Friends in High Places: The Bechtel Story : The Most Secret Corporation and How It Engineered the Wo by Laton Mccartney (readict .txt) 📗

Eventually, Borman came to the conclusion that Suleiman not only was profligate and a cheat and an alcoholic to boot-the last apparent from the nips of gin he kept taking during meetings-but, given the punishments he meted out to those who defied his word, also was losing his grip. 12

Suleiman, however, was cagier than the Americans imagined. Not only did he have a hold on ibn Saud-who tolerated his minister’s 89

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excesses even as he indulged in grander ones himself-but Suleiman had also set out to undermine Bechtel’s position by entering into discussions with several British firms about taking on some of Bechtel’s work. The British were eager for a piece of the Saudi action, and by pay ing their largely Irish work force a third of what Bechtel’s American engineers were making, could underbid to get it.

To complicate matters further, Borman was facing a rival in his own ranks. John Rogers, a Berkeley-educated Bechtel veteran who had accompanied Steve Bechtel on his latest visit, was taking an increasingly active interest in IBI’s Saudi Arabian operations, and an increasingly jaundiced view of Borman’s performance. Borman had better take care, his friends warned him: Rogers was after his scalp.

Borman managed to get Bechtel’s contract renewed for 1949; but the situation in Saudi Arabia, his own and IBI’s, was deteriorating rapidly.

Suleiman still owed Bechtel hundreds of thousands, and rather than bringing him to heel, ibn Saud had begun complaining about IBI’s delay s and high costs. Growing more worried, Borman sought the counsel of J. Rives Childs, the American minister and a good friend.

Childs was sy mpathetic. He admired Borman and valued his straightforward honesty, a quality rare in Saudi Arabia not only among the Saudis, but among a number of Aramco executives as well. In their dealings with the Arabs and the American government alike, the Aramco chiefs were haughty and imperious and routinely disregarded Childs’s advice. By contrast, Borman was low-key, deferential and on a number of occasions, greatly helpful to U.S. interests. Still, Childs knew his friend was in trouble, and when Steve Bechtel reappeared in Saudi Arabia in early March, he invited him to the Mission residence to talk out the problem. After several brandies, Steve hit on a possible solution. Why not beat Suleiman at his own game, he suggested, and invite in George Wimpey & Company, Ltd., one British firm with which Bechtel had established a good working relationship, to handle the housekeeping that was consuming so much of IBI’s time? That way, he went on, IBI could give its undivided attention to projects of prime importance. 13

There was merit in Bechtel’s suggestion. Childs agreed-but before calling in Wimpey, perhaps IBI should set up a program to train Arab workers to perform less technically demanding chores, like plumbing, or radio and appliance repair. It would free up IBI’s resources, undercut Suleiman and best of all, provide a vivid demonstration of how “a great American company” was working to help-underdeveloped countries, rather than merely profiting by them.

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Bechtel leaped at the suggestion and soon reported back to Childs that the king, Suleiman and the rest of the Saudi government were enthusiastic as well. Moreover, Steve had been assured that the government was “fully satisfied” with IBI’s work. As for the outside