Washington's Engineer by Norman Desmarais (best romantic novels in english TXT) 📗

there with an extraordinary, laborious and long toil, by the eastern slope; if he captures only Redoubt S he must bring his cannon along the Furnace [?] road, which can be regarded as almost impracticable, because it cannot be supposed in advance that he will bring his cannon through the valley under fire from Redoubts T and S and of their batteries. As to the difficulty itself of capturing the works, one can only set up batteries against them on the slope of the mountain opposite at more than 500 Toises, too great a distance to destroy them with cannon. There will be, moreover, in each of these redoubts an underground bomb-proof shelter to protect the garrison. The enemy must then always come to an attack in force and they are in such condition that the undertaking would certainly be very dangerous.

It seems to me that we have assured the defense of this mountain, as much as it is necessary to do it, in view of the number of troops the enemy can sacrifice to the attack of West Point. . . .

Munitions. We have supposed up to the present the post of West Point left to its own forces, that is, defended by its own fortifications with their garrisons. We will say a word on how to use the additional troops that should be on hand when the enemy appears or who should come in the course of the attack. First, as we have said, the first posts to be occupied are the points of debarkation. Since we think that the enemy cannot come from King’s Ferry by land, one might question that we do not advise stringing out troops in quantity on the roads and paths which lead from this area to West Point. Patrols only are necessary to warn that the fort at Montgomery not be surprised from the rear.

After that, the mountains opposite the redoubts R, S, T, being the first posts where the enemy must establish himself in order to push his operations against West Point, it is thus also one of the first that we must garrison. Some hundred men on these mountains making the approaches difficult by abatis will stop the enemy for a long time. We must reconnoiter, look for ways to attack them, to dislodge them. In areas of difficult access, covered with woods and rocks, this is quite long.

I will note here in passing that in a mountainous country if troops are placed on a mountain which has another one on its flank, . . . it is appropriate to put some men (as small a number as it might be) on this other mountain. This would prevent the enemy, who does not know their strength, from descending in the valley in order to turn the troops on the first mountain for fear of finding himself between two, or cut. There is place to apply this principle in the locations of which I am speaking here.

After occupying the mountains of which it was just a question, the location of the troops which we have more of as well as the natural retreat of those forward, if they were dislodged and on the mountain M, O, then they would place themselves in the rear of the abatis constructed between the redoubts S. T. and along the eastern and western slopes within range of defending these redoubts and to oppose themselves everywhere to the passage of the enemy. These troops, depending on their number, would construct in their rear, fortifications in the most favorable locations, leading to the type of works they can execute; in a word, they must use everything to defend this mountain for as long a time as possible for on it depends principally the defense of West Point, it cannot be repeated too much.17

Plans for the defense of West Point were complete by fall 1779 and only required improvements and maintenance. The complex now consisted of a mutually supporting system of forts, redoubts, and batteries designed to close the Hudson to enemy vessels.

The French military engineer Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban stressed the use of single massive fortresses, so Duportail viewed West Point’s scattered defenses with misgivings. However, Vauban noted that defenses ought to utilize and augment the surrounding natural terrain.

The Crown forces did not attack West Point that fall. Duportail proposed to reconnoiter Verplanck Point on the morning of September 30. A covering party of three hundred men alarmed the British, who opened fire on them with their artillery and sent a reinforcement from Stony Point to Verplanck Point.18 After the British abandoned Stony and Verplanck Points, Gouvion led a large detachment of soldiers to level the enemy works at Verplanck Point.

WINTER QUARTERS

Washington wrote General Duportail on September 22, 1779, about making preparation for winter quarters. He decided on the Highlands, and it became necessary to increase the accommodations at the different forts:

Head Quarters, West Point, Sept. 22nd 1779

Sir,

I am to request you will give instruction to your attendants attached to the different works—to turn their attention to the different barracks necessary at each to cover the men required to be constantly stationed for the immediate security of the respective posts—and the places at which it will be most proper to erect them—Were it not for the difficulty of transporting material to those high mountains to build barracks at each sufficient to cover the whole number of men required for its complete defence, I should give a preference to this; but the difficulty of transportation inclines me to desire only strong guards during the winter at each post, to put them out of the reach of a surprise and coup de main by a small detachment and consequently barracks proportioned to these.—I leave it to your judgment, what guards will be sufficient to answer this purpose and to regulate the arrangements for barracks accordingly—and I shall be obliged to you to make a report as speedily as possible.

I have the honor to be etc.

P.S.