to an imminent attack directly against Narvik. These reports were based primarily on prisoner interrogations.

German Relief and Supply Operations

The situation for the German troops in Narvik was growing daily more desperate in late May. While some reinforcements were flown into the pocket and others arrived through Sweden disguised as Red Cross personnel and “specialists,” they were not sufficient to replace the losses or counter the increased Norwegian and Allied buildup. Supplies were also arriving by air but most came by train from Sweden, classified as “humanitarian assistance.” In the early part of the campaign, the supplies arriving through Sweden were mostly limited to rations, coal, and medical equipment. Later, they included clothing and ski equipment. The Swedes would not allow the transport of ammunition, which had to be brought in entirely by air.

With Group Windisch near collapse, Dietl needed fresh troops to shore up the front and give some of his mountain troops a chance to rest. General von Falkenhorst had only a few paratroopers at his disposal, who were sent to Narvik between May 14 and 16 On May 15, von Falkenhorst asked OKW for one parachute battalion. He argued persuasively that the valiant efforts by the troops in General Feurstein’s 2nd Mountain Division would have been in vain if Narvik could not be held until they arrived. He mentioned the importance of tying down Allied forces as long as possible. His reference to the importance of holding Narvik for political and prestige reasons was no doubt intended more for Hitler than for the officers at OKW.

Falkenhorst’s arguments produced results. Hitler ordered 1st Bn, 1st Para Regt made available to reinforce Narvik, the same battalion that had landed at Fornebu near Oslo on April 9 and that subsequently participated in the operations in Holland on May 10. It was anticipated that this unit should start arriving in Narvik within a week or ten days.

In the meantime, Group XXI carried out expedited and abbreviated parachute training for some of the mountain troops. The first group, consisting of 65 men from Co 2, 137th, parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area on May 23. The Germans expected ten percent casualties in the operation, but only two soldiers sustained minor injuries. Another parachute drop was made the following day, this time involving 55 troops from Co 1, 137th. On the same day, 14 troops from Co 6, 138th arrived by seaplane. Another 54 troops from Co 1, 137th arrived by parachute on May 25, as did 44 troops from Co 2, 138th. Forty mortar and machinegun personnel arrived via Sweden on May 25.

The airborne troops began arriving on May 26 when 81 men parachuted safely into the Bjørnefjell area. Inclement weather delayed the next lift until May 28 when 46 paratroopers were dropped and one mountain howitzer with a crew of five landed by seaplane. One hundred thirty four paratroopers arrived on May 29 with the remaining 46 arriving on June 2. A further 80 “specialists” arrived from Sweden on May 31.9 While 599 troops arrived in the Narvik area between May 23 and June 2, Dietl concluded that he needed another 1,500 to 2,000 men in order to hold out.

The resupply of weapons and ammunition was not without mishap. Seaplanes successfully flew in five antitank guns and two captured Norwegian mountain howitzers. The airdrop of 15 captured Polish antitank guns was unsuccessful. All weapons became unserviceable. About 30% of the infantry weapons (mortars, machineguns, and sub-machineguns) airdropped were damaged and unserviceable. About 20-25% of the ammunition parachuted into the Narvik pocket was damaged to the point where it was useless.

Bringing rations and ammunition to the forward troops was a major task for the Germans as it was for the Norwegians, French, and Poles. The Germans started out using two officers and 60 men for this task but this was soon increased to six officers and 460 men, including Norwegian prisoners. About 8,000 lbs of rations and 4-6,000 lbs of ammunition had to be brought forward on a daily basis.10 Some supplies were moved by sleds but most were carried by men, at least part of the way.

The use of Norwegian prisoners in the supply effort was a serious breach of the conventions regulating the treatment of prisoners. On May 10, Hitler directed that all non-career Norwegian prisoners of war be released and allowed to proceed to their homes. This was an atypical document by the German dictator and since it is so uncharacteristic, it is worthwhile to quote its operative parts:

… In the course of the campaign in the east German soldiers who had the misfortune to fall injured or uninjured into Polish hands were usually brutally ill-treated or massacred. By way of contrast, it must be said of the Norwegian army that not one single such incident of the debasement of warfare has occurred.11

The Norwegian soldier spurned all the cowardly and deceitful methods common to the Poles. He fought with open visor and honorably, and he tended our prisoners and injured properly and to the best of his ability. The civilian population acted similarly. Nowhere did they join in the fighting, and they did all they could for the welfare of our casualties.

I have therefore decided in appreciation for this to authorize the liberation of the Norwegian soldiers we took prisoner. Only the professional soldiers will have to remain in captivity until such time as the former Norwegian government withdraws its call to arms against Germany, or individual officers and men give their formal word not to take part under any circumstances in further hostilities against Germany.

This proclamation was a political gesture designed to

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