Washington's Engineer by Norman Desmarais (best romantic novels in english TXT) 📗

is very susceptible of them, and I think if the enemy should be imprudent enough to abandon Verplank’s point to its own force, and there is no body of troops near enough to support it, we ought not to hesitate to make the attack because we risk nothing.—If the enemy arrives in time to bring them succour we get rid of the business by retiring; I think therefore we ought always to be ready for this enterprise.

Though I do not think that we ought to attack Stony point or Verplank’s point by assault or otherwise unless in some extraordinary circumstances which may present themselves, nevertheless it appears to me essential to menace them continually.—I should then have been glad if 10 or 1500 men had been left at the outlet of the mountain about Stony Point and a like corps at the Continental village. These corps will absolutely risk nothing unless they should suffer themselves to be surprised—and even this would be very difficult—they could be turned on neither side and they have always their communication secure with West Point. By showing themselves, always ready to attack the forts, they oblige the enemy to have within reach to support them, corps of at least three thousand men to have nothing to fear.—Then, which will appear singular, the possession which the enemy have of Verplank’s and Stony points will turn against them and become an advantage to us.—For here are 5000 men employed to maintain a point which is of no great consequence to us.—Let us add to these the number of men they must have at New York for the security of that place and on this side of King’s bridge to support readily the three thousand men advanced, unless they keep their men upon the water; and we shall see that the enemy by having posted themselves at King’s ferry have imposed on themselves the necessity of establishing a chain of posts from King’s ferry to New York, which will prevent them from having so many for different operations; and thus we shall perhaps save the country from pillage.14

MEMORIALS

Duportail’s memorial and those of the other officers must have completely answered Washington’s questions because there was no further mention of an attack. The British abandoned both posts on October 21, justifying Duportail’s judgment.

Major General Alexander McDougall was ordered on August 14, “with generals Knox and Du Portail [to] make a visit to all the works on both sides of the River, and ascertain the number of cannon and the sizes which will be necessary for their defence.” They were “to distinguish between a full complement of cannon, which it would be expedient to have and the number which is absolutely necessary.”15 General Washington received the report on August 20 and decided that the forts receive a “speedy and ample supply of powder” because the scarcity of it prevented them from undertaking any offensive or defensive operations.16

Duportail sent his review of British options at West Point on the same day:

To bar the river from the North in a suitable location is one thing the extreme importance of which everyone is presently aware. It is known that the depth of this river is considerable enough so that warships or frigates at least can go up it almost to Albany and that the breadth or the nature of its banks is such that enemy ships would find innumerable spots where in no manner would it be possible to damage them from the river bank. The enemy, by constant sailing of its frigates or small armed boats would prevent communication from the North to the south below Albany. Since the country above is still quite new sparsely populated and since there are few roads and besides the enemy, most of the river up to Albany, has the greatest facilities to reinforce and maintain the army of English, Tories and savages that he has within reach in these cantons, it follows that the passages above Albany would soon be in their possession, consequently, all communication between the lands situated on one side of the river and those of the other would be completely broken; which would have very fatal consequences: the main ones are that all parts of the United States thus separated would be left to their own forces, without being able to call on any aid one from the other, which would weaken them considerably, against an enemy Which can maneuver anywhere he desires. . . . When one reflects on that, one is surprised that the English have not turned their sights to that point, that they have not undertaken an operation so easy for a long time and so decisive. They could have done it up to the time of last May, for at that moment the works at West Point, even though I prepared them, and until then, there had never been enough troops to make up for the insufficiency of the works. Thus were we in a constant dilemma in regard to this valuable post. Happily, the time for fear is passed, and now far from being apprehensive about seeing the enemy march on this place, we infinitely desire it, assured that he would find there his ruin and his dishonor, and we an opportunity to weaken him so as to be unable to maintain himself any longer in New York, without receiving considerable reinforcements; this is what we are going to try to show by the following study:

In order to judge correctly the effect of the fortifications built at West Point, . . . it is appropriate to examine the different undertakings that the enemy can plan against this post; the different means by which he can proceed in his operations, as much by the land as by water, and what we can contrast with if from our side, we supposing West Point left to its own forces, that is defending itself with its garrison. [Here Duportail considered four alternatives open to the British and reached