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from German observation by the Øyjord Peninsula. Plans were to move follow-up elements from the ferry landing at Øyjord and have them ashore about 45 minutes after the first echelon had landed.

The 1st Bn of Legionnaires was to make the initial landing with assault groups Gilbert and de Guittaut, each consisting of two rifle platoons with machineguns, in the first echelon. Group Gilbert’s primary mission was to secure a small bridgehead before the arrival of the second echelon. Group de Guittaut was to seize the railroad tunnel above and to the right of the landing area. Group Bouchet, consisting of four rifle platoons, machineguns, and some regimental elements, formed second echelon. After its arrival, Group de Guittaut had orders to expand the bridgehead eastward. Later, after the Norwegian battalion had landed and moved forward past its right flank, Group de Guittaut would resume its advance towards Hill 457 (Taraldsvikfjell), the dominant terrain east of Narvik. Group Bouchet was supposed to move forward between Group Guittaut and the Norwegians. This was how the French understood the plan.

The Norwegians had a different understanding. They expected to pass through the French battalion only after that unit had seized the northern slope of Hill 457. This misunderstanding was only one of the problems facing the assault forces.

The German Defenses

The German defenders in the Narvik sector numbered about 1,100 troops but only 550 of these were mountain infantry. Major Haussels, the sector commander, faced serious problems in mounting an effective defense. He had to defend the long coastline from Straumsnes in the east, around the Framnes Peninsula, and the harbor area. Three reinforced mountain infantry companies under his command were tied down on the Ankenes Peninsula, facing the Poles. The Germans did not know where the attack would take place and had to prepare for all eventualities. This made for a thinly manned strong-point defense line and very limited reserves. Major Haussels had to assume that it would be exceedingly difficult to move his reserve or shift his forces once the attack was underway because of expected heavy naval and artillery fire.

The German right flank was held by Naval Co von Freytag, which tied into Naval Regiment Berger on its right. A naval artillery unit under Lieutenant Nöller was located in the Ornes area. Co 6, 2/139th and the battalion engineer platoon were located on the Framnes Peninsula. Company 6 had earlier occupied Ankenes village but Co 8 replaced it there on May 24. Two naval infantry companies, Co Möllmann and Co von Gaartzen, were responsible for the defense of the harbor area. A railway company of about 40 men constituted the sector reserve.

Company 7 (reinforced) held the southern front on Ankenes Peninsula while Co 8 (reinforced) held the pocket around the village of Ankenes. In addition to the approximately 900 troops mentioned by most writers, Cos 1 and 2 of the 137th Mountain Regiment were moved into the Narvik sector shortly after they parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area on May 23, 24, and 25. These reinforcements increased the strength of Major Haussels command to approximately 1,100 troops.

Company 1, with a strength of 108, was placed in reserve while Co 2, with a strength of 109, was moved across the Narvik harbor to reinforce Co 8. Haussels had ordered this move despite the reluctance expressed by General Dietl at a meeting between the two on May 27. The 3rd Division journal notes on May 28 that the movement of that company to Ankenes did not have the desired results and it could have been used to better effect as a reserve in Narvik.1

The battalion’s heavy machinegun platoon had four guns located where they could fire on the harbor area and two at the bottom of the Fagernes Mountains from where they could support the German forces in Ankenes. There were only two 75mm mountain howitzers in the Narvik sector, located about 700 meters northeast of the railroad station. The two 105mm railway guns were not very effective since their positioning was restricted by their dependence on the rail network. There were seven 20mm and one 37mm antiaircraft guns that could be used against enemy attempts to land in the harbor as well as at Vassvik and Taraldsvik.

The Recapture of Narvik

The Germans expected an attack on Narvik at any time, but there was not much they could do about it while they did not know the exact landing sites. A German agent in Stockholm–Marina–had overheard a conversation between the Norwegian Ambassador and the embassy. Based on this conversation, she reported that coordinated attacks against Hundal from the north and across the Rombak against the railroad should be expected within the next six days.2 This information was forwarded immediately to Major Haussels, although it turned out to be inaccurate.

The first useful information received by the Germans came around 2300 hours on May 27 when British warships entered Ofotfjord. This was the British naval fire support group consisting of the cruiser Southampton, the antiaircraft cruisers Cairo and Coventry, and five destroyers. Four destroyers entered Rombakfjord while the two antiaircraft cruisers and one destroyer remained in the eastern part of Ofotfjord. Southampton, with its 6-inch guns, remained further west in that fjord. General Béthouart was aboard Cairo and a flare from that ship at 2340 hours signaled the start of the attack.

The weather had been sunny and beautiful and the midnight sun provided excellent visibility at the time of the attack. A thunderous fire from the warships and artillery batteries now broke the stillness of the night. In order not to give away the intended landing sites, the fire from the warships was directed at a wide spread of targets along the whole coastline. Communications between the German units were lost within ten minutes of the start of the bombardment. The fire from the French and Norwegian batteries located at Øyjord, on the other hand, was concentrated on and around the landing area. Buchner describes the inferno:

Without interruption, hundreds of projectiles exploded along the railway, detonated with

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