Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 by Henrik Lunde (popular e readers .TXT) 📗

attitude of deep distrust and arrogance towards their new allies from the very beginning, often based on fallacious information. Intelligence Summary No 227 in mid-April, for example, reports that Norwegian inactivity was due to low morale, mass desertions, a country riddled with Nazi agents, and an army of disloyal elements. Reports by Auchinleck to Dill in May demonstrate disrespect for Norwegians in general and especially for their military. Reflecting on British/Norwegian relations in 1946, Ruge wrote:

To start with, the British did not have a high opinion of Norwegian defense forces. Our apparent collapse on April 9 did not exactly improve the respect for us by a people who had not yet felt what it meant to confront the German war machine and be placed in a hopeless position by German air power. Excessive talk here at home in the days after April 9 about treason and Quisling and his followers created the impression in London that Norway was full of traitors …17

It is understandable that the Norwegians were bitter towards the Allies. Norwegian operational recommendations, based on their intimate knowledge of local conditions and better intelligence on German forces, were brushed aside, often with tragic consequences. Agreed on cooperation with Allied land forces were altered without timely notification. Moulton observes that the Allies felt that the Norwegian Government and its military were unwarlike, negligent in their security, and that there was a large number of Norwegians who sympathized with the Germans.

The behavior of ill-disciplined British and French troops added to the bad atmosphere. Colonel Tue, commanding the 4th Regiment in Romsdal, reported, “Very young lads who appeared to come from the slums of London. They had taken a very close interest in the women of Romsdal, and engaged in wholesale looting of stores and houses.”18 Kersuady also attests to such behavior:

It was hard to deny the evidence, as the Foreign Office grudgingly acknowledged shortly thereafter: ‘Drunk’ British troops had on one occasion quarreled and eventually fired upon some Norwegian fishermen. Again, some of the British Army officers had behaved ‘with the arrogance of Prussians’ and the Naval Officers were in general so cautious and suspicious that they treated every Norwegian as a Fifth Columnist and refused to believe vital information when given them.19

Chamberlain’s speech to a very unfriendly parliamentary session on May 7 did not improve things. In trying to play down the extent of the defeat in South and Central Norway, he stated, “the German strike was made easy by treachery from inside Norway.” The Norwegians felt betrayed and such statements only served to increase their bitterness.

Derry notes that the shortcomings of the Norwegian forces and their lack of morale were not helped by a lack of sympathy and continual mistrust by the British. General Moulton notes that there was enough blame to go around for both sides but claims that neither side behaved badly in southern and central Norway.

Moulton underestimates the ill feeling among Norwegians in the Narvik area. They remembered the unannounced Allied withdrawals from the southern and central parts of the country where they were kept in the dark until the last moments, resulting in large segments of their troops being placed in untenable positions and forced to surrender. This pattern continued with the withdrawals from Mosjøen and Bodø. The plan to withdraw from Bodø was kept from General Ruge despite a solemn promise to the contrary on May 16. This action, which left Roscher-Nielsen’s forces isolated in Røsvik, so infuriated the Norwegian Government that the British command suspected that it might conclude peace with the Germans.

The British had the lead in the Norwegian campaign and they went to great lengths to insure that this command authority was kept intact. Auchinleck’s instructions were that, in case he became ill or incapacitated, a junior British officer be temporarily promoted to lieutenant general and assume command. In the planned operation against Trondheim, again without consulting or informing the Norwegians, it was stipulated that all forces, including Norwegians, would come under British command. Auchinleck, after taking over from Mackesy, requested authority not only to assume command of Norwegian forces but the right to regulate the non-military sector, including mass movements of civilians.

In a letter to General Dill, Auchinleck wrote, “I shall shortly have to have a wholesale clearing out of the inhabitants from the occupied areas. The place is riddled, I am convinced, with spies.”20 There is no mention of where he intended to move the civilians in this winter wilderness or how he proposed to feed and care for them after such a move. While these proposals and suggestions were never acted on, they illustrate the extent of the mistrust that existed.

There was a complete lack of systematic coordination and cooperation between the Allied military leaders in North Norway and the Norwegian authorities. The British commanders, Cork, Mackesy, and Auchinleck, never visited Ruge or Fleischer’s headquarters. Fleischer had likewise not visited the Allied headquarters in Harstad until Ruge brought him along on May 16. This conference was General Fleischer’s first and last direct contact with the British leadership during the campaign.

Liaison officers were exchanged but they were not provided with adequate communications and were often purposely kept in the dark about planned operations. Consequently, they had little or no influence on the planning and conduct of operations at the highest echelons. The failure to include Norwegian officers on the operations and intelligence staffs at Harstad is deplorable.

News of what had transpired in southern and central Norway made Norwegians, especially Fleischer, suspicious of Allied plans and intentions. The way the evacuations were carried out was looked upon by many as treachery, particularly since the Norwegian forces were not given an opportunity to be evacuated. The broken promises caused bitterness and dejection from cabinet level to the privates who suffered at the front.

Fleischer’s suspicions were evident when Admiral Cork sent a wing commander to arrange for British use of Bardufoss Airfield for two fighter squadrons. After keeping the British waiting for twenty minutes and then listening to the